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This article provides a primer on forensic voice comparison (aka 
forensic speaker recognition), a branch of forensic science in which the forensic 
practitioner analyzes a voice recording in order to provide an expert opinion that 
will help the trier-of-fact determine the identity of the speaker. The article begins 
with an explanation of ways in which human speech varies within and between 
speakers. It then discusses different technical approaches that forensic 
practitioners have used to compare voice recordings, and frameworks of reasoning 
that practitioners have used for evaluating the evidence and reporting its strength. 
It then discusses procedures for empirical validation of the performance of 
forensic voice comparison systems. It also discusses the potential influence of 
contextual bias and ways to reduce this. Building on this scientific foundation, 
the article then offers analysis, commentary, and recommendations on how courts 
evaluate the admissibility of forensic voice comparison testimony under the 
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Daubert and Frye standards. It reviews past rulings such as U.S. v. Angleton, 
269 F. Supp. 2d 892 (S.D. Tex. 2003) that found expert testimony based on 
the spectrographic approach inadmissible under Daubert. The article also offers 
a detailed analysis of the evidence presented in the recent Daubert hearing in 
U.S. v. Ahmed, 94 F. Supp. 3d 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), which included 
testimony based on the newer automatic approach. The scientific testimony 
proffered in Ahmed is used to illustrate the issues courts are likely to face when 
considering the admissibility of forensic voice comparison testimony in the future. 
The article concludes with a discussion of how proponents of forensic voice 
comparison testimony might meet a reasonably rigorous application of the 
Daubert standard and thereby ensure that such testimony is sufficiently 
trustworthy to be used in court. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. General Introduction 
In criminal and civil cases, disputes sometimes arise about the 
identity of a speaker on an audio recording. In such cases a 
forensic practitioner may be asked to perform a forensic voice 
comparison.1 This involves comparing recordings of one or more 
known speakers with a recording of a speaker of questioned 
identity. The goal is to provide an expert opinion that will help the 
trier-of-fact determine the identity of that speaker. 
Forensic voice comparison testimony has a long and troubled 
history in the United States. In the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, courts 
frequently admitted forensic voice comparison testimony.2 The 
                                            
1.  Forensic voice comparison is our preferred term; See Geoffrey Stewart 
Morrison, Forensic Voice Comparison, Expert Evidence (Thomson Reuters) ch. 
99, at §99.170 (Ian Freckelton & Hugh Selby eds., 2010) [hereinafter Morrison 
2010]. Other terms which have been used include: forensic speaker comparison, 
forensic speaker recognition, forensic speaker identification, forensic voice 
identification, forensic talker identification, voiceprint identification, and 
voicegram identification. The differences between the terms may reflect subtle 
philosophical differences, but in general the courts can simply interpret all these 
terms as equivalent (but see infra note 30 (with respect to the term 
voiceprinting)). 
2.  Based on published rulings, the rate of admission appears to have 
been somewhat greater than the rate of exclusion.  David L. Faigman et al., 
Talker Identification: I. Legal Issues, Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and 
Science of Expert Testimony (Thomson Reuters) vol. 5, §36.1–36.3 (David L. 
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testimony of that era was typically based on the spectrographic 
approach or auditory-spectrographic approach.3,4 Almost from its 
                                            
Faigman, Michael J. Saks, Joseph Sanders & Edward K. Cheng eds., 2015) 
[hereinafter Faigman et al. 2015] (indicating in the rulings listed in Table 1 that 
between 1967 and 1999 the counts were 22 versus 15 for admission versus 
exclusion). 
3.  When we use the term approach in the singular with the definite 
article, for example, the acoustic-phonetic approach, this is a cover term for all 
methods which could be classed as acoustic-phonetic. For example, one method 
could be based on format measurements and another method could be based 
on fundamental frequency measurements, but they would both be classed as 
acoustic-phonetic approaches (see infra Section II.C). When we use the term 
approach in the plural or in the singular without the definite article, e.g., 
acoustic-phonetic approaches or an acoustic-phonetic approach, its meaning is 
interchangeable with method. Different approaches to forensic voice comparison 
can be conceptualized as broadly different ways of extracting information from 
speech recordings. 
We use the term system to mean a concrete implementation of a method. A 
system constitutes the whole of the data and the processes used to evaluate the 
strength of evidence after the forensic scientist has stated what competing 
hypotheses they intend to evaluate. 
We use the term framework to refer to different ways of making use of 
information in order to derive a strength of evidence statement, i.e., the 
reasoning process by which a practitioner goes from observations about the 
properties of the recorded speech to the conclusions that they state in written 
reports and oral testimony (see infra Section III). Although in practice there may 
be correlation between the use of particular approaches and particular 
frameworks, approaches and frameworks are in principle orthogonal to one 
another.  
We use the term paradigm to subsume a particular combination of 
approach and framework, and “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community”, THOMAS 
S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 175 (2d ed. 1970) 
[hereinafter KUHN 1970]. 
4.  See descriptions of auditory and spectrographic approaches in Sections 
1 and 2. Spectrograms are graphical representations of the acoustic properties of 
short sections of recordings of speech. The auditory-spectrographic approach 
(also called the aural-spectrographic approach) involves both listening to the 
audio recordings and looking at spectrograms. In the early 1970s, there was 
debate about whether it was better to use a visual only or a visual plus auditory 
approach. The latter won out. We are not concerned with this debate in the 
present paper, and since it is not always clear from published rulings which of 
the two was actually used, we will often use either spectrographic or auditory-
spectrographic as a cover for both approaches. Based on published rulings, 
auditory-only approaches appear to have seldom been presented to U.S. courts, 
and they do not appear to have ever been admitted under the standards set 
forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Auditory-
only approaches were proffered but excluded. United States v. Salimonu, 182 
F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Jones, 24 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 1994). 
Harry Hollien writes in An Approach to Speaker Identification, that auditory 
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inception, however, this testimony was soundly criticized by 
members of the scientific community.5 Following a 1979 National 
Research Council (hereinafter NRC) report,6 the FBI stopped using 
the spectrographic approach in court,7 and the number of reported 
cases in which it was used by others gradually declined.8 
After an extensive Daubert hearing9 in U.S. v. Angleton 
(2003),10 where the defense attempted to introduce conclusions 
reached using the auditory-spectrographic approach, a federal 
judge ruled the testimony inadmissible, finding specifically that: 
The testimony and evidence show that voice identification 
techniques using the aural spectrographic method are not 
widely accepted by the scientific community. . . . [T]here is 
great dispute among researchers and the few practitioners 
in the field over the accuracy and reliability of voice 
spectrographic analysis . . . The evidence also shows that 
                                            
approaches “have satisfied Daubert . . . in well over 150 cases and 40 trials,” but 
provides no references to substantiate this claim. Harry Hollien, An Approach to 
Speaker Identification, 61 J. FORENSIC SCI. 334, 339 (2016). We requested 
references from the author, but they were not provided. 
5.  Richard A. Bolt et al., Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms: 
A Scientists’ View of its Reliability for Legal Purposes, 47 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC’Y 
AM. 597 (1970); Richard A. Bolt, Franklin S. Cooper, Edward E. David Jr., Peter 
B. Denes, James M. Pickett & Kenneth N. Stevens, Speaker Identification by 
Speech Spectrograms: Some Further Observations, 54 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC’Y 
AM. 531 (1973). 
6.  COMM. ON EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTROGRAMS, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE 
IDENTIFICATION (1979) [hereinafter NRC 1979]. 
7.  According to Dr. Hirotaka Nakasone, the FBI continued using the 
spectrographic approach for investigative purposes until 2011. The laboratory 
then abandoned this approach in favor automatic approaches, but still only for 
investigative purposes. Interview with Dr. Hirotaka Nakasone, Senior Scientist, 
Digital Evidence Section, FBI laboratory (Nov. 30, 2011). 
8.  See Jordan S. Gruber & Fausto T. Poza, Voicegram Identification 
Evidence, 54 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 (1995) [hereinafter Gruber & Poza 1995]; 
Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, Distinguishing Between Forensic Science and 
Forensic Pseudoscience: Testing of Validity and Reliability, and Approaches to 
Forensic Voice Comparison, 54 SCI. & JUST. 245 (2014) (references cited within 
explain the history of the scientific debate) [hereinafter Morrison 2014]. Gruber 
& Poza, supra, is the most comprehensive published review of the controversy 
over the use of the spectrographic approach. 
9.  When a litigant challenges the admissibility of expert evidence under 
the Daubert standard, the judge may hold a hearing (called a Daubert hearing) 
at which the parties may present evidence and argument, outside the presence 
of the jury, regarding whether the expert’s reasoning and methodology are 
sufficiently valid to meet the Daubert standard. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–95. 
10.  United States v. Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 2d 878, 892 (S.D. Tex. 2003). 
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error rates for voice spectrographic techniques are 
unknown and vary widely depending on the conditions 
under which the analysis is made.11 
Since Angleton, there are no reported cases in which testimony 
based on the spectrographic approach has overcome a Daubert 
challenge.12  
                                            
11.  Id. at 905. 
12.  Prior to Angleton, there were at least three published rulings on the 
admissibility of the spectrographic approach under Daubert. The spectrographic 
approach was ruled admissible in United States v. Salimonu, 182 F.3d 63 (1st 
Cir. 1999), and in State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999), and inadmissible in 
United States v. Bahena, 223 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2000), but the latter two rulings 
explicitly stated that they were specific to those particular cases and not 
generalizable to other cases in which the circumstances could be different. 
The court in United States v. Drones denied a petition for federal habeas 
corpus relief for ineffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel had 
failed to call a voice comparison expert; the court concluded that failure to call 
such an expert was not unreasonable “given the uncertainty of the current state 
of the law regarding the reliability and admissibility of expert voice identification 
evidence, and the vulnerability of such expert testimony at trial.” United States 
v. Drones, 218 F.3d 496, 504 (5th Cir. 2000). 
Post Angleton, use of the spectrographic approach was ruled inadmissible 
in: State v. Morrison, 867 So. 2d 740, (La. Ct. App. 2003); People v. Hubbard, 
738 N.W.2d 769 (Mich. 2007); and State v. Forty, 989 A.2d 509 (Vt. 2009). 
Forensic voice comparison testimony was also ruled inadmissible in United 
States v. Ramos, 71 F. App’x. 334 (5th Cir. 2003) and in United States. v. Arce-
Lopez, 979 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D. P.R., 2013), although neither appellate ruling 
stated what approach to voice comparison the practitioner had used. In Arce-
Lopez, the court found that “the jury is ‘perfectly well-equipped’ to listen to the 
witnesses testify in court, compare their voices to the voice in the audio 
recordings, and draw conclusions about whose voice is in the audio recordings. . 
. . Accordingly, this is ‘not an area in which expert testimony would be helpful 
to the jury.’” Id. at 230 (citing Salimonu, 182 F.3d at 74). Since the court found 
that the expert testimony would not be of assistance to the trier-of-fact, it did not 
rule on whether it satisfied the other Rule 702 criteria. We think the court’s 
confidence in the ability of jurors to draw conclusions about the identity of 
speakers from audio recordings was misplaced. Speaker identification by 
laypeople is highly problematic. It varies widely from listener to listener and 
depending on speaking, recording, and/or listening conditions. Also, people 
think that they and other listeners are better at speaker identification than they 
really are. Reviews of legal and/or research literature on this topic are presented 
in: Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M. Tiersma, Hearing Voices: Speaker 
Identification in Court, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 373 (2003); Morrison supra note 1; 
Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, Ewald Enzinger & Cuiling Zhang, Forensic Speech 
Science, Expert Evidence (Thomson Reuters) ch. 99 (Ian Freckelton & Hugh 
Selby eds., 2nd ed. 2017) [hereinafter Morrison et al. 2017]; Gary Edmond et al., 
Unsound Law: Issues with (‘Expert’) Voice Comparison Evidence, 35 
MELBOURNE L. REV. 52 (2011); Christopher Sherrin, Earwitness Evidence: The 
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Judicial rejection of the spectrographic approach does not, 
however, mean the end of forensic voice comparison testimony. 
Over the last 15 to 20 years there have been substantial advances 
in automatic speaker recognition technology and in the application 
of this technology to forensic voice comparison.13 In April 2015, in 
a terrorism prosecution in federal district court in New York the 
prosecution attempted to introduce testimony by a forensic 
practitioner who had, in part, used an approach based on 
automatic speaker recognition (he also used auditory and acoustic-
phonetic approaches).14 Because the automatic approach is 
fundamentally different from the auditory-spectrographic approach 
considered in cases like Angleton, this testimony could not be 
dismissed out of hand and required an extensive Daubert hearing. 
No ruling was issued, however, because soon after the hearing the 
case was resolved through a negotiated plea. Nevertheless, the 
evidence offered in the Daubert hearing is worth careful 
consideration because testimony based on automatic approaches 
will surely be offered in other cases in the not too distant future. 
Due to its complexity, deciding whether to admit such testimony 
and what weight it deserves will be challenging for the courts. 
The present article is designed to guide lawyers and judges in 
their evaluation of the new generation of forensic voice comparison 
testimony. We begin with a primer on forensic voice comparison. 
We describe different approaches to forensic voice comparison, 
and frameworks for reasoning in assessing the strength of forensic 
evidence. We offer guidance on how to evaluate the scientific 
validity and reliability of forensic analysis systems. We also discuss 
the dangers of contextual bias and ways of shielding forensic 
practitioners from its potential effects. We then discuss the 
admissibility of forensic voice comparison under Daubert and 
Frye.15 To provide concrete examples and argumentation 
regarding the underlying issues, we take a close look at the forensic 
voice comparison testimony from the Daubert hearing in Ahmed. 
We examine this hearing in some depth because we believe that 
the same issues will recur in future cases. Finally, we describe the 
showing that we believe proponents of voice comparison testimony 
                                            
Reliability of Voice Identifications, 11 OSGOODE LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER 
SERIES, no. 6, 2015, http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/101. 
13.  See infra Section II.C, for a description of the automatic approach. 
14.  United States v. Ahmed, 94 F. Supp. 3d 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). The first-
named author of the present paper is a forensic practitioner who advised the 
Yusuf defense. 
15.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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should be required to make in order to meet the standards for 
admissibility under Rule 70216 and Daubert. 
Earlier legal commentaries on forensic voice comparison 
evidence have focused primarily or exclusively on the auditory-
spectrographic approach.17 As far as we know, the present article is 
the first law review article to provide a detailed discussion of the 
newer automatic approach.18 
Just as we were completing the final draft of the present article, 
on September 20, 2016, The President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology (hereinafter “PCAST”) issued its report 
on Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific 
Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods.19 We believe that the 
views we express in the present article are in broad agreement with 
the thrust of the PCAST report.20 
Although the present paper focuses on the admissibility of 
forensic voice comparison testimony, we believe that many of the 
principles discussed are applicable to other branches of forensic 
science, and it would be logically consistent to apply the same 
criteria when considering the admissibility of forensic-science 
testimony in general. 
 
B. Outline of the Paper 
To understand and evaluate forensic voice comparison 
evidence it is necessary to understand a number of topics which we 
will introduce and discuss in the following sections. It is important 
to understand: 
                                            
16.  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
17.  See, e.g., Michele Meyer McCarthy, Admissibility and Weight of 
Voice Spectrographic Analysis Evidence in AMERICAN LEGAL REPORTS at 471 
(ALR, 5th Series, Vol. 95, 2002); Solan & Tiersma, supra note 12; Faigman et al., 
supra note 2. 
18.  We restrict the present paper to forensic voice comparison performed 
by experts; we do not review speaker identification by laypeople. Reviews of 
legal and/or research literature on the latter are included in: Solan & Tiersma, 
supra note 12; Morrison, supra note 1; Morrison et al. supra note 12; Edmond et 
al., supra note 12; Sherrin, supra note 12. 
19.  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-
COMPARISON METHODS (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
administration/eop/ostp/pcast/docsreports/ [hereinafter PCAST 2016]. 
20.  Although we are very supportive of the primary message of the 
PCAST report, the report does have shortcomings, and we will be critical of 
some of them. 
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Section II.A: The nature of human speech and how it may 
vary within individuals and between individuals.  
Section II.B: That additional variability between speech 
recordings may be introduced by differences in recording 
conditions.  
Section II.C: The different approaches that practitioners use 
when analyzing speech recordings. We will explain four 
major methodological approaches that voice comparison 
practitioners have used.  
Section III: The frameworks that practitioners use when 
evaluating and reporting the strength of the evidence. We 
use the term framework to refer to the reasoning process by 
which the practitioner goes from observations about the 
properties of the recorded speech to the conclusions that 
the expert states in written reports and oral testimony.  
Section IV: The importance of empirically testing the 
validity and reliability of practitioners’ analytical 
procedures, and how that is achieved.  
Section V: What contextual bias is, its potential to influence 
the conclusions reached by forensic practitioners, and how 
it can be mitigated. 
Having established this foundational knowledge, we then turn 
to: 
Section VI: A general discussion of admissibility under the 
Daubert and Frye standards. This includes references to a 
number of rulings pertinent to the admissibility of forensic 
voice comparison. 
Section VII: A contextualized discussion of the 
admissibility of forensic voice comparison under the FRE 
702 - Daubert standard. This discussion is based on the 
concrete example of the Ahmed case. 
Section VIII: A description of what we believe would be 
necessary for forensic voice comparison testimony to satisfy 
a rigorous application of the FRE 702 - Daubert standard.  
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A conclusion is provided in Section IX, and several appendices 
provide additional details related to topics raised in the text. 
 
II. PRIMER ON FORENSIC VOICE COMPARISON21 
In a forensic voice comparison case there are at least two voice 
recordings, one is a recording of a speaker of known identity, and 
the other is a recording of a speaker of questioned identity (there 
could be multiple known-speaker and multiple questioned-speaker 
recordings, but for simplicity the following description assumes one 
of each). One party in the trial contends that the speaker of 
questioned identity is the same as the speaker of known identity, 
and the other party contends that it is not the same speaker. The 
task of the forensic scientist is to analyze the two voice recordings 
and to report a conclusion that will aid the trier-of-fact in deciding 
whether the recorded voices are those of the same speaker or of 
different speakers.  
Often the speaker of known identity will be a suspect or 
defendant, and the speaker of questioned identity will be an 
offender. The recording of the speaker of known identity could be 
a recording of an interview at a police station, and the recording of 
the speaker of questioned identity could be a recording of an 
intercepted telephone call during which incriminating statements 
are made or during which the crime is actually committed (e.g., a 
fraud is perpetrated). In such cases the prosecution will contend 
that the two recordings are of the same speaker and the defense 
will contend that they are of different speakers. There are other 
possible scenarios, for example, the speaker of questioned identity 
could be hypothesized to be a kidnap victim. 
 
A. The Nature of Speech 
The nature of speech is quite different from that of DNA and 
from that of fingerprints. With some minor exceptions a person’s 
DNA and the pattern of friction ridges on a person’s finger pads 
do not change over time. In contrast, even if a speaker attempts to 
say the same thing exactly the same way twice, there will almost 
inevitably be measurable differences in the acoustic properties of 
                                            
21.  A more detailed introduction to the technical aspects of forensic voice 
comparison, still intended to be accessible to a legal audience, appears in 
Morrison, supra note 1; Morrison et al. 2017, supra note 12. 
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the speech they produce. These are intrinsic differences in the 
speech produced, not just differences due to measurement error.  
There are physical differences between speakers which cause 
differences in the properties of their speech. Men generally have 
more massive vocal folds and longer vocal tracts than women, so 
men generally have deeper voices and lower resonance 
frequencies than women do. Ceteris paribus, physical differences 
between different men or between different women will also result 
in differences in the properties of their speech.  
An audio recording of a person speaking is, however, not just a 
representation of physical attributes in the same way as a DNA 
profile or a fingerprint would be. The properties of speech are also 
influenced by the speaker’s behavior: factors such as the language 
spoken, the accent or dialect spoken,22 speaking style,23 and the 
speaker’s emotional24 and physical condition25 all affect the 
properties of recorded speech. Also, the words a speaker says on 
one occasion are unlikely to be exactly the same as the words they 
say on another occasion.   
Hence, although in general there are differences between 
different speakers (between-speaker variability), there are also 
differences in the properties of a person’s speech from occasion to 
occasion (within-speaker variability). Just looking at how similar or 
different two voice recordings are is therefore not sufficient to be 
able to tell whether they were produced by the same speaker or 
not. One has to ask whether the properties of the speech in the 
                                            
22.  A person who is bilingual can speak one language on one occasion 
and another language on another occasion; they have not changed the anatomy 
of their vocal tracts, they have changed their behavior. Along the same lines, 
different people speaking the same language may speak with different regional 
or social accents and dialects, and smaller groups of people such as family or 
friendship groups may share behavioral speech patterns which differ from those 
of other groups. An individual may even have some behavioral speech patterns 
which are peculiar to them. 
23.  For example, the way a person speaks when giving a formal 
presentation will probably differ from the way they speak when socializing with 
friends. A speaker may whisper on one occasion and shout on another. When 
there is a lot of background noise, speakers speak not only louder but more 
clearly (this is called the Lombard effect). 
24.  When a speaker is calm they will speak differently from when they are 
excited. People sound different when they are happy compared to when they 
are sad, etc. 
25.  For example, a person’s voice may be creaky when they have not 
spoken for a long time or harsh if they have stressed their vocal folds by 
speaking loudly for a prolonged period. Medical conditions such as laryngitis or 
nasal congestion will also affect the properties of a person’s speech. 
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questioned-speaker recording are more likely to occur if they were 
produced by the known speaker (any difference being due to 
within-speaker variability) or by some other speaker from the 
relevant population26 (any similarity between the known- and 
questioned-speaker recording being due to chance). The same 
logic applies to DNA analysis, latent print analysis, and other types 
of forensic comparison, but the degree of intrinsic within-person 
variability is much larger for speech than for DNA or fingerprints. 
B. The Nature of Speech Recordings 
As well as speech being intrinsically variable, there are also 
differences between recordings of speech due to variability in the 
conditions under which the recordings are made. A common 
scenario in forensic voice comparison is that the known-speaker 
recording is a recording of a police interview and the questioned-
speaker recording is a recording of a telephone call. A speaker 
may use different speaking styles when talking on the telephone 
and when being interviewed by the police, but the acoustic 
environment and technical aspects of the recording will also differ. 
The police interview may be made in a small room with hard 
walls. Such a room would have a substantial amount of 
reverberation (echoes). The room may also have an audible 
ventilation system. The questioned-speaker recording could be 
made in the street on a mobile telephone. There could be traffic 
noise in the background. The known-speaker recording may be 
made with a relatively good microphone directly in front of the 
speaker. The questioned-speaker recording may have been 
transmitted through one or more communications systems such as 
a landline telephone system, a mobile telephone system, or using a 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) system such as Skype. Such 
communication systems distort and remove acoustic information. 
Some file formats which make file sizes smaller (e.g., MP3), also 
distort and remove acoustic information. Another potential source 
of difference between voice recordings is the distance from the 
speaker to the microphone, for example, a covert recording device 
may be far from the speaker but an interview microphone close. 
Even if the sound coming out of the speaker’s mouth were the 
same, different distances to the microphone would affect the 
acoustics of the recorded signal. Not all microphones have the 
same characteristics, and changing microphones can also affect the 
                                            
26.  The concept of relevant population will be discussed below in Section 
III. 
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properties of the recorded signal. Another factor which can affect 
the performance of forensic voice comparison analysis is the 
duration of the recordings. Performance may be very poor for 
recordings which are only a few seconds long. 
In forensic casework, there is usually a mismatch in recording 
conditions between known-speaker and questioned-speaker 
recordings. Recording-condition mismatch can make two 
recordings more different than they would otherwise be. Poor 
recording conditions can also mask intrinsic between-speaker 
differences. Genuine between-speaker differences could be absent, 
obscured, or distorted in the recorded signals. On the other hand, 
the cause of genuine between-speaker differences which persist in 
the recorded signal could be incorrectly attributed to differences 
due to recording conditions. 
All of these variables must be taken into account when 
performing a forensic comparison of known- and questioned-
speaker recordings. 
C. Approaches to Forensic Voice Comparison 
Historically, and still in current practice, there are four 
basic approaches to forensic voice comparison, which we 
denominate auditory, spectrographic, acoustic-phonetic, and 
automatic. We will further divide acoustic-phonetic into acoustic-
phonetic non-statistical and acoustic-phonetic statistical. 
Practitioners frequently use a mixture of different approaches (e.g., 
auditory-spectrographic, and auditory-acoustic-phonetic), but for 
clarity we will describe each one separately.  
In auditory, spectrographic, and acoustic-phonetic non-
statistical approaches, the conclusion as to the strength of evidence 
is based directly on the forensic practitioner’s subjective 
judgment.27 In contrast, in acoustic-phonetic statistical and 
automatic approaches, the output of the statistical model can be 
reported as the strength of evidence. All approaches have some 
degree of subjectivity. Approaches based on relevant data, 
quantitative measurements, and statistical models (acoustic-
                                            
27.  Some consider the term subjective to be pejorative. In scientific 
writing, this is generally not the case. Throughout the present paper we use the 
term subjective in accordance with the following definition from Merriam-
Webster: “3a: characteristic of or belonging to reality as perceived rather than as 
independent of mind . . . b: relating to or being experience or knowledge as 
conditioned by personal mental characteristics or states.” Subjective, Merriam-
Webster Online (last visited Mar. 26, 2017) http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/subjective. 
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phonetic statistical and automatic approaches), however, distance 
subjective elements from the final output of the system. Subjective 
elements include decisions as to what constitute relevant data for 
training and testing the system (see Sections III.A and IV). Once 
these decisions have been made (and documented so that the 
court can consider whether they were appropriate), the remaining 
procedures are objective. The increased objectivity only pertains, 
however, if the forensic practitioner directly reports the output of 
the statistical model as a quantification of the strength of evidence. 
If a forensic practitioner instead takes the output of the statistical 
model and uses it as input to a subjective judgment process, 
perhaps also considering the results of analyses based on other 
approaches, then the final conclusion as to the strength of evidence 
is again directly based on a subjective judgment.  
 
1. Auditory Approach28 
In an auditory approach (a.k.a. aural approach), the 
practitioner listens to the known-speaker and questioned-speaker 
recordings. They listen in search of similarities which they would 
expect to hear if the two recordings consisted of speech from the 
same speaker, but which they would not expect to be likely to hear 
if the recordings consisted of speech from different speakers. They 
also listen in search of differences which they would expect to hear 
if the two recordings consisted of speech from different speakers, 
but which they would not expect to be likely to hear if the 
recordings consisted of speech from the same speaker. They may 
listen to the pronunciation of particular vowel sounds or of 
particular consonant sounds, the pronunciation of particular words 
or phrases, and other more global properties such as intonation 
patterns and the auditory effects of physical properties and 
configurations of vocal folds. Practitioners will typically have 
                                            
28.  For other introductions to the auditory approach, see Francis Nolan, 
Speaker Recognition and Forensic Phonetics, in THE HANDBOOK OF PHONETIC 
SCIENCES 744–67 (William J. Hardcastle & John Laver eds. 1997); PHILIP J. 
ROSE, FORENSIC SPEAKER IDENTIFICATION (2002) [hereinafter ROSE]; Philip J. 
Rose, Technical Forensic Speaker Recognition, 20 COMPUTER SPEECH & 
LANGUAGE 159 (2006) [hereinafter Rose 2006]; Michael Jessen, Forensic 
Phonetics, 2 LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS COMPASS 671 (2008) [hereinafter Jessen]; 
Morrison, supra note 1; Morrison et al., supra note 12; Hollien, supra note 4; 
Harry Hollien, Grace Didla, James D. Harnsberger & Keith A. Hollien, The 
Case for Aural Perceptual Speaker Identification, 269 FORENSIC SCI. INT. 5 
(2016). 
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training in auditory phonetics, including training in transcribing the 
speech sounds they hear using a phonetic alphabet. Thus the 
practitioner will have a means of documenting what they hear and 
highlighting the similarities and differences that they consider to be 
pertinent. Practitioners may have tools which allow them to listen 
to short sections of speech from each recording, one immediately 
after the other. They may also listen to sections of speech from 
other speakers who act as foils, i.e., speakers who sound broadly 
similar to the questioned speaker. The practitioner may be 
presented with multiple recordings of each of a number of 
speakers, without being told which are of the known speaker, the 
questioned speaker, and the foils, and be asked to group the 
recordings by speaker. 
The conclusion emerging from an auditory approach is the 
practitioner’s subjective judgment based on listening to the speech 
recordings. 
 
2. Spectrographic Approach29 
In a spectrographic approach, the practitioner takes parts of the 
audio recordings (typically words or phrases) and converts them 
into pictures. These pictures are called spectrograms. In the 
context of forensic voice comparison, spectrograms have also been 
called voiceprints30 and voicegrams. An example of a spectrogram 
                                            
29.  For other introductions to the spectrographic approach, see Oscar 
Tosi, Voice Identification: Theory and Legal Applications (1979); NRC 1979, 
supra note 6; Gruber & Poza 1995, supra note 8; Harry Hollien, Forensic Voice 
Identification (2002) [hereinafter Hollien 2002]; Rose 2002, supra note 28; Didier 
Meuwly, Le Mythe de L’empreinte Vocale I, 56 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE 
CRIMINOLOGIE ET POLICE TECHNIQUE 219–36 (2003); Didier Meuwly, Le Mythe 
de L’empreinte Vocale II, 56 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE CRIMINOLOGIE ET 
POLICE TECHNIQUE 361–74 (2003); Morrison 2010, supra note 1; Morrison et al. 
2017, supra note 12. 
30.  The term voiceprint in a forensic context dates back to at least the 
1960s; Lawrence G. Kersta, Voiceprint Identification, 196 NATURE 1253 (1962). 
Voiceprinting referred to a particular approach, and voiceprint was even a 
registered trademark. The term quickly fell into disrepute among forensic 
practitioners, even among practitioners of the spectrographic approach. One 
objection was that the term implied a false analogy with fingerprint. 
Unfortunately, the term is still widely used by the general public and in legal 
circles, where it is often incorrectly used to refer to forensic voice comparison in 
general. Lawyers and judges should be aware that many forensic voice 
comparison practitioners will consider it an insult if they are called a voiceprint 
expert. We recommend that the term not be used (except in relation to its 
proper historical referent). 
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is shown in Fig. 1.31 The practitioner looks at spectrograms derived 
from the known-speaker recording and spectrograms derived from 
the questioned-speaker recording, and may also look at 
spectrograms derived from recordings of foil speakers. Usually the 
practitioner will look at multiple words or phrases that occur in 
both the known-speaker and questioned-speaker recordings. They 
may look at particular details in the pictures in search of similarities 
which they would expect to see if the two recordings were of the 
same speaker but not expect to be likely if they were of different 
speakers, and also in search of differences they would expect to 
see if the two recordings were of different speakers but not expect 
to be likely if they were of the same speaker. In contrast to other 
approaches, there has been a tradition for practitioners of the 
spectrographic approach to make new recordings of the known 
speaker in which the known speaker is required to say the same 
words as on the questioned-speaker recording and in the same 
manner as they were said on the questioned-speaker recording. 
This practice has been criticized by others, but has been enshrined 
as a requirement in published standards.32 
The conclusion emerging from a spectrographic approach is 
the practitioner’s subjective judgment based on looking at 
spectrograms. 
                                            
31.  Spectrograms were initially produced using specialized hardware 
which was first developed in the 1940s. Measurements of acoustic properties of 
speech could be made from the spectrogram, i.e., by lining up a ruler with 
graphical features and reading off values on the time or frequency axis. Since at 
least the early 1990s, it has been possible to produce spectrograms using 
ordinary computers running signal processing software. Such software calculates 
numbers which describe the acoustic properties of the speech on the recording, 
then converts those numbers into pictures. Continued reliance on spectrograms 
as a basis for subjective judgments could be criticized as anachronistic given that 
measurements of acoustic properties can be directly extracted using software 
and those numbers can be immediately entered into statistical models. 
32.  AM. BD. OF RECORDED EVIDENCE, VOICE COMPARISON STANDARDS 
(1999), available at http://www.tapeexpert.com/pdf/abrevoiceid.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2016) [hereinafter ABRE 1999]; Gruber & Poza, supra note 8 (citing 
VOICE IDENTIFICATION & ACOUSTIC ANALYSIS SUBCOMM., INT’L ASS’N FOR 
IDENTIFICATION, Voice Comparison Standards, 41 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION, 
373 (1991) [hereinafter IAI 1991]; NRC 1979, supra note 6, at Appendix A. 
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3. Acoustic-Phonetic Approach34 
In an acoustic-phonetic approach the practitioner usually uses 
computer software to make quantitative measurements of acoustic 
properties of parts of the voice recordings. Measurements may be 
made on particular speech sounds that occur in both the known-
speaker and questioned-speaker recordings. The types of 
measurements made are generally the same as the types of 
measurements made in acoustic phonetics, an area of research 
which studies the transmission of human speech between the 
speaker’s vocal tract and the listener’s ear. An example of 
properties commonly measured are formants. Formants are the 
resonances of the vocal tract. In the same way that longer tubes of 
wind instruments have lower resonances than shorter tubes (e.g., 
bassoon versus oboe, or tuba versus trumpet), longer human vocal 
tracts have lower resonances than shorter human vocal tracts. The 
length of the vocal tract can vary from person to person, but when 
speaking a person changes the length and shape of their vocal tract 
to produce a range of different resonance frequencies. The 
differences between vowel sounds such as “ee,” “oo,” and “ah” are 
the result of different resonances resulting from the speaker moving 
their tongue, jaw, lips, etc. to make different vocal tract shapes. 
Another commonly made measurement is fundamental frequency, 
which is the acoustic correlate of what listeners perceive as the 
                                            
33.  This figure was first published in Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, Forensic 
Voice Comparison and the Paradigm Shift, 49 SCI. & JUST. 298 (2009). 
34.  For other introductions to the acoustic-phonetic approach, see: Nolan, 
supra note 28; Hollien, supra note 29; ROSE, supra note 28; Rose 2006, supra 
note 28; Jessen, supra note 28; CUILING ZHANG, FORENSIC SPEECH 
TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH (2009); Morrison, supra note 1; Morrison et al., supra 
note 12; MICHAEL JESSEN, PHONETISCHE UND LINGUISTISCHE PRINZIPIEN DES 
FORENSISCHEN STIMMENVERGLEICHS (2012); Philip J. Rose, Where the Science 
Ends and the Law Begins: Likelihood Ratio-based Forensic Voice Comparison 
in a $150 Million Telephone Fraud, 20 INT’L J. SPEECH, LANGUAGE & L. 227 
(2013). 
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pitch of someone’s voice, e.g., a deep voice or a high-pitched 
voice. Whereas formants are related to the length and shape of the 
vocal tract, fundamental frequency is related to the size of the 
speaker’s vocal folds and the configuration in which they hold and 
put tension on their vocal folds. To return to the analogy of a wind 
instrument, the vocal folds are like the vibrating reed/reeds of a 
woodwind instrument or the vibrating lips of a musician playing a 
brass instrument. In the same way that the musician can alter the 
frequency of vibration of the reed/reeds or their lips, a speaker can 
alter the frequency of vibration of their vocal folds. The same 
vowel sound can be sung using different musical notes, the 
different musical notes are due to the singer changing the 
frequency of vibration of their vocal folds. Many types of acoustic 
measurements are the quantitative acoustic parallels of the 
subjective auditory properties that practitioners of the auditory 
approach listen for, and many are quantitative parallels of 
properties which are represented graphically in spectrograms. 
A practitioner will usually manually search for all occurrences 
of a particular speech sound, or word, or phrase which occurs in 
both the known-speaker and questioned-speaker recordings. They 
will then make measurements of the acoustic properties of those 
units. The numbers resulting from the measurements can then be 
compared. The practitioner may also make the same types of 
measurements on the same units in voice recordings from other 
speakers. The latter could be foil speakers, or could be intended to 
be a sample of speakers representative of the relevant population 
in the case. The practitioner will usually make measurements on 
several different speech sounds, words, and/or phrases, not just 
one. 
There are both statistical and non-statistical versions of the 
acoustic-phonetic approach. In the non-statistical version the 
conclusion is the practitioner’s subjective judgment based on 
considering the raw numbers from the measurements, or based on 
looking at graphical plots of those numbers. In the statistical 
version the conclusion is based on a statistical model applied to the 
numbers.35 Statistical models can take such numbers as input and 
                                            
35.  An example of a simple statistical model is a normal distribution. This 
has two parameters: a mean, and a standard deviation. Data are used to 
calculate estimates of these parameter values (these estimates are called 
statistics). The process of using data to estimate parameter values is called model 
training. If we asked you “What is the probability that an adult American male 
would be between 5 feet 6 inches tall and 6 feet tall?” you could make a 
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calculate numeric expressions of strength of evidence in a more 
objective manner.36 
Some practitioners directly report the numeric output of the 
statistical model as their conclusion. Other practitioners take the 
output of the statistical model and use it as input to a subjective 
judgment process. They may consider the output of the statistical 
model along with the results of other analyses, e.g., auditory and 
acoustic-phonetic non-statistical analyses. In the latter case, the 
practitioner’s final conclusion as to the strength of evidence is 
based directly on a subjective judgment. 
4. Automatic Approach37 
                                            
estimate. Imagine that we obtain data which consist of measurements of the 
heights of 5,232 adult male Americans, we assume that our sample is 
representative of the population and that heights in the population are normally 
distributed, and we calculate that the mean height is 69.2 inches and the 
standard deviation is 6.0 inches, values from CHERYL D. FRYAR, QIUPING GU, 
CYNTHIA L. OGDEN & KATHERINE M. FLEGAL, ANTHROPOMETRIC REFERENCE 
DATA FOR CHILDREN AND ADULTS: UNITED STATES, 2011–2014, 16 (VITAL & 
HEALTH STAT., Ser. 3 No. 39, 2016) http://www.cdc.gov/nchs 
/data/series/sr_03/sr03_039.pdf (last accessed Oct 22, 2016); we can then use a 
normal distribution with this mean and standard deviation to calculate an 
estimate of the probability that an adult American male is between 66 and 72 
inches tall. Using this procedure, the answer is 38%. Note that use of a statistical 
model is not entirely objective since choices have to be made about what 
particular statistical model to use and what data to use to train the model. Poor 
choices may lead to poor results, but once these choices have been made, the 
remainder of the process is objective. In fact a normal distribution is a poor 
choice for modelling human height, and a more complex model taking account 
of population substructure would give better results. The value calculated above 
(38%) is an estimate which may be far from the true value; a better model would 
get us closer to the true value. 
36.  In Section III we will discuss how statistical models can be used to 
evaluate strength of forensic evidence. 
37.  For other introductions to the automatic approach, see DIDIER 
MEUWLY, RECONNAISSANCE DE LOCUTEURS EN SCIENCES FORENSIQUES: 
L’APPORT D’UNE APPROCHE AUTOMATIQUE (2001), 
http://www.unil.ch/webdav/site/esc/shared/These.Meuwly.pdf (last accessed Oct 
22, 2016); ANIL ALEXANDER, FORENSIC AUTOMATIC SPEAKER RECOGNITION 
USING BAYESIAN INTERPRETATION AND STATISTICAL COMPENSATION FOR 
MISMATCHED CONDITIONS (2005); Daniel Ramos Castro, Forensic Evaluation of 
the Evidence Using Automatic Speaker Recognition Systems UNIVERSIDAD 
AUTONOMA DE MARDRID (2007); Tomi Kinnunen & Haizhou Li, An Overview 
of Text-Independent Speaker Recognition: From Features to Supervectors, 52 
SPEECH COMM. 12–40 (2010), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.specom.2009.08.009; 
TIMO BECKER, AUTOMATISCHER FORENSISCHER STIMMENVERGLEICH (2012); 
John H.L. Hansen & Taufiq Hasan, Speaker Recognition by Machines and 
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In an automatic approach the practitioner uses computer 
software to make measurements of the acoustic properties of the 
known-speaker and questioned-speaker recordings, and of voice 
recordings from other speakers who are intended to represent the 
relevant population for the case. Generally the acoustic 
measurements are made on the whole of a speaker’s speech in the 
recordings, and there is no focus on individual speech sounds, 
words, or phrases. The types of measurements made are usually 
the same as those used in speech processing (a branch of signal 
processing, in turn a branch of electrical engineering). These types 
of measurements are also applied to other tasks such as automatic 
speech recognition. An example of a common type of 
measurement is mel frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs). 
MFCCs are a set of numbers, e.g., 14 numbers, which describe the 
frequency components (the spectrum) of the speech during a short 
interval of time, e.g., 20 milliseconds. MFCC measurements are 
usually made once every 10 milliseconds, i.e., 100 times per 
second (with a 50% overlap of adjacent 20 millisecond long 
intervals). A set of 14 MFCCs provides a more detailed 
measurement of the speech spectrum than do traditional acoustic-
phonetic measurements, such as fundamental frequency plus two 
or three formants, but the value of an individual cepstral coefficient 
is not usually directly interpretable in terms of acoustic-phonetic 
theory.38 
In an automatic system, the numbers from the measurements 
are always used as input to statistical models. The practitioner may 
be involved in selecting what they consider to be appropriate 
statistical models, appropriate types of measurements, appropriate 
data for training the statistical models, and in selecting which 
portions of the audio recordings correspond to the speaker of 
                                            
Humans: A Tutorial Review, 32 IEEE SIGNAL PROCESSING MAG. 74–99, 
November 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2015.2462851; EWALD 
ENZINGER, IMPLEMENTATION OF FORENSIC VOICE COMPARISON WITHIN THE 
NEW PARADIGM FOR THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE (2016) 
http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/55772 [hereinafter Enzinger 2016]; Morrison et 
al. 2017, supra note 12; Geoffrey Stewart Morrison & Ewald Enzinger, An 
Introduction to Forensic Voice Comparison, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
PHONETICS (William F. Katz & Peter F. Assmann eds., forthcoming) [hereinafter 
Morrison & Enzinger forthcoming]. 
38.  The boundary between acoustic-phonetic-statistical and automatic 
approaches is fuzzy. A recent trend in automatic speaker recognition is to 
incorporate acoustic-phonetic information (or acoustic-phonetic like information) 
by, for example, using automatic speech recognition to divide the speech 
recording into different phonetic units and then make use of those units in 
subsequent analysis. 
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interest, but the measurements and statistical models themselves 
run automatically without additional human intervention. In 
automatic speaker recognition, a number of statistical techniques 
have been developed to deal with differences in recording 
conditions between known-speaker and questioned-speaker 
recordings. Many of these techniques can also be applied in 
automatic approaches to forensic voice comparison. 
The conclusion emerging from an automatic approach will be 
based on the output of the statistical model. As with the acoustic-
phonetic statistical approach, some practitioners directly report the 
numeric output of the statistical model as their strength of evidence 
conclusion, but others use it as input to a subjective judgment 
process. 
 
III. FRAMEWORKS FOR THE EVALUATION AND REPORTING OF 
STRENGTH OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE 
We next consider frameworks that practitioners use to reason 
and draw conclusions from their analyses of voice recordings. 
Practitioners who use the same approach may apply different 
frameworks to evaluate and present the strength of the evidence. 
To understand a practitioner’s conclusions, one must understand 
both the approach used for technical analysis of the voice 
recordings, and the framework applied to reason and draw 
conclusions from that analysis. A practitioner who uses 
sophisticated methods of analysis but draws illogical or otherwise 
unjustifiable conclusions from that analysis will not produce 
trustworthy evidence. 
Below we discuss the likelihood-ratio framework, similarity-only 
framework, posterior-probability framework, two-stage framework, 
and the UK framework.39 
                                            
39.  More comprehensive introductions to the likelihood ratio framework 
within the context of forensic voice comparison are provided in Rose 2002, 
supra note 28; Morrison 2010, supra note 1; and Morrison & Enzinger 
forthcoming, supra note 37.  
General introductions to the likelihood ratio framework which should be 
accessible to a legal audience include: DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID A. BERNSTEIN & 
JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT 
EVIDENCE Ch. 14 (2nd ed. 2011); and BERNARD ROBERTSON & G.A. VIGNAUX, 
INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 
(1995) [hereinafter Robertson & Vignaux 1995] or the recently released second 
edition: BERNARD ROBERTSON, G.A. VIGNAUX & CHARLES E.H. BERGER, 
INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 
(2nd ed. 2016) (hereinafter Robertson et al. 2016). Some readers may find 
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A. The Likelihood-Ratio Framework 
In the opinion of many leading scholars in the field of forensic 
inference and statistics,40 the logically correct framework for the 
evaluation of forensic evidence is the likelihood ratio framework 
(which has also been called the Bayesian framework41 and the 
logical framework). In the context of forensic voice comparison, 
this framework requires the practitioner to consider two questions:  
                                            
chapters 7 and 8 of Robertson et al. 2016 somewhat technical, and may wish to 
skip these, at least on a first reading.  
Other recommended, but more technical introductions include: DAVID J. 
BALDING, WEIGHT-OF-EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC DNA PROFILES Ch. 1–3, 9 (2005) 
[hereinafter Balding 2005]; DAVID J. BALDING & CHRISTOPHER D. STEELE, 
WEIGHT-OF-EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC DNA PROFILES Ch. 1–3, 11 (2nd ed. 2015) 
[hereinafter Balding & Steele 2015]; COLIN G.G. AITKEN, PAUL ROBERTS & 
GRAHAM JACKSON G, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICAL 
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: GUIDANCE FOR JUDGES, LAWYERS, 
FORENSIC SCIENTISTS AND EXPERT WITNESSES (Royal Statistical Society 2010), 
http://bit.ly/1WnoXRx.   
For additional discussion of similarity-only and posterior-probability 
frameworks and other non-likelihood-ratio means of expressing strength of 
evidence, we recommended Graham Jackson, Understanding Forensic Science 
Opinions, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 419–445 (2009); and DAVID H. 
KAYE NO. 23-2015, PRESENTING FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION FINDINGS: THE 
CURRENT SITUATION, IN COMMUNICATING THE RESULTS OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 
EXAMINATIONS (PENN STATE LAW, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2690891.  
Also recommended, but more technical: John S. Buckleton, A Framework 
for Interpreting Evidence, in FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE INTERPRETATION 27–63 
(2005) [hereinafter Buckleton 2005]; Tasha Hicks, John S. Buckleton, Jo-Anne 
Bright, Duncan Taylor (2015). A Framework for Interpreting Evidence, in 
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE INTERPRETATION 37–86 (2015) [hereinafter Hicks et 
al. 2015]. 
40.  For example: Colin G.G. Aitken, Charles E.H. Berger, John S. 
Buckleton, Christophe Champod, James M. Curran, A. Philip Dawid, Ian W. 
Evett, Peter Gill. Joaquín González-Rodríguez, Graham Jackson, Ate 
Kloosterman, Tina Lovelock, David Lucy, Pierre Margot, Louise McKenna, 
Didier Meuwly, Cedric Neumann, Niamh Nic Daéid, Anders Nordgaard, 
Roberto Puch-Solis, Birgitta Rasmusson, Michael Redmayne, Paul Roberts, 
Bernard Robertson, Claude Roux, Marjan J. Sjerps, Franco Taroni, Tjark Tjin-
A-Tsoi, G.A. Vignaux, Shiela M. Willis & Grzegorz Zadora, Expressing 
Evaluative Opinions: A Position Statement, 51 SCI. & JUST. 1–2 (2011), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2011.01.002; EUR. NETWORK OF FORENSIC SCI. 
INSTS., GUIDELINE FOR EVALUATIVE REPORTING IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (2015), 
http://enfsi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/m1_guideline.pdf. 
41.  Although it has been called the Bayesian framework, it is not 
necessarily the case that the forensic practitioner applies Bayes theorem or uses a 
Bayesian concept of probability. 
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1. What is the probability of obtaining the observed 
properties of the voice on the questioned-speaker recording 
if it were produced by the known speaker? 
2. What is the probability of obtaining the observed 
properties of the voice on the questioned-speaker recording 
if it were produced not by the known speaker, but by some 
other speaker from the relevant population?42 
The answer to the first question quantifies the similarity of the 
recording of the voice of the questioned speaker with respect to the 
known speaker, and the answer to the second question quantifies 
the typicality of the recording of the voice of the questioned 
speaker with respect to the relevant population. 
The need to consider both similarity and typicality is more 
intuitively understood if we use an example based on a simpler 
(and simplified) evidence type. Imagine that all the eyewitnesses to 
a crime agree that the offender had blond hair; that the 
eyewitnesses are not mistaken; that blond is clearly different from 
every other hair color; and that no one ever dyes their hair or 
wears a wig, etc. (we work in a simplified world to make the 
example easier). Also imagine that a suspect has been arrested (for 
reasons unrelated to hair color), and the suspect also turns out to 
have blond hair. What is the probability that the offender would 
have blond hair if he were the suspect? Please think about this for 
a moment before reading the next sentence. Given all the 
simplifications, the probability that the offender would have blond 
hair if he were the suspect should be 100%.43 We can consider this 
a quantification of the similarity of the hair color of the offender 
and the suspect. 
If in fact the offender is not the suspect, then the offender must 
be someone else from the population. What is the probability that 
the offender would have blond hair if he were someone selected at 
random from the population? Please think about this for a moment 
before reading the next sentence.  
Maybe you have decided that you actually can’t answer the 
question as posed because the question didn’t specify which 
population was relevant. Which is the relevant population in this 
case? Let’s assume that the offender must have been someone from 
                                            
42.  The concept of relevant population will be discussed below. 
43.  Statisticians use numbers between 0 and 1 for probabilities, whereas 
laypeople usually use percentages. Divide or multiply by 100 to convert from 
one system to the other.  
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the geographical area in which the crime was committed and that 
people in that geographical area therefore form the relevant 
population. What if the crime were committed in Stockholm? 
What is the probability that someone would have blond hair if they 
were selected at random from the population of Stockholm? We 
don’t know the exact number for that probability, but we imagine 
that it is pretty high, maybe as high as 80%. It should be intuitively 
obvious that the fact that both the suspect and offender have blond 
hair does not constitute strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis 
that they are the same person if the alternative hypothesis is that 
the offender is someone selected at random from the population of 
Stockholm. We can consider this a quantification of the typicality 
of the hair color of the offender with respect to the relevant 
population. 
If we use the values of 100% for similarity and 80% typicality we 
previously mentioned, then the probability that the offender would 
have blond hair if they were the suspect is 100/80 = 1.25 times 
higher than if the offender were someone selected at random from 
the population of Stockholm.44  
The number we just calculated has a name, it is called a 
likelihood ratio. In the present context, a forensic likelihood ratio is 
the probability of the evidence if the same-origin hypothesis were 
true divided by the probability of the evidence if the different-
origin hypothesis were true.45 In this case:  
• the evidence is the observation that the offender has blond 
hair,  
• the same-origin hypothesis is that the offender is the 
suspect, and  
                                            
44.  Note that “the probability that the offender would have bond hair if he 
were the suspect is 1.25 times higher than the probability he would have blond 
hair if he were not the suspect,” is not the same as “given the offender has blond 
hair, the probability that he is the suspect is 1.25 times higher than the 
probability that he is not the suspect.” Equating these two expressions would be 
an example of what is known as the prosecutor’s fallacy. We discuss the 
prosecutor’s fallacy at the end of Appendix A. 
45.  In scientific literature on forensic inference and statistics, the generic 
terms for the competing hypotheses are often the prosecution hypothesis and the 
defense hypothesis. It is not necessarily the case, however, that they are overtly 
advanced by the prosecution and defense respectively. They must be two 
alternative hypotheses which are of interest to the trier-of-fact in that together 
they pose a question the answer to which will assist the trier-of-fact to determine 
a fact at issue in the trial. The two hypotheses must be mutually exclusive, and, 
within the circumstances of the case, exhaustive. 
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• the different-origin hypothesis is that the offender is not the 
suspect but someone else selected at random from the 
population of Stockholm.  
A likelihood ratio is a quantitative statement of the strength of 
the evidence. If the likelihood ratio has a value greater than one, 
then the evidence is more likely under the same-origin hypothesis 
than under the different-origin hypothesis, and the larger the 
likelihood ratio value the greater the relative support for the same-
origin hypothesis over the different-origin hypothesis. Mutatis 
mutandis, if the likelihood ratio has a value less than one, then the 
evidence is more likely under the different-origin hypothesis than 
under the same-origin hypothesis, and the smaller the likelihood 
ratio value the greater the relative support for the different-origin 
hypothesis over the same-origin hypothesis. If the likelihood ratio 
value is close to one, then the evidence is about equally likely 
under each hypothesis. 
What if instead of Stockholm the crime had been committed in 
Beijing and it is the population of Beijing that is the relevant 
population? Intuitively, we know that blond hair is rare in Beijing. 
Perhaps we guess that 1% of the population has blond hair. In this 
case the likelihood ratio value would be 100/1 = 100, i.e., the 
probability that the offender would have blond hair if they were 
the suspect is 100 times higher than if the offender were someone 
selected at random from the population of Beijing. 
Rather than guessing the probability that someone selected at 
random from the population would have blond hair, we can 
estimate this probability based on relevant data. If we go back to 
Stockholm, there are more than 1 million people in the greater 
Stockholm area and it isn’t practical to look at the hair color of all 
of them. It is practical, however, to look at the hair color of a few 
hundred people and base our estimate on that. The data from a 
few hundred people are a sample of the population. We want the 
sample to be representative of the population as a whole, so we 
need to take some care in selecting who to include in the sample. 
Maybe there is a neighborhood in Stockholm where lots of 
Chinese immigrants live and in that neighborhood blond hair is 
relatively uncommon compared to the rest of the city. If we want 
our sample to be representative of the city as a whole, we should 
not take our whole sample from that neighborhood. Maybe we 
decide that people walking in the city center will give us a 
representative sample of the population as a whole. For every 
person who passes by we note their hair color, is it blond or some 
other color? Once we have noted the hair color of a few hundred 
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people we can calculate the percentage (or the proportion) who 
have blond hair. We can then use that percentage as our estimate 
of the probability that someone selected at random from the 
population of Stockholm will have blond hair.  
Note that, in addition to sampling in the right parts of the city 
so that we expect the sample to be representative of the population 
of the city as a whole, the size of our sample also matters to some 
extent. What if we only sampled two people? If we repeatedly 
sampled groups of two people we would probably find that our 
estimate of the probability of blond hair in the population varied 
wildly from sample group to sample group, sometimes 0%, 
sometimes 50%, sometimes 100%. What if our sample size were 10? 
The situation would be better, but we could still have considerable 
variability in our estimate. We could make our sample size 100 
and get a more stable estimate, or even make the sample size 1000. 
At some point, however, we should find that the estimate is quite 
stable, i.e., adding substantially more individuals to the sample 
would not result in a substantial difference in the estimate, and that 
the costs associated with collecting a larger sample would not be 
warranted. At some point we decide that our sample is large 
enough to get a sufficiently accurate and precise46 estimate of the 
probability of blond hair in the population, and we do not collect a 
larger sample. In some (or many) instances the cost of collecting 
data may dictate how much we can afford to collect and then we 
will have to post hoc assess accuracy and precision given this 
amount of data. 
Speech data will be less intuitive for most readers, but the same 
principles apply. The forensic practitioner must estimate both the 
degree of similarity of the properties of the voice on the 
questioned-speaker recording with respect to the known speaker, 
and the degree of typicality of the properties of the voice on the 
questioned-speaker recording with respect to the relevant 
population. One must estimate the probability of the properties of 
the speech on the questioned-speaker recording had it been 
produced by the suspect, and one must also estimate the 
probability of the properties of the speech on the questioned-
speaker recording had it been produced by someone else from the 
relevant population. Unlike in the simplified hair color example, 
because of within-speaker variability, even if the known- and 
questioned-speaker recording are produced by the same speaker, 
                                            
46.  Accuracy and precision (a.k.a. validity and reliability) are discussed 
below in Section IV. 
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their properties will not be exactly same. Therefore, similarly will 
never be 100% (in fact it will always be much less than 100%). 
Deciding what constitutes the relevant population may not be 
trivial. The defense position is usually that the questioned speaker 
is not the known speaker, so a different-speaker hypothesis 
including a specific relevant population could be explicitly stated 
by the defense, but the defense is under no obligation to provide 
an explicit hypothesis, and the forensic scientist often has to work 
without being provided with an explicit hypothesis from the 
defense. In this case the forensic scientist must adopt a hypothesis 
that they expect will be deemed appropriate by the trier-of-fact. 
The relevant population is the population of people who could 
plausibly have produced the voice on the questioned-speaker 
recording if it were not produced by the known speaker. 
Information in the questioned-speaker recording itself will usually 
(but not always) indicate whether the speaker is a male or female, 
what language is being spoken, and broadly what accent is being 
spoken. For example, if it is clear that the questioned speaker is an 
adult male who speaks English with a Boston accent, and this is not 
likely to be disputed by either party, then it would be reasonable 
to adopt as the relevant population men who speak English with a 
Boston accent.47  
It is vital that the forensic practitioner clearly communicate to 
the trier-of-fact the choices the forensic practitioner makes 
regarding the particular hypotheses and the particular relevant 
population that they adopt. In order to know whether the forensic 
practitioner’s testimony addresses a relevant question, and in order 
to understand the forensic practitioner’s answer to that question, 
the trier-of-fact must know what hypotheses the forensic scientist is 
evaluating. In order to understand the meaning of the likelihood 
                                            
47.  Note that information about the known speaker cannot be used (see 
Robertson & Vignaux 1995, supra note 39, at 43–44; Robertson et al. 2016, 
supra note 39, at 39–40). For example, we may know for a fact that the known 
speaker is 30 years old, but this information cannot be used to refine the 
relevant population. We don’t know who the questioned speaker is, that is the 
question which the court proceedings will answer, so we do not know exactly 
how old they are. The defense contends that the questioned speaker is not the 
known speaker, so for the relevant population which is part of the different-
origin hypothesis we are not justified in assuming that because the known 
speaker is 30 years old the questioned speaker is also 30 years old. Just by 
listening to a person’s voice we cannot tell exactly how old they are. On the 
basis of listening (or acoustic measurements and statistical models) we might 
believe that the questioned speaker is not a child or a teenager and not elderly 
but it would be unlikely that we would be correct in estimating their exact age in 
years. 
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ratio value provided by the forensic practitioner, the trier-of-fact 
must know what the forensic practitioner adopted as the relevant 
population. 
One cannot understand the answer if one does not understand 
the question. Imagine a forensic scientist working on a case in 
which the questioned-speaker recording is clearly of a female 
speaking Chinese but the forensic scientist uses a database of male 
speakers of Swedish to estimate the probabilities of speech 
properties in the population. The question being asked and the 
relevant population implied by the sample data would be 
nonsensical in the context of this case, and the answer would be 
meaningless. Consider a less obvious example: Both the 
questioned speaker and the known speaker are speaking English 
and pronounce the word “car” without pronouncing an “r” sound. 
If the relevant population is that of the United States in general, 
then the degree of typicality (the value of the denominator of the 
likelihood ratio) will be very different than if the relevant 
population is restricted to that of Boston.48 The forensic scientist 
must clearly state the hypotheses they are addressing so that the 
judge at an admissibility hearing can decide if the question the 
forensic scientist asked is appropriate, and also so that the trier-of-
fact can decide if it is appropriate and so they can understand the 
forensic scientist’s answer to the question. 
 
B. Similarity-Only Framework 
Some forensic practitioners only consider similarities between 
the voices on the known-speaker and questioned-speaker 
recordings. Similarity may be expressed verbally using terms such 
as “match”, “indistinguishable from”, or “consistent with,” e.g., “the 
fundamental frequency of the voice on the questioned-speaker 
recording matches that of the voice on the known-speaker 
recording,” or “the spectral properties of the voice on the 
                                            
48.  If it is obvious to the trier-of-fact that the questioned speaker has a 
Boston accent, then they will already have taken this into account, and 
(assuming the known speaker also has a Boston accent) they will be interested in 
the strength of evidence associated with whether the questioned speaker is the 
known speaker versus someone else who speaks with a Boston accent. See 
discussion of this issue in Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, Ewald Enzinger, & Cuiling 
Zhang, Refining the Relevant Population in Forensic Voice Comparison - A 
Response to Hicks Et Alii (2015) The Importance of Distinguishing Information 
from Evidence/Observations When Formulating Propositions, 56 SCI. & JUST. 
492 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2016.07.002. 
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recording of the bomb threat are consistent with it having been 
made by the defendant.” Alternatively, the practitioner may simply 
point out properties that are similar in the known- and questioned-
speaker recordings, e.g., “on both recordings the speaker 
pronounces the word ‘ask’ like ‘axe’.”  
As already explained in Section III, degree of similarity alone 
is not sufficient; degree of typicality with respect to a relevant 
population also needs to be considered. Saying that the suspect 
and the offender both have blond hair could be highly misleading 
without also providing information about the probability of finding 
blond hair in the relevant population. Likewise, only considering 
similarities between voice recordings could be highly misleading.  
 
C. Posterior-Probability Framework 
Some practitioners present posterior probabilities, e.g., there is 
a 95% probability that the voice on the questioned-speaker 
recording was produced by the known speaker. Expressions of 
posterior probabilities need not be numerically exact. Expressions 
such as “identification,” “probable identification,” “possible 
identification,” “inconclusive,” “possible elimination,” “probable 
elimination,” and “elimination”49 are verbal expressions of 
posterior probabilities.  
Logically, posterior probabilities cannot be derived solely via 
comparison of the properties of the known- and questioned-speaker 
recordings. The only logical way to derive a posterior probability is 
to combine the likelihood ratio with a prior probability (we define 
prior probability in the next paragraph). This is a matter of logic. 
The logic is formally stated in Bayes’ Theorem, which dates back 
to the mid 1700s.50 In Appendix A, we explain how a prior 
probability and a likelihood ratio are combined to arrive at a 
posterior probability.  
In the context of a court case in which forensic voice 
comparison testimony is presented, the prior probability is the 
                                            
49.  ABRE 1999, supra note 32; IAI 1991, supra note 32. 
50.  Thomas Bayes, An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine 
of Chances, 53 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 370–418 (1763); PIERRE-
SIMON LAPLACE, THÉORIE ANALYTIQUE DES PROBABILITÉS (1812). Popular 
literature on this topic includes SHARON B. MCGRAYNE, THE THEORY THAT 
WOULD NOT DIE: HOW BAYES’ RULE CRACKED THE ENIGMA CODE, HUNTED 
DOWN RUSSIAN SUBMARINES, AND EMERGED TRIUMPHANT FROM TWO 
CENTURIES OF CONTROVERSY (2011); and DENIS V. LINDLEY, UNDERSTANDING 
UNCERTAINTY (11th ed. 2006). 
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belief that the trier-of-fact has regarding the probability that the 
questioned-speaker is the known-speaker before the forensic voice 
comparison testimony is presented. The trier-of-fact’s prior 
probability will depend on other information and evidence which 
have already been presented to them during the trial. If the trier-of-
fact were to use the normative logic of Bayes’ Theorem, they 
would combine the likelihood ratio with their prior probability to 
arrive at a posterior probability – the belief that the trier-of-fact has 
as to the probability that the questioned-speaker is the known-
speaker after the forensic voice comparison testimony has been 
presented. The posterior probability would be either higher or 
lower than the prior probability depending on whether the 
likelihood ratio was greater than or less than one, and the extent to 
which the posterior probability was higher or lower than the prior 
probability would depend on how high or low the likelihood ratio 
was. 
Even if they are not aware of it, a forensic practitioner who 
presents a posterior probability must have at least implicitly used a 
prior probability. Unless the trier-of-fact tells the forensic 
practitioner what prior probability to use, which is highly unlikely, 
the forensic scientist cannot calculate the appropriate posterior 
probability. The posterior probability the practitioner presents will 
instead reflect the practitioner’s own views or assumptions about 
the prior probability, which may differ from those of the trier-of-
fact. The trier-of-fact may be unaware that the conclusion offered 
by the forensic practitioner depended partly on the practitioner’s 
views or assumptions about the prior probability. Even if they are 
aware, it may not be clear to the trier-of-fact the extent to which the 
practitioner’s conclusions were influenced by matters other than 
consideration of the voice evidence. 
 
D. Identification / Inconclusive / Exclusion 
Many forensic practitioners report definitive posterior-
probability conclusions. They report conclusions as 
“identification,” or “exclusion.”51 “Identification” or “same 
speaker” and “exclusion” or “different speaker” are extreme cases 
                                            
51.  See Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, Farhan Hyder Sahito, Gaëlle Jardine, 
Djordje Djokic, Sophie Clavet, Sabine Berghs & Caroline Goemans Dorny, 
INTERPOL Survey of the Use of Speaker Identification by Law Enforcement 
Agencies, 263 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 92–100 (2016), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2016.03.044 [hereinafter INTERPOL survey]. 
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of verbal probabilities corresponding to 100% and 0% respectively. 
The practitioner uses the “inconclusive” option when they are 
uncertain.  
Logically, if the probability is 100% then no other evidence 
such as an alibi could outweigh it. If the probability is 0% then no 
other evidence such as an eyewitness statement could outweigh it. 
If no other evidence could outweigh the evidence presented by the 
forensic practitioner, then logically the forensic practitioner would 
have made a definitive decision on the ultimate issue of identity. 
That is a decision which should be made by the trier-of-fact after 
weighing all the relevant evidence presented to them, it should not 
be made by a forensic practitioner. The forensic practitioner 
should only analyze and express the strength associated with the 
one piece of evidence that they were asked to analyze. Of course, 
in practice the trier-of-fact can simply decide that the forensic 
practitioner is wrong. The weight that the trier-of-fact assigns to the 
forensic practitioner’s testimony does not have to equal the 
strength of evidence stated by the forensic practitioner. 
In addition, making definitive statements of 100% certainty goes 
beyond what can be empirically supported. The PCAST report 
opines that:  
the expert should not make claims or implications that go 
beyond the empirical evidence and the applications of 
valid statistical principles to that evidence.52 
And recommends that: 
courts should never permit scientifically indefensible claims 
such as: “zero,” “vanishingly small,” “essentially zero,” 
“negligible,” “minimal,” or “microscopic” error rates; “100 
percent certainty” or . . . identification “to the exclusion of 
all other sources;” or a chance of error so remote as to be a 
“practical impossibility.”53 
 
E. A Reasonable Degree of Scientific Certainty 
Some forensic practitioners may state conclusions such as the 
following: “To a reasonable degree of scientific certainty the voice 
on the questioned-speaker recording was produced by the known 
                                            
52.  PCAST 2016, supra note 19, at 6. 
53.  Id. at 19. 
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speaker.” The expression a reasonable degree of scientific certainty 
is not used in science in general, and it has no clearly defined 
meaning. The phrase was originally required by courts to rein in 
expert witnesses by requiring them to present scientifically valid 
testimony. But it became a set of “magic words,”54 accepted in lieu 
of an actual inquiry into the scientific validity of the testimony. The 
NCFS and the PCAST report have recommended that expressions 
of this sort not be used.55 
 
F. Two-Stage Framework56 
The framework for evaluation of evidence recommended in 
the PCAST report57 is essentially a likelihood-ratio framework. It is 
not, however, appropriate for data resulting from acoustic 
measurements made on voice recordings.  
The PCAST report recommends a procedure in which if a 
forensic practitioner declares a “match,” they also report the results 
of an empirical assessment of the probability of declaring a 
“match” if the questioned-source specimen came from the known-
source (this is the numerator for a likelihood ratio) and the 
probability of declaring a “match” if the questioned-source 
specimen came from some other source (this is the denominator 
for a likelihood ratio).  
The forensic examiner should report the overall false 
positive rate [denominator of the likelihood ratio] and 
sensitivity [numerator of the likelihood ratio] for the 
method established in the [empirical] studies of 
                                            
54.  Jonas R. Rappeport, Reasonable Medical Certainty, 13 BULL. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 5–15 (1985). 
55.  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & 
TECH., RECOMMENDATIONS ON USE OF THE TERM “REASONABLE SCIENTIFIC 
CERTAINTY” (2016) https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/839726/download; PCAST 
2016, supra note 19, at 19. 
56.  An expanded version of this section is published as Geoffrey Stewart 
Morrison, David H. Kaye, David J. Balding, Duncan Taylor, Philip Dawid, 
Colin G.G. Aitken, Simone Gittelson, Grzegorz Zadora, Bernard Robertson, 
Sheila Willis, Susan Pope, Martin Neil, Kristy A. Martire, Amanda Hepler, 
Richard D. Gill, Allan Jamieson, Jacob de Zoete, J., R. Brent Ostrum & Amke 
Caliebe, A Comment on the PCAST Report: Skip the “Match”/“Non-Match” 
Stage, 272 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e7–e9 (2016), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2016.10.018 [hereinafter Morrison, Kaye et al. 
2016]. 
57.  PCAST 2016, supra note 19. 
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foundational validity and should demonstrate that the 
samples used in the foundational studies are relevant to the 
facts of the case.58  
Acoustic measurements made on voice recordings result in 
continuously-valued data with within-speaker variability.59 For such 
data it is not appropriate to include a “match”/“non-match” stage, 
i.e., a stage which assesses “whether the features in an evidentiary 
sample and the features in a sample from a suspected source lie 
within a pre-specified measurement tolerance.”60 Such a procedure 
suffers from a “cliff-edge effect”: A questioned-source specimen 
which falls just above the threshold for “match” with the known-
source sample and a questioned-source specimen which falls just 
below the threshold will result in very different conclusions as to 
the strength of the evidence, even though the difference between 
the two is negligible (the two specimens could in fact be from the 
same source, with the difference between them due to within-
source variability). Also, a procedure that includes a “match”/“non-
match” stage limits the strength-of-evidence conclusion to one of 
two possible values: A questioned-source specimen which vastly 
exceeds the threshold will be assessed as having exactly the same 
strength of evidence as a questioned-source specimen which just 
exceeds the threshold, even if the former should in theory 
constitute much stronger evidence than the latter. Mutatis mutandis 
for a specimen which falls just short of the threshold and one 
which falls far below the threshold. 
A more appropriate procedure for continuously-valued data 
with within-source variability would calculate a likelihood ratio 
using statistical models which work directly with the continuously-
valued measurements. The history of forensic science includes 
multiple examples in which two-stage procedures were proposed 
                                            
58.  Id. at 56. We note that the PCAST report actually confuses assessment 
of strength of evidence with empirical validation of system performance, see 
infra Section IV. If the results of empirical tests form the basis for the calculation 
of the strength of the evidence (e.g., via correct acceptance and false acceptance 
rates), then a second set of empirical tests using a separate set of test data (or 
using cross validation) should be conducted to assess the performance of the 
system which calculates the strength of the evidence. 
59.  Discrete (non-continuous) data can have values such a 1, 2, or 3, but 
do not allow for intermediate values such as 1.5, 1.9, 1.99999, or 2.00001. 
Continuously-valued data allow any value to occur. Measurements made on 
objects of interest in many branches of forensic science will naturally result in 
continuously-valued data with within-source variability.  
60.  PCAST 2016, supra note 19, at 48. 
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and used, but subsequently replaced by procedures which use 
statistical models that directly calculate likelihood ratios from 
continuously-valued measurements.61 
 
G. UK Framework 
Another framework that the courts could potentially encounter 
is the so-called UK framework. This comes from a position 
statement produced in 2007 by a number of forensic voice 
comparison practitioners and researchers in the United Kingdom.62 
The framework is similar to the two-stage framework in that it first 
has a “match”/“non-match” stage. The practitioner first makes a 
subjective judgment as to “whether the known and questioned 
samples are compatible, or consistent, with having been produced 
by the same speaker.”63 The choices are “consistent,” “not 
consistent,” or “no-decision.” If “consistent,” the practitioner then 
makes a subjective judgment as to whether the known- and 
questioned-speaker recordings fall into one of five levels of 
distinctiveness with respect to the population: “exceptionally-
distinctive,” “highly-distinctive,” “distinctive,” “moderately-
distinctive,” or “not-distinctive.” The framework also allows for 
“categorical statements of identification,”64 and “making the 
statement that the samples are spoken by different speakers.”65 
The UK position statement has been criticized as not logically 
tenable, for suffering from cliff-edge effects, and for failing to 
consider testing of validity and reliability.66 Unlike the PCAST 
                                            
61.  For examples from glass and DNA respectively, see COLIN G.G. 
AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC 
EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENTIST 10–11 (2nd ed. 2004); and Lindsey A. 
Foreman, Christophe Champod, Ian W. Evett, J.A. Lambert & Susan Pope, 
Interpreting DNA Evidence: A Review, 71 INT’L STAT. REV. 473, 474–76 (2003), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-5823.2003.tb00207.x. 
62.  J. Peter French & Philip Harrison, Position Statement Concerning Use 
of Impressionistic Likelihood Terms in Forensic Speaker Comparison Cases, 14 
INT’L J. SPEECH, LANGUAGE & L. 137–44 (2007), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/ijsll.v14i1.137 [hereinafter French & Harrison 2007]; J. 
Peter French, Francis Nolan, Paul Foulkes, Philip Harrison & Kirsty McDougall, 
The UK Position Statement on Forensic Speaker Comparison: A Rejoinder to 
Rose and Morrison, 17 INT’L J. SPEECH, LANGUAGE & L. 143–52 (2010), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/ijsll.v17i1.143 [hereinafter French et al. 2010]. 
63.  French & Harrison 2007, supra note 62, at 141. 
64.  Id. at 142. 
65.  Id. at 141. 
66.  Philip J. Rose & Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, A Response to the UK 
Position Statement on Forensic Speaker Comparison, 16 INT’L J. SPEECH, 
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procedure, the UK procedure is not based on empirical validation. 
Instead, it is based on “research literature and general experience,” 
with “education, training and experience” as pre-requisites.67  
forensic phoneticians . . . need to judge the distinctiveness 
of the features found in the criminal and suspect samples . . 
. informally via the analyst’s experience and general 
linguistic knowledge rather than formally and 
quantitatively.68 
As of 2015, the lead authors of the UK position statement have 
abandoned the framework proposed in that document in favor of 
the likelihood ratio framework. In a presentation on 7 September 
2015 at the Interspeech conference in Dresden, Germany, Dr 
Philip Harrison of JP French Associates stated that they had 
adopted the Association of Forensic Science Providers’ standards,69 
which require the reporting of either a numeric or a verbal 
likelihood ratio. 
 
IV. TESTING VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
The 2009 NRC Report to Congress on Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States,70 was highly critical of existing 
practice in many branches of forensic science. Its 
recommendations for improvements included “The development 
and establishment of quantifiable measures of the reliability and 
accuracy of forensic analyses.”71 The Forensic Science Regulator of 
England & Wales (hereinafter FSR) has mandated that, in all 
branches of forensic science, the methods applied be validated 
prior to being used to perform analyses for presentation to the 
                                            
LANGUAGE & L. 139–63 (2009), http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/ijsll.v16i1.139; Morrison 
2009, supra note 33; Morrison 2010, supra note 1; Morrison 2014, supra note 8. 
67.  French & Harrison 2007, supra note 62, at 138. 
68.  French et al. 2010, supra note 62, at 144. 
69.  See generally Ass’n of Forensic Sci. Providers, Standards for the 
Formulation of Evaluative Forensic Science Expert Opinion, 49 SCI. & JUST. 161, 
161–64 (2009), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2009.07.004 [hereinafter AFSP 
2009]. 
70.  COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY ET. 
AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12589 [hereinafter NRC 2009]. 
71.  Id. at 23. 
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courts.72 The NRC and the US National Commission on Forensic 
Science (hereinafter NCFS) have also both recommended that all 
forensic science providers be accredited, which includes a 
requirement to conduct method validation.73 Morrison (2014)74 
presents a review of calls from the 1960s onwards for the validity 
and reliability of forensic voice comparison to be empirically tested 
under casework conditions. 
The PCAST report opines: 
Without appropriate estimates of accuracy, an examiner’s 
statement that two samples are similar—or even 
indistinguishable—is scientifically meaningless: it has no 
probative value, and considerable potential for prejudicial 
impact.75 
In science, validity and reliability are distinct concepts. The 
terms validity and reliability, can be used with a broader range of 
meanings, but we use validity as a synonym of accuracy, and 
reliability as a synonym of precision. Fig. 2 illustrates the difference 
between these concepts. Imagine that we have four archers who 
each fire arrows at a target. One of the archers has a tight grouping 
of arrows, this archer’s results are reliable/precise, but on average 
the arrows are far from the center of the target, this archer’s results 
are not valid/accurate. For another archer, averaging over the 
location of all the arrows, that average is close to the center of the 
target, this archer’s results are valid/accurate, but the spread of the 
arrows is wide, this archer’s results are not reliable/precise. A third 
archer has results which are neither valid/accurate nor 
reliable/precise, they have a wide spread and on average are not 
close to the center of the target. A fourth archer is both 
valid/accurate and reliable/precise, this archer has a tight grouping 
of arrows and on average they are close to the center of the target. 
We have described these results in terms of valid versus not valid 
and reliable versus not reliable (accurate versus not accurate and 
                                            
72.  FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT FOR 
FORENSIC SCIENCE PROVIDERS AND PRACTITIONERS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 24 (v. 2.0, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/forensic-
science-providers-codes-of-practice-and-conduct-2014 [hereinafter FSR 2014]. 
73.  See generally NRC 2009, supra note 70; NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC 
SCI., UNIVERSAL ACCREDITATION (2015), http://www.justice.gov/
ncfs/file/477851/download (last visited Oct 27, 2016) [hereinafter NCFS 2015 
UNIVERSAL]. 
74.  Morrison 2014, supra note 8. 
75.  PCAST 2016, supra note 19, at 6. 
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precise versus not precise), but it is important to understand that 
these are not binary concepts, there are degrees of greater or lesser 
validity and degrees of greater or lesser reliability (degrees of 





Figure 2. Results of four different archers firing arrows at a target. 
Each archer has a different pattern of validity and reliability 
(accuracy and precision).  
 
In legal literature, terms such as validity and reliability are 
seldom explicitly and unambiguously defined. From context, it is 
clear that when legal texts use the term reliability they are often 
primarily concerned with what scientists would call validity. In the 
present paper we use the terms validity and reliability with their 
technical meanings as defined above. 
Empirical testing of validity and reliability is the only way to 
demonstrate how well a forensic analysis system actually works. 
We use the term system to designate the whole of the data and the 
processes used to evaluate the strength of evidence after the 
forensic scientist has stated what competing hypotheses they intend 
to evaluate. A forensic voice comparison system can include the 
sampling and selection of relevant voice recordings, procedures 
used to measure properties of the voice recordings, and statistical 
models used to calculate values which will be reported. A system 
also includes any actions taken by a human. The forensic 
practitioner is part of the system. A system could be entirely a 
human who listens and makes subjective judgments. Empirical 
testing of validity and reliability should be blind to the internal 
workings of the system. The system could be auditory, 
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statistical, automatic, or a room full of monkeys with keyboards. 
The testing procedure would treat each system as a black box. The 
only condition would be that any system to be tested conform to 
the input and output requirements of the test protocol. 
In order to empirically test the validity of a forensic voice 
comparison system,76 one must have a set of test data. The data 
must include pairs of voice recordings for which the tester knows 
that the two members of each pair were produced by the same 
speaker. The test data must also include pairs of voice recordings 
for which the tester knows that the two members of each pair were 
produced by different speakers. What constitutes relevant test data 
will vary from case to case. There can be major differences 
between cases as to what constitutes the relevant population, 
speaking styles, and recording conditions. The variability between 
cases is generally such that the results of a test of the performance 
of a forensic voice comparison system under the conditions of one 
case may be very different to the performance of that system under 
the conditions of another case. A forensic voice comparison system 
which works well under good recording conditions may work 
poorly under conditions which include background noise, 
reverberation, and transmission through communication systems, 
and it may work especially poorly when there is a mismatch 
between known-speaker and questioned-speaker recording 
conditions. The test data must therefore be representative of the 
relevant population for the case, and the conditions of one 
member of each test pair must reflect the speaking style and 
recording conditions of the known-speaker recording, and the 
conditions of the other member of each test pair must reflect the 
speaking style and recording conditions of the questioned-speaker 
recording.77  
                                            
76.  With appropriate changes in vocabulary, etc., the following also 
applies to testing the validity and reliability of systems which compare other 
objects of forensic interest. 
77.  The principle also applies across other branches of forensic science. 
The PCAST report notes that “for DNA analysis, the frequency of genetic 
variants is known to vary among ethnic groups; it is thus important that the 
sample collection reflect relevant ethnic groups to the case at hand. For latent 
fingerprints, the risk of falsely declaring an identification may be higher when 
latent fingerprints are of lower quality; so, to be relevant, the sample collections 
used to estimate accuracy should be based on latent fingerprints comparable in 
quality and completeness to the case at hand.” PCAST 2016, supra note 19, at 
56 n.128. In the context of forensic analysis of physicochemical data, e.g., 
measurements of glass fragments, flammable liquid residue, car paint, fibers, and 
ink, Grzegorz Zadora, Agnieszka Martyna, Daniel Ramos, and Colin Aitken also 
stress the need for test data to reflect the conditions of the forensic cases to 
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A key question is who decides whether the test data are 
sufficiently representative of the relevant population and 
sufficiently reflective of the conditions of the known-speaker and 
questioned-speaker recordings? In the first instance the tester must 
be satisfied. Who must be satisfied in the context of an 
admissibility hearing is a question we address in Section VI below. 
A general protocol for testing the validity of a forensic voice 
comparison system is as follows: A pair of voice recordings is 
presented to the system, one recording with conditions reflecting 
those of the known-speaker recording and the other with 
conditions reflecting those of the questioned-speaker recording. 
The tester knows whether this pair of recordings is a same-speaker 
pair or a different-speaker pair, but the system being tested must 
not be told which of these is true. The tester compares the output 
of the system with their knowledge about whether the input was a 
same-speaker pair or a different-speaker pair, and assesses how 
good the output is. A large number of same-speaker and different-
speaker pairs are presented to the system, and the tester assesses 
how good the output is on average. Additional details of this 
protocol are presented in Appendix B. 
For any system in which the conclusion is based primarily or 
directly on subjective judgment, the tester must not be the same 
person as the practitioner who performs the forensic voice 
comparison. The tester must know the truth as to whether each 
pair is a same-speaker pair or a different-speaker pair, but the 
person being tested must not. For systems in which the conclusion 
is directly the output of a statistical model, and subjective judgment 
is confined to early parts of the process (selecting relevant training 
data and appropriate statistical models to use etc.), the tester can 
be the same person as the practitioner who performs the forensic 
voice comparison. In fact in the latter case the test procedure will 
be automated: the tester will select appropriate test data and then 
have a computer program test the forensic voice comparison 
system using those data. 
Measured and calculated numbers in science are not absolutely 
precise, they have a degree of imprecision. It is good practice in 
science to quantify the degree of imprecision. Several factors can 
affect the precision (reliability) of a forensic voice comparison 
system, including intrinsic variability at the source, sampling 
variability, and measurement variability. For example, using one 
                                            
which forensic analysis systems will be applied. GRZEGORZ ZADORA ET AL., 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE: EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF 
MULTIVARIATE PHYSICOCHEMICAL DATA 182–83 (2014). 
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recording of the known speaker rather than another, or using one 
sample of the relevant population rather than another, or re-
measuring the same recordings again can result in a different value 
for a calculated likelihood ratio. There are several solutions 
proposed for dealing with imprecision in forensic likelihood ratios. 
We discuss testing the precision (reliability) of a forensic voice 
comparison system in Appendix C. 
Whatever the approach or combination of approaches used, 
what needs to be tested is the entire system. Only knowing the 
performance of components of a system would not be sufficient.78 
For example, in an acoustic-phonetic approach, it would not be 
enough to test the performance of the tools and procedures used 
for measuring fundamental frequency. The performance of such 
tools could be excellent, but if fundamental frequency 
measurements contain little useful information, or if subsequent 
components of the system are not able to effectively utilize the 
information they may contain, then the validity and reliability of 
the output of the system will be poor. Similarly, if the output of 
multiple systems are combined (e.g., an automatic system and an 
acoustic-phonetic statistical system), it is the combined system 
which must be tested. If a practitioner uses the output of an 
automatic system or an acoustic-phonetic statistical system as input 
to a subjective judgment process, then it is the output of the final 
subjective judgment process which must be tested. The system 
which needs to be tested is the system which is actually used to 
evaluate the strength of evidence in the actual case. 
Whereas automatic systems (and to a lesser extent acoustic-
phonetic statistical systems) can quickly and cheaply run hundreds 
or thousands of test comparisons, systems which are based 
primarily on subjective judgment (and systems in which the final 
stage is a subjective judgment) may take considerable investment 
of a human practitioner’s time to perform each test comparison. 
The higher time and financial costs, however, should not excuse 
subjective judgment systems from the requirement that they be 
tested. If the time and financial costs are such that a subjective 
judgment system cannot be adequately tested, then the system 
should not be used. Experience is not a substitute for empirical 
testing. 
                                            
78.  FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR FSR-G-218, DRAFT GUIDANCE: DIGITAL 
FORENSICS METHOD VALIDATION (SECOND CONSULTATION) 40 (2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/digital-forensics-method-validation-
draft-guidance-second-consultation (last visited Oct 27, 2016). 
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Experience in applying spectrographic voice identification 
in law enforcement has led proponents of the method to 
express confidence in its reliability. The basis for this 
confidence is not, however, accessible to objective 
assessment.79 
For an expert to say “I think this is true because I have 
been doing this job for x years” is, in my view, unscientific. 
On the other hand, for an expert to say “I think this is true 
and my judgement has been tested in controlled 
experiments” is fundamentally scientific.80 
Validation of this approach to voice identification becomes 
a matter of replicable experiments on the expert himself, 
considered as a voice identifying machine. . . . [V]alidation 
requires experimental assessment of performance on 
relevant tasks. . . . It may be objected that this minimal set 
of tests is unreasonably arduous. We do not believe that it 
is. As scientists we could accept no less in checking the 
reliability of a “black box” supposed to perform speaker 
identification.81  
The PCAST report opines (emphasis in original): 
[N]either experience, nor judgment, nor good professional 
practices (such as certification programs and accreditation 
programs, standardized protocols, proficiency testing, and 
codes of ethics) can substitute for actual evidence of 
foundational validity and reliability. The frequency with 
which a particular pattern or set of features will be 
observed in different samples, which is an essential element 
in drawing conclusions, is not a matter of “judgment.” It is 
an empirical matter for which only empirical evidence is 
relevant. Similarly, an expert’s expression of confidence 
based on personal professional experience or expressions 
of consensus among practitioners about the accuracy of 
their field is no substitute for error rates estimated from 
relevant studies. For forensic feature-comparison methods, 
establishing foundational validity based on empirical 
                                            
79.  Bolt et al. 1970, supra note 5, at 603. 
80.  Ian W. Evett, Interpretation: A Personal Odyssey, in THE USE OF 
STATISTICS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 9, 21 (Colin G.G. Aitken & David A. Stoney 
eds., 1991). 
81.  Bolt et al. 1970, supra note 5, at 602. 
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evidence is thus a sine qua non. Nothing can substitute for 
it.82  
And recommends that: 
Where there are not adequate empirical studies and/or 
statistical models to provide meaningful information about 
the accuracy of a forensic feature-comparison method, DOJ 
attorneys and examiners should not offer testimony based 
on the method.83  
A multi-laboratory evaluation of multiple forensic voice 
comparison systems under conditions reflecting those of one real 
forensic case is currently under way, and the results are being 
published in a virtual special issue of the journal Speech 
Communication.84 
 
V. CONTEXTUAL BIAS 
The 2009 NRC report found that:  
[F]orensic science experts are vulnerable to cognitive and 
contextual bias . . . Contextual information renders experts 
vulnerable to making erroneous identifications.85  
The PCAST report advised that: 
Subjective methods require particularly careful scrutiny 
because their heavy reliance on human judgment means 
they are especially vulnerable to human error, 
inconsistency across examiners, and cognitive bias. In the 
forensic feature-comparison disciplines, cognitive bias 
includes the phenomena that, in certain settings, humans 
may tend naturally to focus on similarities between samples 
and discount differences and may also be influenced by 
                                            
82.  PCAST 2016, supra note 19, at 6. 
83.  Id. at 19. 
84.  Geoffrey S. Morrison & Ewald Enzinger, Multi-Laboratory Evaluation 
of Forensic Voice Comparison Systems Under Conditions Reflecting Those of a 
Real Forensic Case, 85 SPEECH COMMC’N 119 (2016), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01676393/vsi/10KTJHC7HNM. 
85.  NRC 2009, supra note 70, at 8 n.8. 
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extraneous information and external pressures about a 
case.86 
The NCFS recommended that:  
Forensic laboratories should take appropriate steps to avoid 
exposing analysts to task-irrelevant information through the 
use of context management procedures detailed in written 
policies and protocols.87  
Concern about contextual bias in forensic science arose in part 
from empirical studies showing that forensic practitioners are 
sometimes influenced by information that is irrelevant to their 
assessment of the evidence.88 For example, latent print examiners 
were less likely to report a “match” between a latent print from a 
crime scene and a suspect’s print when they were told the suspect 
had a solid alibi.89 Contextual bias is not, however, limited to 
                                            
86.  PCAST 2016, supra note 19, at 5. 
87.  NAT’L COMMC’N ON FORENSIC SCI., ENSURING THAT FORENSIC 
ANALYSIS IS BASED UPON TASK-RELEVANT INFORMATION 1 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/818196/download (last visited Oct 27, 2016) 
[hereinafter NCFS 2015 TASK]. 
88.  The term context effect originated in psychology and has been used to 
describe circumstances in which the perception of a stimulus is affected by the 
surrounding context, “as where a gray object looks lighter against a dark 
background than against a light background,” William C. Thompson, 
Interpretation: Observer Effects, in WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 
171, 171 (Allan Jamieson & Andre A. Moenssens eds., 2009) [hereinafter 
Thompson 2009]. In forensic science, the term context effect has been used 
more broadly to describe situations in which the results of a forensic analysis are 
affected by the information available to the analyst, “as when an analyst 
becomes more likely to identify a latent print as that of a suspect when told that 
another analyst has already made the identification or when told that other 
evidence indicates the suspect made the print.” Id. The “other evidence” might 
be said to provide a “context” that changes the analyst’s interpretation of the 
scientific data. When the “other evidence” includes information that should have 
no bearing on the analyst’s judgment, the phenomenon is called a contextual 
bias. See D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of 
Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and 
Suggestion, 90 no. 1 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2002), http://www.jstor.org/stable/3481305 
[hereinafter Risinger et al. 2002]; William C. Thompson, What Role Should 
Investigative Facts Play in the Evaluation of Scientific Evidence?, 43 AUSTL. J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 123–34 (2011) [hereinafter Thompson 2011]; NCFS 2015 TASK, 
supra note 87. 
89.  Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. 
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600–16 (2006); Itiel E. Dror, et al., Contextual 
Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 
156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 174–78 (2006); Itiel E. Dror & Robert Rosenthal, Meta-
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forensic scientists. It is a universal phenomenon that affects 
decision making by people from all walks of life and in all 
professional settings, including science.90 People are particularly 
vulnerable to contextual bias when making judgments based on 
data that may be somewhat ambiguous and subject to differing 
interpretations. Contextual bias occurs without conscious 
awareness; it does not require misconduct or bad intent.91 Rather, 
exposure to contextual information can bias the conclusions of 
forensic practitioners who perform their jobs with utmost honesty 
and professional commitment.  
Forensic practitioners who rely on subjective judgment to reach 
conclusions may need to evaluate data that are somewhat 
ambiguous and subject to differing interpretations. Under these 
circumstances, there is clearly a potential for practitioners to be 
influenced by contextual bias.92 Such circumstances will inevitably 
arise in approaches to forensic voice comparison in which 
practitioners rely heavily on subjective judgment. 
One way to minimize contextual bias is to avoid exposing 
practitioners to “task-irrelevant” information, i.e., information that 
is not necessary for assessing the strength of the forensic 
evidence.93 Context management procedures (often called blinding 
                                            
Analytically Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability of Forensic Experts, 53 J. 
OF FORENSIC SCI. 900–03 (2008); EXPERT WORKING GRP. ON HUMAN FACTORS 
IN LATENT PRINT ANALYSIS, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T 
OF COMMERCE, LATENT PRINT EXAMINATION AND HUMAN FACTORS: 
IMPROVING THE PRACTICE THROUGH A SYSTEMS APPROACH (2012), 
http://www.nist.gov/manuscript-publication-search.cfm?pub_id=910745 
[hereinafter NIST/NIJ 2012]. 
90.  Saul M. Kassin, I.E. Dror & J.Kukucka, The Forensic Confirmation 
Bias: Problems, Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. 
MEMORY & COGNITION 42–52 (2013); Risinger et al. 2002, supra note 88. 
91.  Thompson 2011, supra note 88. 
92.  See reviews in Risinger et al. 2002, supra note 88; Michael J. Saks, et 
al., Context Effects in Forensic Science: A Review and Application of the 
Science of Science to Crime Laboratory Practice in the United States, 43 SCI. & 
JUST. 77–90 (2003), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1355-0306(03)71747-X; Bryan 
Found, Deciphering the Human Condition: The Rise of Cognitive Forensics, 47 
AUSTL. J. OF FORENSIC SCIS. 386–401 (2015), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00450618.2014.965204; Reinoud D. Stoel et al., 
Minimizing Contextual Bias in Forensic Casework, in FORENSIC SCIENCE AND 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: CRITICAL ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS 67–86 
(Kevin J. Strom & Matthew J. Hickman eds., 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/
9781483368740.n5 [hereinafter Stoel et al. 2015]. 
93.  See NCFS 2015 TASK, supra note 87; W.C. Thompson, Determining 
the Proper Evidentiary Basis for an Expert Opinion: What Do Experts Need to 
Know and When Do They Know Too Much? in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO 
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procedures) are used to prevent bias in many areas of science.94 
Although context management is relatively new in forensic science, 
procedures for implementing context management have been 
discussed extensively in forensic science literature,95 and many 
laboratories have implemented such procedures, including for 
forensic DNA analysis and latent print analysis.96  
A key issue in implementing a context management procedure 
is determining which information is relevant and irrelevant to a 
particular task. In forensic voice comparison, task-relevant 
information would clearly include information about the recording 
conditions, and information pertinent to understanding what would 
constitute the relevant population. Task-irrelevant information 
would include the crime that the defendant is charged with, the 
results of other forensic analyses such as DNA and fingerprint 
analyses, and whether the forensic voice comparison analysis has 
been requested by the prosecution or the defense.  
There are several ways to prevent practitioners from being 
exposed to task-irrelevant information. In large laboratories, it may 
be practical to use a case manager to interact with the client and 
decide what constitutes task-relevant and task-irrelevant 
information for a practitioner. The case manager then passes on 
only the task-relevant information to the practitioner. Sometimes, 
information that is task-irrelevant and potentially biasing at one 
stage of an analysis becomes necessary and task-relevant at a later 
stage. For example, information about the DNA profile of a 
suspect is unnecessary and biasing when determining what 
potential profiles are present in a DNA mixture, but necessary 
                                            
BIAS IN BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE AND THE COURTS: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
APPROACH 133–49 (Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 
2016); Itiel E. Dror, et al., Letter to the Editor - Context Management Toolbox: 
A Linear Sequential Unmasking (LSU) Approach for Minimizing Cognitive Bias 
in Forensic Decision Making, 60 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1111–12 (2015) [hereinafter 
Dror et al. 2015]. 
94.  Risinger et al. 2002, supra note 88. 
95.  Simon A. Cole, Implementing Counter-Measures Against 
Confirmation Bias in Forensic Science, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & 
COGNITION 61–62 (2013); Itiel E. Dror & Simon A. Cole, The Vision in ‘Blind’ 
Justice: Expert Perception, Judgment, and Visual Cognition in Forensic Pattern 
Recognition, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 161–67 (2010); Bryan Found & 
John Ganas, The Management of Domain Irrelevant Context Information in 
Forensic Handwriting Examination Casework, 53 SCI. & JUST. 154–58 (2013); 
Stoel et al 2015, supra note 92; Thompson 2011, supra note 88; Dror et al. 2015, 
supra note 93.  
96.  NIST/NIJ 2012, supra note 89; Stoel et al. 2015, supra note 95; NCFS 
2015 TASK, supra note 87. 
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when determining the probability of the DNA mixture evidence if 
the suspect were a contributor versus if they were not a 
contributor.97 The potential for bias can be reduced by 
withholding the potentially-biasing information from the analyst 
until it is needed, a procedure known as sequential unmasking.98 
Another example is found in latent print analysis, where some 
laboratories require examiners to evaluate poor quality latent prints 
from crime scenes, and to identify all the points (minutiae) that 
they consider relevant, before they see the high-quality known-
origin print image.99 Withholding information about the known-
origin print prevents the examiner from being biased towards 
seeing indistinct parts of the poor quality questioned-origin image 
as having the same pattern as in the high-quality known-origin 
image.100 
Another way to reduce the potential for cognitive bias is to 
avoid using approaches in which the strength of evidence 
conclusion is primarily or directly based on subjective judgment. 
As previously mentioned, an approach based on relevant data, 
quantitative measurements, and statistical models distances 
subjective elements from the final output of the system (subjective 
elements include decisions as to what constitute relevant data for 
training and testing the system). As long as the likelihood ratio 
output by the statistical model is directly reported as the strength of 
evidence statement, such a system is much less susceptible to the 
potential influence of contextual bias.101 
 
VI. ADMISSIBILITY 
                                            
97.  Thompson 2009, supra note 88; Itiel E. Dror & Greg Hampikian, 
Subjectivity and Bias in Forensic DNA Mixture Interpretation, 51 SCI. & JUST. 
204–08 (2011). 
98.  Dan E. Krane, et al., Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing 
Observer Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006–07 
(2008). 
99.  Dror et al. 2015, supra note 93. 
100.  NIST/NIJ 2012, supra note 89. 
101.  For additional arguments as to why the output of the statistical model 
should be directly reported and not used as input to a subjective judgment 
process, see Geoffrey Stewart Morrison & Reinoud D. Stoel, Forensic Strength of 
Evidence Statements Should Preferably be Likelihood Ratios Calculated Using 
Relevant Data, Quantitative Measurements, and Statistical Models – A Response 
to Fingerprint Identification: How Far Have We Come? 46 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC 
SCI. 282–92 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00450618.2013.833648. 
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In this section, we will review the legal standards for 
admissibility of expert testimony established by Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702, Daubert, and Frye v. United States (1923). We also 
consider the application of these standards when evaluating the 
admissibility of forensic voice comparison testimony. 
The admissibility of scientific evidence in Federal courts is 
governed by Rule 702, which states: 
Testimony by Expert Witnesses 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;102 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;  
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and 
methods to the facts of the case.103 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the admissibility 
of expert evidence in a series of cases that began with Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) and included General Electric 
v. Joiner (1997)104 and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael (1999).105 The 
                                            
102.  The Daubert ruling states that: “The adjective ‘scientific’ implies a 
grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word 
‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 
103.  FED. R. EVID. 702. When Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire were 
decided, Rule 702 read as follows: “If scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.” FED. R. EVID. 702 (subsequently amended 2011). For a history of the 
amendment process, and the subsequent failure of some courts to abide by the 
amended version of the Rule, see David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, 
Defending Daubert: It’s Time to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 57 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1–48 (2015). 
104.  General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
105.  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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Court in Daubert explained that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
requires the trial judge to act as a gatekeeper to “ensure that any 
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only 
relevant, but reliable.”106 The Court used the term “reliable” to 
refer to “evidentiary reliability–that is, trustworthiness.”107 It 
explained that: “In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary 
reliability will be based upon scientific validity.”108  
Before the Daubert ruling, most courts applied an admissibility 
test articulated in Frye v. United States (1923) which required 
courts to determine whether a method had “general acceptance in 
the particular field to which it belongs.” Daubert rejected the idea 
that “general acceptance” should be the sole criterion for 
admissibility, but retained it as one of several factors for federal 
judges to consider when deciding whether expert testimony meets 
the requirements of Rule 702. In state courts, judges follow state 
evidence codes that sometimes differ from the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Although many states have adopted the Daubert 
standard, some states, including California109 and New York, 
continue to use versions of the Frye general acceptance test.110  
In Daubert, the Supreme Court provided a non-exclusive list of 
factors for courts to consider when evaluating whether scientific 
testimony meets the requirements of Rule 702:111 
                                            
106.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
107.  Id. at 579 n. 9. 
108.  Id. (emphasis in original).  
109.  In California the applicable standard is known as Kelly/Frye because 
the state supreme court adopted the Frye standard in People v. Kelly, a case 
concerning the admissibility of testimony based on the spectrographic approach 
to forensic voice comparison. The court ruled that the proponent in that case 
had failed to demonstrate that the spectrographic approach was generally 
accepted by the scientific community. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 
1976). 
110.  Outside the U.S., Section 19A of the Criminal Practice Directions in 
England & Wales (Criminal Practice Directions [2015] EWCA Crim 1567 
Consolidated with Amendment No. 2 [2016] EWCA Crim 1714) is based on 
Federal Rules of Evidence rule 702 and Daubert, and the Daubert criteria have 
also influenced Canadian and New Zealand decisions on admissibility of expert 
evidence: Graham D. Glancy & John M.W. Bradford, The Admissibility of 
Expert Evidence in Canada, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 350–56 (2007); 
Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of 
the State’s Forensic Science and Medical Evidence, 61 U. TORONTO L. J. 343–
409 (2011); Arthur Tompkins, Science in the Courtroom: Is There, and Should 
There, be a Better Way? AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCIS. (forthcoming 2017). 
111.  In legal commentary and appellate opinions there have been varying 
accounts of the number of Daubert factors, and of how to describe and 
distinguish them. While the account we provide here is conventional, some 
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• Whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid and . . . whether that 
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the 
facts in issue.  
• Whether [a theory or technique] can be (and has been) 
[empirically] tested. . . . In the case of a particular scientific 
technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known 
or potential rate of error. 
• Whether the theory or technique has been subjected to 
peer review and publication. 
• In the case of a particular scientific technique . . . the 
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
technique’s operation. 
• General acceptance within a relevant scientific community. 
Below, we consider each of these requirements in turn. First, 
however, we discuss what the Supreme Court called the 
consideration of “fit,” that is:  
• [W]hether expert testimony proffered in the case is 
sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the 
jury in resolving a factual dispute112 
 
A. Whether Expert Testimony is Sufficiently Tied to the Facts 
of the Case 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires that expert evidence 
“help the trier-of-fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue.” Daubert explained that this helpfulness requirement 
of Rule 702 is essentially a matter of “fit” between the expert 
evidence and the issue upon which it is offered. There must be “a 
valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a 
precondition to admissibility.”113 In other words, admissibility 
depends not only on whether the expert’s evidence is trustworthy 
                                            
courts and commentators have offered alternatives. “[W]hile it has become 
conventional (though not universal) to speak of ‘the four Daubert factors,’ it is 
not even clear how many ‘Daubert factors’ there really are.” D. Michael 
Risinger, Whose fault?–Daubert, the NAS Report, and the Notion of Error in 
Forensic Science, 38 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 517, 527 (2010). 
112.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F. 2d 
1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
113.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
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per se but also whether it addresses in a scientifically valid manner 
an issue properly before the trier-of-fact.114  
In General Electric v. Joiner the Supreme Court offered further 
clarification of the requirements of Rule 702, giving particular 
emphasis to the need for a reasonably close connection between 
any data on which the expert relies and the conclusions that the 
expert draws from it with respect to the case under consideration. 
The court upheld a trial judge’s decision to exclude expert 
testimony linking PCB exposure to respondent Joiner’s cancer 
where the expert’s conclusion was supported only by animal 
studies:    
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. 
But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of 
Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion 
evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse 
dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is 
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the 
opinion proffered.115 
                                            
114.  To illustrate how scientific knowledge may be valid but unhelpful, the 
court gave the following example: “The study of the phases of the moon, for 
example, may provide valid scientific ‘knowledge’ about whether a certain night 
was dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier-of-
fact. However (absent creditable grounds supporting such a link), evidence that 
the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier-of-fact in determining 
whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that 
night.” Id. at 482. See also, In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 743 
(3d Cir. 1994) (reasoning that a valid connection between chemical exposure 
and animal cancer was insufficient to make the animal studies of carcinogenicity 
admissible because “there must be good grounds to extrapolate from animals to 
humans, just as the methodology of the studies must constitute good grounds to 
reach conclusions about the animals themselves.”). For further discussion of the 
concept of “fit,” see D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-
Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 767 (2000); Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and 
Expert reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 
SETON HALL L. REV., 15–75 (2004). 
115.  Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). The analytic gap in 
Joiner arose from uncertainty about whether the exposure conditions modeled 
in the animal studies were sufficiently comparable to the conditions under which 
Joiner was exposed to render the research relevant. “Of course, whether animal 
studies can ever be a proper foundation for an expert’s opinion was not the 
issue. The issue was whether these experts’ opinions were sufficiently supported 
by the animal studies on which they purported to rely. The studies were so 
dissimilar to the facts presented in this litigation that it was not an abuse of 
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A subsequent case, Kumho Tire, also emphasized the need for 
a close connection between the expert’s methodology and the 
conclusion drawn. The issue the judge must consider when 
evaluating admissibility is not the general validity of the underlying 
theory or method but whether it is valid for drawing the specific 
kinds of conclusions that the expert drew in the case at hand:  
[T]he specific issue before the court was not the 
reasonableness in general of a tire expert’s use of a visual 
and tactile inspection . . . Rather, it was the reasonableness 
of using such an approach, along with [the expert’s] 
particular method of analyzing the data thereby obtained, 
to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to 
which the expert testimony was directly relevant.116 
Following Kumho Tire, Rule 702 was revised in a manner that 
further emphasized the need for a case-specific inquiry into the 
validity and trustworthiness of expert evidence.117 The new 
language requires, as a condition of admissibility, that “the expert 
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case.” 
Kumho Tire, and the revised Rule 702, clarify which issues 
related to expert evidence must be considered by the judge as part 
of the Daubert inquiry, and which are matters of weight to be left 
to the trier-of-fact. Issues left to the trier-of-fact include assessing the 
veracity and sincerity of the expert, and determining how to weigh 
an expert’s conclusions against other evidence in a case. A judge 
should not exclude expert testimony as unreliable simply because 
other evidence convinces the judge that the expert is wrong.118  
Issues for the judge at an admissibility hearing include any factors 
related to the scientific validity of the methods used by the expert 
for drawing conclusions of the type drawn in the case at hand. For 
                                            
discretion for the District Court to have rejected the experts’ reliance on them.” 
Id. at 144. 
116.  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 154 (1999) (emphasis in 
original). 
117.  See Bernstein & Lasker supra note 103. 
118.  Nor should a judge admit expert evidence simply because other 
evidence suggests the expert’s conclusion is correct. The judge must ask 
“whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically 
valid, and . . . whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied 
to the facts in issue”, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93, not whether, in light of other 
evidence, the expert is likely to be correct or incorrect. See also Risinger et al., 
supra note 88. 
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forensic voice comparison, this would include questions about 
whether the expert chose an appropriate relevant population for 
the case at hand, whether they obtained a sample of data 
sufficiently representative of that relevant population, and whether 
the data or analytical techniques adequately accounted for the 
speaking styles and recording conditions in the known- and 
questioned-speaker recordings. We would argue that the judge 
should also consider whether the expert took adequate steps to 
avoid cognitive and contextual bias, as this also affects the validity 
of the expert’s methods as applied and hence the trustworthiness of 
the expert’s conclusions in the case at hand.119 All of these matters 
relate to the relevance of the expert evidence to the “task at hand” 
and hence all go to admissibility under Daubert.  
The need to evaluate such case-specific factors as part of the 
Daubert inquiry suggests that there can be no definitive precedent-
setting ruling on whether a particular approach (auditory, 
spectrographic, acoustic-phonetic, or automatic) is admissible. 
Instead, courts will need to consider in each case whether there is 
adequate evidence that the system employed by the practitioner is 
sufficiently valid and reliable for the conditions in that case.120  
 
B. Empirical Testing of Validity and Reliability 
                                            
119.  For a detailed discussion of the implications of cognitive and 
contextual bias for the admissibility of forensic science evidence under Daubert 
and Kumho Tire, see Risinger et al. supra note 88. 
120.  With respect to forensic voice comparison, that admissibility should be 
decided on a case by case basis because the application of science will be case 
specific is also the interpretation that Faigman et al., supra note 2 infer from the 
rulings in State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999) and in Angleton. Coon 
states:  
The dissent [in Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 136 (Alaska 1986)] reaches 
a different conclusion because it begins with the premise that the scientific 
validity of a technique is a legal issue which does not turn on case-sensitive facts. 
This premise does not adequately take account of the reality of the judicial 
process and the variable state of science . . . [T]he state of science is not 
constant; it progresses daily . . . We recognize that different trial judges, in 
exercising their discretion, may reach different conclusions about scientific 
reliability . . . The principal reason for adopting the Daubert standard is to give 
the courts greater flexibility in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, 
so as to keep pace with science as it evolves. 
Coon, 974 P.2d at 399. Angleton states: “The potential rate of error of the 
aural spectrographic method is unknown and may vary considerably, depending 
on the conditions of the particular application.” United States v. Angleton 269 F. 
Supp. 2d 892, 902. 
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In considering the admissibility of expert testimony, the 
Daubert ruling instructs the trial judge to consider “whether the 
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically 
valid and . . . whether that reasoning or methodology properly can 
be applied to the facts in issue.”121 It goes on to state that “a key 
question to be answered in determining whether a theory or 
technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will 
be whether it can be (and has been) tested . . . ‘[T]he statements 
constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical 
test.’” Later it states that “in the case of a particular scientific 
technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or 
potential rate of error.” We interpret these statements as requiring 
the forensic scientist to empirically test the degree of validity and 
reliability of their system and provide the results of such tests to the 
judge so that the judge can take them into consideration when 
deciding on admissibility. We further interpret “properly . . . 
applied to the facts in issue” to imply that the tests of validity and 
reliability must be conducted under conditions which reflect those 
of the case under investigation (see the discussion of Kumho Tire 
and the revision of Rule 702 in Section VI above).  
A key question is who decides whether the test data are 
sufficiently representative of the relevant population and 
sufficiently reflective of the conditions of the known-speaker and 
questioned-speaker recordings? In the first instance the tester must 
be satisfied. The tester may be the forensic practitioner if the 
approach is based on relevant data, quantitative measurements, 
and statistical models, in which case the testing is actually 
automated, or another member of the forensic laboratory or an 
outside party if the approach is based on subjective judgment. But 
ultimately it is the judge at an admissibility hearing and/or the trier-
of-fact at trial who must be satisfied. The tester must therefore 
explain to the judge / trier-of-fact how they have sampled data from 
the relevant population and how they have selected or simulated 
data which reflect the conditions of the case. If the judge / trier-of-
fact is not satisfied with what the tester has done then they need 
proceed no further and should rule the proffered testimony 
inadmissible / ignore whatever strength of evidence statement is 
produced by the system. If the judge / trier-of-fact is satisfied with 
what the tester has done, then they can consider the outcome of 
the tests as being representative of how the system will be expected 
to perform under the conditions of the case. In the latter case the 
                                            
121.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. 
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judge should then consider whether the test results are good 
enough that testimony based on the system can be admitted, and if 
it is admitted the trier-of-fact can consider, based on the test results, 
the degree to which they will trust the output of the system.  
It is worth noting that the Daubert opinion cited two prior 
appellate cases involving the admissibility of forensic voice 
comparison testimony: United States v. Williams (1978)122 and 
United States v. Smith (1989).123 Both cases had been decided 
under the Frye standard, but in each case the court had gone 
beyond counting of scientific supporters and considered whether 
the proponents of the expert testimony had laid a “proper 
foundation” for establishing that the testimony was “reliable” and 
not likely to mislead.124 These rulings were cited in Daubert in 
support of the court’s assertion that the judge at an admissibility 
hearing “should consider the known or potential rate of 
error.”125,126 
                                            
122.  United States v. Williams, 583 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978). 
123.  United States v. Smith, 869 F. 2d 348, 353–54 (7th Cir. 1989). 
124.  Both appeal rulings related to the legal question of whether it was 
appropriate for the lower courts to take these factors into consideration and 
whether they had properly taken them into consideration. Absent any abuse of 
discretion by the lower courts, the appeal rulings did not question the 
conclusions that the lower courts reached on the basis of consideration of these 
factors. Both the lower courts had found auditory-spectrographic testimony 
admissible. 
125.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
126.  In both Williams and Smith the courts had considered published 
research related to the validity of forensic voice comparison using spectrographic 
approaches. Williams, 583 F. 2d 1194; Smith, 869 F. 2d 348. One publication 
considered in both cases was Oscar Tosi, Herbert Oyer, William Lashbrook, 
Charles Pedrey, Julie Nicol & Ernest Nash, Experiment on Voice Identification, 
51 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC’Y AM. 2030–43 (1972), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1121/1.1913064 [hereinafter Tosi et al.], which reported on 
two studies which tested the performance of students and practitioners using the 
spectrographic and auditory-spectrographic approaches respectively. The first 
was the most extensive empirical test of spectrographic or auditory-
spectrographic approaches ever conducted. Immediately after its publication, 
however, Tosi et al. was criticized by Bolt et al., supra note 5, who argued that 
the first study was methodologically flawed. The first study was conducted under 
laboratory conditions (high quality audio recordings, no background noise, no 
transmission through communication channels, etc.) and not under forensically 
realistic conditions. Among other criticisms of its methodology, Bolt et al. 
therefore argued that the results of the first study were not informative as to how 
implementations of the approach would perform under casework conditions. 
The second study in Tosi et al. was a review of actual casework, comparing the 
conclusion of each forensic voice comparison analysis with the verdict or plea 
accepted in the case. This has been criticized on the grounds that validation 
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During the Daubert hearing in Angleton127 (first discussed in 
the Introduction, Section I above), the court considered research 
literature on auditory-spectrographic approaches covering a period 
of over 30 years.128 Some earlier rulings on the admissibility of 
spectrographic evidence had acknowledged the criticisms of this 
approach found in the literature, but dismissed them as raising 
issues going to weight rather than admissibility. In contrast, the 
court in Angleton viewed these criticisms as going to the heart of 
the matter – the scientific validity of the testimony. With respect to 
testing and error rates, the court in Angleton concluded that: 
The evidence and testimony show that there is great 
dispute among researchers and the few practitioners in the 
field over the accuracy and reliability of voice 
spectrographic analysis to determine the identity of 
recorded speakers . . . The post-Daubert case law casts 
doubt on the reliability and admissibility of voice 
spectrograph analysis.129 
The potential rate of error of the aural spectrographic 
method is unknown and may vary considerably, depending 
on the conditions of the particular application.130 
[The expert’s] testimony is unreliable under Rule 702. He is 
applying a technique that, in general, lacks the reliability 
necessary for admission under Rule 702. His application of 
the technique was flawed . . . [His] testimony does not meet 
the standards necessary for admission. It is properly 
excluded as unhelpful and confusing to the jury.131 
                                            
requires the tester to know the truth, and the outcome of a legal case cannot be 
substituted for the truth, especially when the object being tested may have 
contributed to the outcome of the case––if a forensic scientist testifies that the 
defendant is the speaker on the questioned-speaker recording, and on the basis 
of the forensic scientist’s testimony the trier-of-fact finds the defendant guilty, the 
forensic scientist cannot legitimately cite the verdict as evidence that their 
testimony was correct––the argument is circular. For additional criticisms of Tosi 
et al., see NRC 1979, note 6 supra, Gruber & Poza 1995, supra note 8, and 
Morrison 2014, supra note 8. 
127.  United States v. Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 2nd 878, 892 (S.D. Tex., 2003) 
128.  That literature included the aforementioned Tosi et al., supra note 126, 
Bolt et al., supra note 5, and NRC 1979 supra note 6. 
129.  Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 905. 
130.  Id. at 902. 
131.  Id. at 904. 
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As previously mentioned, since Angleton there are no reported 
cases in which testimony based on the spectrographic approach 
has overcome a Daubert challenge.  
 
C. Peer review and Publication 
Daubert also states that “Another pertinent consideration is 
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review 
and publication.”132 It goes on to state that “submission to the 
scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of ‘good 
science,’ in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive 
flaws in methodology will be detected.”133 But it warns that peer-
reviewed publication is not necessarily an indication of scientific 
validity. “The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a 
peer-reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not 
dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a 
particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is 
premised.”134  
The NCFS has stated that what counts as foundational scientific 
literature supportive of forensic practice must have been published 
in peer-reviewed archival venues, for example, articles published in 
respected scientific journals, i.e., “a journal that utilizes rigorous 
peer review with independent external reviewers to validate the 
accuracy in its publications and their overall consistency with 
scientific norms of practice.”135 The NCFS further stated that non-
peer reviewed publications and ephemera such as conference 
presentations do not count for this purpose.  
We are probably more pessimistic than the Daubert ruling as 
to the quality of many papers that are accepted for publication 
after peer review. Courts should be aware that the quality of peer-
reviewed publications may vary from subject area to subject area. 
We believe that a substantial proportion of papers published in 
forensic science in general and forensic voice comparison in 
particular suffer from major methodological flaws, including the 
use of databases which are very small and which do not represent 
forensically realistic conditions. There is also nothing to prevent a 
                                            
132.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. at 594. 
135.  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI, SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE IN SUPPORT 
OF FORENSIC SCIENCE AND PRACTICE (2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/786591/download [hereinafter NCFS 2015 
LITERATURE]. 
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group of supporters of a particular approach from forming an 
association and sponsoring their own journal in which they peer 
review each other’s papers and exclude dissenting voices.136 Even 
the quality of review in respected peer-reviewed journals can fail – 
there is a high element of chance due to the difficulty of finding 
reviewers who are qualified, who have time, and who are willing to 
review papers on a volunteer basis. The NCFS has released a 
document which provides a list of criteria for assessing forensic 
science research literature.137 The list is actually a list of things 
which should all be part of the peer review process,138 but the 
NCFS recommends that the criteria be applied in assessing 
literature which has already been published in peer reviewed 
journals.  
Given all these problems, we would recommend that courts 
considering admissibility not be overly impressed by the mere 
existence of a peer-reviewed paper supporting a particular 
technique, unless the judge is able to obtain a competent 
independent assessment of the scientific quality of that paper (or 
they are able to perform their own assessment of scientific quality). 
Any such independent assessment should also consider the extent 
to which the results of a published paper are actually applicable to 
the conditions of the particular case under investigation.139 
As previously mentioned, in Angleton the court considered 
research literature on auditory-spectrographic approaches covering 
a period of over 30 years. The court concluded that: 
                                            
136.  The quality of the review process for peer-reviewed conference 
proceedings, as opposed to peer-reviewed journal articles, is often particularly 
poor, each reviewer often being asked to review up to 10 submissions in a short 
amount of time. Another problem is the rise and proliferation of so-called 
predatory journals, journals which have the trappings of peer reviewed journals 
but which will publish essentially anything if the authors are willing to pay: 
Jeffrey Beall, Predatory Publishing is Just One of the Consequences of Gold 
Open Access, 26 LEARNED PUBLISHING 79–84 (2013), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1087/20130203; John Bohannon, Who’s Afraid of Peer 
Review? 342 SCIENCE 60–65 (Oct 4, 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/
science.342.6154.60. It may not be immediately obvious whether a cited paper is 
a genuine peer reviewed paper published in a respected journal, or whether it 
was published in a predatory journal. 
137.  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI, ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATIONAL 
LITERATURE WITHIN THE FORENSIC SCIENCE DISCIPLINES (2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/795096/download. 
138.  We think, however that requiring strict adherence to every point 
would be overzealous. 
139.  For additional discussion of the strengths and limitations of peer review 
as a means for assessing scientific evidence, see Susan Haack, Evidence Matters: 
Science Proof, and Truth in the Law Chapter 7 (2014). 
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Although aspects of the voice spectrographic method have 
been subject to review in published studies, many of the 
studies conclude that voice spectrographic analysis is of 
questionable scientific validity as a method of identifying an 
unknown speaker.140 
D. Standards 
The Daubert ruling also states that “in the case of a particular 
scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider . . . the 
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s 
operation.”141  
What are standards? National and International Standards142 
are published by Standards organizations. They have procedures 
for developing Standards which include an opportunity for public 
comment on drafts, through which stakeholders can provide 
feedback.143 A laboratory that wishes to be accredited has to 
demonstrate that it follows one or more relevant National or 
International Standards.144 Clients may require a laboratory to be 
accredited to a particular Standard before contracting services 
from that laboratory. The FSR in England & Wales, and the NRC 
and NCFS in the U.S. have respectively mandated and 
recommended that forensic science providers be accredited.145 For 
many forensic laboratories this is accreditation to International 
Standard ISO/IEC 17025.146 This Standard requires laboratories to 
                                            
140.  United States v. Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 2d 892, 899 (S.D. Tex. 2003). 
141.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
142.  We use initial capitalization to distinguish an official Standard 
published by a National or International Standards organization from anything 
else which may in common usage be called a standard. 
143.  The procedure is not perfect in every instance. The public comment 
period may be short and there may be a failure to publicize it well to potential 
stakeholders. The committee charged with drafting the standard has to consider 
the comments but does not necessarily have to substantially revise the 
document, even in the face of major criticism.  
144.  Guidelines may also be issued by National and International Standards 
organizations. A Guideline differs from a Standard in that documenting 
compliance with a Standard is essential for accreditation, but a Guideline 
constitutes advice which the laboratory can choose to follow or not. Compliance 
with Guidelines does not form part of the accreditation process. 
145.  FSR 2014, supra note 72; NRC 2009, supra note 70; NCFS 2015 
universal, supra note 73. 
146.  International Standard Organization / International Electrotechnical 
Commission, ISO/IEC 17025 General Requirements for the Competence of 
Testing and Calibration Laboratories, https://www.iso.org/standard/39883.html. 
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develop written policies and procedures and produce 
documentation which demonstrates that they follow those policies 
and procedures. The Standard defines what the policies and 
procedures should cover, but the laboratory has substantial 
discretion as to the details. The Standard includes a requirement to 
document validation of implementations of methods used by the 
laboratory (empirically demonstrate the validity and reliability of 
systems based on approaches). Accreditation bodies will inspect 
the laboratory and award accreditation if the laboratory has 
demonstrated that it is in compliance with the Standard. It should 
be remembered that being accredited and following a Standard is 
no more than a guarantee that a Standard has been followed and 
that there is documentation to show that it has been followed, but 
it does not guarantee that the results of an analysis will necessarily 
be correct, especially if the Standard or the validation procedures 
are not actually fit for purpose. 
The Daubert ruling does not, however, define what the 
Supreme Court meant by the term standard, and in interpreting 
Daubert, it is clear that courts consider the term standard to be 
much broader than National and International Standards. Courts 
appear to accept practically any so-called standard developed by 
just about any organization without necessarily going through the 
procedures which would be needed to develop a National or 
International Standard. The standards that have been mentioned in 
court rulings include standards developed by the International 
Association of Voice Identification (hereinafter IAVI), the 
International Association for Identification (hereinafter IAI), and 
the American Board of Recorded Evidence (hereinafter ABRE).147 
                                            
The Standard is actually designed for testing and calibration laboratories rather 
than forensic laboratories, and may therefore not be ideal. 
147.  IAVI 1979, supra note 32; IAI 1991, supra note 32; ABRE 1999, supra 
note 32. 
These standards have been mentioned in several rulings. E.g., United States 
v. Williams, 583 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Smith, 869 F. 
2d 348, 353–54 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 2d 892, 
902 (S.D. Tex. 2003); State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 400 (Alaska 1999); State v. 
Forty, (Vt. 2009) 989 A.2d 509, 520. 
The court in Angleton found that “The IAI . . . has ceased certifying aural 
spectrographic examiners” and that the forensic practitioner in that case failed to 
follow all requirements of the IAI and ABRE standards. Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 
2d at 902. 
Under Daubert, the lower court in Coon found that the auditory-
spectrographic approach had been tested and had a low error rate when the IAI 
standards were followed, and that the practitioner in that case had followed 
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These groups were, however, all formed by practitioners of the 
auditory-spectrographic approach and the standards were written 
by practitioners of the auditory-spectrographic approach.148 The 
existence of standards should not be taken as conveying any 
credibility on claims made by the supporters of an approach when 
those standards simply assume that the approach is valid and 
reliable rather than requiring demonstration of degree of validity 
and reliability if implementations of the approach under casework 
conditions. How would a neutral observer choose between 
mutually contradictory standards or position statements issued by 
rival associations when what each has to say amounts to no more 
than ipse dixit? 
[T]he IAI “does not support or approve the use of any 
other voice identification technique [other than the 
                                            
those standards. The appeal court found that the lower court had not abused its 
discretion. 
In Forty the defense sought to have forensic voice comparison testimony 
based on an auditory-spectrographic approach admitted. The lower court held 
an admissibility hearing in which the defense expert testified. The prosecution 
did not call a forensic expert of its own and did not challenge the defense expert 
with respect to his claims regarding error rates. Instead the prosecution attacked 
the testimony on the grounds that the forensic practitioner had not followed the 
ABRE standards. The ABRE standards required at least ten words to be 
examined, but the recording of the offender was short and the forensic 
practitioner had only examined eight words. Citing previous rulings, the lower 
court ruled that the testimony failed to satisfy the criteria of Daubert and 
Vermont Rule 702, and was thus inadmissible. The appeals court sympathized 
with the lower court’s predicament of having to rule in a situation in which the 
prosecution failed to present adequate arguments related to the evidence 
proffered by the defense; however, it found that the lower court was in error in 
relying on rulings made by other courts rather than on the evidence and 
arguments presented to it by the parties. Ultimately, however, the appeals court 
upheld the lower court’s decision to exclude the testimony on the grounds that 
the ABRE standards had not been followed. From a scientific perspective we 
find absurd the implication that the addition of two extra words would have 
magically rendered the auditory-spectrographic testimony acceptable. The 
appeals court in Forty appears to have found a scientifically indefensible but 
legally correct way to uphold the lower court’s decision that the testimony was 
inadmissible. Arguably it did the right thing for the wrong reason. 
148.  The IAVI was established as an independent association in 1971 and 
became part of the IAI in 1980. See Gruber & Poza 1995, supra note 8 at §123. 
ABRE was a group which subsequently broke away from the IAI. See United 
States v. Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 2d 878, 892 (S.D. Tex. 2003). 
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auditory-spectrographic techniques] listed within these 
standards.”149 
IAFPA [International Association for Forensic Phonetics 
and Acoustics] dissociates itself from the approach to 
forensic speech comparison known as the “voiceprint” or 
“voicegram” method . . . . The Association considers this 
approach to be without scientific foundation, and it should 
not be used in forensic casework.150 
We would caution that the existence of standards, and that a 
practitioner follows those standards, is no guarantee of the validity 
and reliability of the results.151  
 
E. General Acceptance 
Frye states: 
‘The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses 
are admissible in evidence in those cases in which the 
matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are 
unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment 
upon it, for the reason that the subject matter so far 
partakes of a science, art, or trade as to require a previous 
habit or experience or study in it, in order to acquire a 
knowledge of it. When the question involved does not lie 
within the range of common experience or common 
knowledge, but requires special experience or special 
knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that 
                                            
149.  IAI 1991, supra note 32. 
150.  Int’l Ass’n for Forensic Phonetics & Acoustics, IAFPA Resolution - 
Voiceprints (July 24, 2007), http://www.iafpa.net/voiceprintsres.htm. IAFPA was 
formed in 1991. It was formed by, and primarily consists of, practitioners of 
auditory-acoustic-phonetic approaches. 
151.  Standards which at first may seem to be rational can miss the mark. 
For example, the ABRE standard includes a section on the preparation of 
spectrograms which includes instructions as to technical settings to be used when 
making spectrograms. ABRE 1999, supra note 32. One may be willing to accept 
that following these instructions will produce better quality spectrograms, but be 
skeptical about the degree of validity and reliability of the spectrographic 
approach as a whole. As previously mentioned, it is not enough to validate 
components of a system, one has to validate the performance of the system as a 
whole. One may also decide that the ABRE standards now refer to obsolete 
technology. They refer to analogue audio recordings on magnetic tape and the 
use of specialized hardware for the generation of spectrograms. Id. 
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particular science, art, or trade to which the question relates 
are admissible in evidence.’ . . . Just when a scientific 
principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. 
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the 
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a 
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a 
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing 
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs. [emphasis added] 
Daubert rejected the idea that general acceptance should be 
the only relevant factor for determining admissibility, but stated 
that: 
“[G]eneral acceptance” can yet have a bearing on the 
inquiry. A “reliability assessment does not require, although 
it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific 
community and an express determination of a particular 
degree of acceptance within that community.” . . . 
Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in 
ruling particular evidence admissible, and “a known 
technique that has been able to attract only minimal 
support within the community,” . . . may properly be 
viewed with skepticism.152 
Ultimately, however, the Court in Daubert concluded that 
“‘general acceptance’ is not a necessary precondition to the 
admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.”153  
The outcome of a judicial inquiry into “general acceptance” 
often depends on the judge’s determinations of what must be 
accepted and by whom.  
What exactly is “the thing from which the deduction is made” 
in the context of forensic voice comparison? Is it the approach, the 
framework, the system as applied in a particular case, or, as we 
would argue, all of these? The assessment of “general acceptance” 
may well depend on the answer to this question.  
In the context of forensic voice comparison, who must 
generally accept this thing? That is, what class of experts constitutes 
                                            
152.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
153.  Id. at 597. 
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the “relevant scientific community” whose views are to be 
examined to determine “general acceptance?” Is it practitioners of 
a particular approach, researchers who publish specifically on 
forensic voice comparison, researchers in the broader scientific 
community? The assessment of “general acceptance” will also 
depend on the answer to this question. 
If the goal of the inquiry is to ensure the trustworthiness of 
forensic voice comparison evidence, then we suggest courts look to 
a relatively broad scientific community. Spectrographic analysis is 
undoubtedly accepted among the community of spectrographic 
analysts (just as astrology is generally accepted among astrologers 
and phrenology among phrenologists), but history suggests that 
acceptance of a particular approach among enthusiastic promoters 
or users of the approach, who often have a financial stake it its 
success, provides little assurance that it is trustworthy. 
In Coon,154 when considering under Daubert the admissibility 
of testimony based on the auditory-spectrographic approach, the 
appeal court noted that the lower court described the relevant 
scientific community as “forensic scientists and scientists in 
acoustics and speech-related fields with experience using the 
technique.” The lower court therefore defined the relevant 
scientific community narrowly, effectively excluding all critics of 
the approach other than potentially a few former practitioners who 
had subsequently changed their opinion with respect to its efficacy. 
The critics would have no doubt disputed the error rate claims of 
the proponents. The appeal court in Coon noted that in 
Gortarez155 the relevant scientific community had been defined 
more widely as “disinterested and impartial experts in many fields, 
possibly including acoustical engineering, acoustics, 
communications electronics, linguistics, phonetics, physics, and 
speech communications,” the latter list being non-exclusive.156 The 
appeal court in Coon found that it was not clear whether the 
auditory-spectrographic approach was generally accepted within 
the relevant scientific community, but did not conclude that the 
lower court had abused its discretion in choosing a narrow 
definition for the relevant scientific community or in finding that 
                                            
154.  State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 401 (Alaska 1999). 
155.  Id. (citing State v. Gortarez, 686 P.2d 1224, 1233 (Ariz. 1984)). 
156.  The appeal court in Gortarez reviewed a large number of research 
publications (43 were listed) and found that the auditory-spectrographic 
approach was not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community and 
hence inadmissible under Frye. Gortarez, 686 P.2d at 1236. 
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the approach was generally accepted. Faigman et al. (2015)157 note 
that, under Frye, when courts have adopted a broad definition of 
the relevant scientific community they have unanimously found the 
auditory-spectrographic approach to be inadmissible, whereas 
when they have adopted a narrow definition they have 
unanimously found it admissible. In its implementation, the 
general acceptance criterion has therefore been about choosing a 
relevant scientific community rather than determining whether an 
approach is generally accepted within the relevant scientific 
community.  
For U.S. courts the general acceptability of the spectrographic 
approach appears to have waned,158 but is there any evidence that 
there is currently a generally accepted approach to forensic voice 
comparison? There are at least two relatively recent surveys of 
approaches used by practitioners, and at least one relatively recent 
review of the research literature. We discuss these in Appendix D. 
Ultimately, however, we think that general acceptance is a very 
poor indicator of scientific validity, especially during a period in 
which a paradigm shift159 is underway, as is now the case in 
                                            
157.  Faigman et al., supra note 2. 
158.  Although the appeal court in Drones did not actually rule on the issue 
of admissibility, testimony called by both parties indicated that by the year 2000 
general acceptance of the auditory-spectrographic approach had waned. United 
States v. Drones, 218 F.3d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 2000). During a habeas corpus 
hearing an expert witness called by the defense “testified that there were 
published recommended procedures for conducting [auditory-spectrographic] 
voice identification examinations, . . . [but] that there was no set of objective 
criteria against which to check the accuracy of a particular expert’s analysis and 
that voice identification analysis was largely subjective,” Id. at 499,and that 
“[While] expert voice identification testimony has been used extensively in state 
and federal courts over the past thirty years . . . [the expert] did not know if 
spectrographic evidence was widely accepted by the relevant scientific 
community.” Id. at 503. An expert witness called by the prosecution “testified 
that very little research has been done in the area of ‘courtroom application of 
spectrographic voice identification,’ largely because since the 1970’s, many 
researchers have felt that spectrographic comparison could not produce reliable 
results. [The expert further] stated that ‘almost nobody’ in the relevant scientific 
community uses spectrographic voice identification because there is no 
theoretical basis for the proposition that an individual’s voice is truly unique and 
identifiable.” Id. at 499. “He further stated that [the lack of theoretical basis] has 
resulted in a precipitous drop in the number of expert practitioners over the past 
few decades, from fifty to sixty practitioners in the 1970’s to roughly a dozen 
experts at the time of Drones’s trial.” Id. at 503. 
159.  THOMAS S. KUHN, THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION: PLANETARY 
ASTRONOMY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN THOUGHT (1957); KUHN 1970, 
supra note 3. 
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forensic science in general160 and forensic voice comparison in 
particular.161 One should not prefer an earth centered model of the 
universe, or prefer an approach to forensic voice comparison 
based on subjective judgment, because it is the preference of the 
majority of scientists and/or practitioners, one should prefer the 
model or approach which shows the greatest promise or which is 
ultimately demonstrated to make the most valid and reliable 
predictions / strength of evidence statements.162 
 
F. Conclusion with Respect to Admissibility 
Concluding remarks of Section II C of the Daubert ruling 
include the following statements: 
The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a 
flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity–
and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability–of the 
principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, 
of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, 
not on the conclusions that they generate.163 
Given all the above, we believe that the Daubert criterion 
which should be given greatest weight is that requiring empirical 
demonstration of degree of validity and reliability. Indeed, we 
believe that this should be both a necessary and a sufficient 
criterion. We believe that the other criteria (peer-reviewed 
                                            
160.  MICHAEL J. SAKS & JONATHAN J. KOEHLER, The Coming Paradigm 
Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 892–895 (2005). 
161.  Morrison 2009, supra note 33. 
162.  According to Kuhn, scientific revolutions are precipitated by crises, 
such as a major problem which has repeatedly defied solution within the old 
paradigm. The new paradigm must at least offer the promise of a solution, but 
the realization of that promise need not be immediate. It actually took 
approximately 80 years before the empirical advantages of the Copernican 
revolution were realized. It took Kepler’s mathematical models applied to 
Brahe’s observations to produce more accurate predictions of planetary motion 
than had ever been possible before. It would not, however, have been possible 
without a shift from an earth-centered to a sun-centered paradigm. Even with an 
empirically demonstrated better solution to the problem, there was still 
concerted opposition to the Copernican paradigm, and it took at least another 
half century before it became universally accepted. Polling the scientific 
community during that period would not have given us the answer which later 
was universally accept as correct (although the paradigm has since shifted at 
least once again with Einstein’s theories of relativity). 
163.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95 (1993). 
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publication, standards, and general acceptance) constitute 
secondary proxies. Although a degree of correlation with the 
primary criterion may be expected, none of the other criteria 
should be considered either necessary or sufficient, either 
individually or in combination.164 
 
VII. THE FORENSIC VOICE COMPARISON TESTIMONY IN US V 
AHMED 
We review and critique the testimony in the recent case of U.S. 
v. Ahmed165 in some detail. The reason for this is that many of the 
problems in this testimony are concrete examples of the sorts of 
problems that we expect to potentially recur in future attempts to 
have forensic voice comparison testimony admitted under 
Daubert. Understanding the specific problems in this case will 
therefore potentially assist forensic practitioners to avoid making 
the same types of mistakes in the future and/or assist lawyers and 
judges to identify, understand, and deal with the occurrence of 
these types of problems in the future. 
 
A. Summary of the Testimony 
In Ahmed a forensic practitioner compared five recordings 
known to be of defendant Yusuf with three questioned-speaker 
recordings associated with terrorist activity. Four of the known-
speaker recordings were of intercepted mobile telephone calls and 
one was of a landline telephone call. The questioned recordings 
consisted of one video recording of a man speaking with a 
bandana over his mouth and two intercepted mobile telephone 
calls. The quality of the questioned-speaker recordings was poor.166 
                                            
164.  See also Jonathan J. Koehler, Forensics or Fauxrensics? Ascertaining 
Accuracy in the Forensic Sciences, 49 ARIZ. ST. L. J. (forthcoming Jan. 2018). 
165.  United States v. Ahmed, 94 F. Supp. 3d 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12-
661). 
166.  The video recording had been retrieved from the internet and showed 
signs of lossy compression. Compression is a procedure which reduces the size 
of files so that less space is taken up on storage devices and so that they can be 
transmitted faster or more files can be transmitted in the same time. Many 
compression algorithms are lossy in that they result in the loss of some acoustic 
information and some distortion of the remaining acoustic information. 
Additionally, there were some transient background noises on the recording 
(including gunshots), which the practitioner manually edited out. One of the 
mobile recordings contained “highly degrading electrical current noise,” Report 
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In the known-speaker recordings and in two of the three 
questioned-speaker recordings, the speaker spoke a mixture of 
Swedish, Somali, and Arabic. The other questioned-speaker 
recording contained no Swedish. 
As described below, the practitioner compared the known- and 
questioned-speaker recordings167 using four different approaches: 
auditory, acoustic-phonetic non-statistical, acoustic-phonetic 
statistical, and automatic. He then combined the results of these 
four analyses to reach a final conclusion as to the strength of the 
evidence. 
 
1. Relevant Population 
The forensic practitioner stated that he regarded “a reasonable 
reference population in this case to be young male Somali and 
Swedish speakers of the Stockholm area with a fluent ability in 
Swedish.”168 He stated that the known speaker spoke Swedish with 
a Stockholm accent. He did not say anything about the accent of 
                                            
§1.3.1, which was probably electrical hum from an alternating current electrical 
supply, which runs at either 50 or 60 Hz depending on the part of the world. 
The other mobile recording contained “disruptive electrical pulses” which 
occurred once every half second, and it also had “a very low transmission bit 
rate” Report §1.3.1. Mobile telephone systems use lossy compression so that less 
data are transmitted. The amount of compression varies depending on the 
demand put on the mobile telephone system, greater compression corresponds 
to a lower “transmission bit rate” and greater loss and distortion of the acoustic 
information in the signal. This leads to poorer performance from forensic voice 
comparison systems compared to if the recordings are landline telephone 
recordings (which in turn leads to poorer performance than if the recordings are 
direct microphone recordings); see, e.g., Cuiling Zhang et al., Effects of 
Telephone Transmission on the Performance of Formant-Trajectory-Based 
Forensic Voice Comparison – Female Voices, 55 SPEECH COMM. 796 (2013). 
167.  In his analyses, the practitioner grouped the known-speaker recordings 
together and compared these as a group with each individual questioned-
speaker recording: 
Comparison 1: known-speaker recordings versus the video recording (54 
seconds net speech, lossy compression) 
Comparison 2: known-speaker recordings versus the longer mobile 
telephone recording (82 seconds net speech, electrical pulses, very low 
transmission bit rate) 
Comparison 3: known-speaker recordings versus the shorter mobile 
telephone recording (35 seconds net speech, electrical hum, no Swedish) 
The material in parentheses describes the conditions of the questioned-
speaker recording in each comparison. 
168.  Report §3.1. 
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the voices on the questioned-speaker recordings, but we assume 
that they also spoke Swedish with Somali and Stockholm accents. 
 
2. Auditory Analysis 
The forensic practitioner noted auditory perceptual similarities 
between the pronunciation of particular Swedish vowel and 
consonant sounds, and particular words in the questioned-speaker 
recordings and in the known-speaker recordings. He also noted: 
similar use of filler words169 and of a grammatically incorrect 
phrase; similarities in tempo and intonation, and that the voices 
were somewhat nasal and had a raised laryngeal setting;170 that the 
speakers mixed languages (a phenomenon known as code 
switching), but also that this was relatively common for the relevant 
population. 
When asked about the conclusions drawn from his auditory 
approach, the practitioner stated: “The important thing is that, you 
know, it’s not assessed separately every single thing. It’s more of a 
wholistic picture in the end.”171  
 
3. Acoustic-Phonetic Non-Statistical Analysis 
The forensic practitioner measured several acoustic-phonetic 
properties of the speech in the recordings. He compared 
measurements of fundamental frequency and of articulation rate (a 
measure of how fast the speaker is speaking) for the Swedish-
language portions of the recordings. He found that both were 
within the normal range for Swedish speakers. 
 
                                            
169.  In English, filler words include um, ah, and like. 
170.  The practitioner did not mention that Somali is a language which 
includes speech sounds made with a constricted pharynx; Jerold A. Edmondson 
et al., The Laryngeal Articulator: Source and Resonator, PROC. 16TH INT’L. 
CONGRESS PHONETIC SCI. 2065–68 (2007), 
http://www.icphs2007.de/conference/Papers/1674/1674.pdf. This could potentially 
influence a bilingual Somali-Swedish speaker’s Swedish pronunciation and could 
be perceived as a raised laryngeal setting. 
171.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 104, United States v. Ahmed, 94 F. 
Supp. 3d 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12-661). 
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4. Acoustic-Phonetic Statistical Analysis172 
The forensic practitioner also compared long-term formant 
measurements, which are measurements taken over all instances of 
all the vowel sounds in the whole of the recording (and of the 
subset of consonant sounds for which formants can also be 
measured). In addition to comparing the questioned-speaker 
recordings with the known-speaker recordings, the practitioner also 
compared them with a set of 500 recordings of other speakers from 
a database. He described these as having “similar acoustics to [the 
recordings] in the case.”173 No details were provided as to how 
exactly these recordings reflected the conditions of the known-
speaker or questioned-speaker recordings, or what population the 
speakers represented.  
The statistical analysis did not involve calculation of likelihood 
ratios. Instead, it involved calculating scores and then making a 
subjective judgment based on the value of the questioned-speaker 
versus known-speaker score compared to the database-speakers 
versus known-speaker scores.174 
 
5. Automatic Analysis 
The forensic practitioner also made use of a commercially 
marketed forensic voice comparison system: Batvox version 4.1,175 
produced by the company Agnitio.176 The measurements that 
                                            
172.  Although we have listed this approach as an acoustic-phonetic 
statistical approach, it could instead be considered an automatic approach, but 
using a type of measurement which is traditional in acoustic phonetics rather 
than a type of measurement which is traditional in speech processing. 
173.  Report §3.3.3. 
174.  The procedure was to calculate a score for the comparison of a 
questioned-speaker recording with the set of known speaker recordings, and also 
calculate scores for the comparison of each of the 500 database speakers with 
the set of known speaker recordings. No details were supplied with respect to 
the algorithm which was used to calculate the scores. All the scores were ranked, 
and if a questioned-speaker score was ranked the highest the practitioner made a 
subjective judgment as to the strength of the evidence based on the magnitude 
of the questioned-speaker score compared to the 500 database-speaker scores. 
175.  For a more technical but still brief description of this system, see David 
van der Vloed, Evaluation of Batvox 4.1 Under Conditions Reflecting Those of 
a Real Forensic Voice Comparison Case (forensic_eval_01), 85 SPEECH COMM. 
127, 127–130 (2016), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167639316302357 [hereinafter 
van der Vloed 2016]. 
176.  In November 2016 Agnitio was purchased by Nuance. 
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Batvox makes are MFCCs (see Section II4). The statistical 
modeling technique used by Batvox is based on i-vectors, which is 
a common approach in automatic speaker recognition systems. 
Batvox first produces a score for the comparison of a questioned-
speaker recording and the known-speaker recordings, then 
converts that score to a likelihood ratio. Again the general 
approach is common in automatic speaker recognition systems, 
although some of the details of the particular implementation may 
be peculiar to Batvox. To calculate scores, Batvox uses a statistical 
model trained on data, but those data are diverse and not 
representative of the particular relevant population or particular 
conditions of the case. Instead, Batvox attempts to take account of 
the relevant population and conditions of the particular case 
during a subsequent score to likelihood ratio conversion process. 
The user enters reference population data consisting of recordings 
of a number of speakers, and Batvox selects the recordings which 
it calculates to be most similar to the known speaker. The 
reference data which the practitioner entered consisted of 
approximately 6000 mobile telephone calls and 5000 landline 
telephone calls (the population represented by the speakers in 
these recordings appears to have been Swedish speakers in 
general).177 The practitioner had Batvox select the 45 recordings 
which it calculated to be most similar to the suspect model. These 
45 selected recordings were then used in training a statistical model 
which was used to convert scores to likelihood ratios.  
As is common in automatic speaker recognition systems, 
Batvox includes statistical techniques intended to compensate for 
recording condition mismatches. One of these techniques requires 
the user to provide Batvox with recordings which they believe 
reflect the recording conditions of the questioned-speaker 
recording. This set of recordings is known as an imposter set. 
These recordings are then used to train a statistical model intended 
to compensate for the mismatch in recording conditions between 
the known-speaker and the questioned-speaker recordings. Use of 
                                            
177.  The practitioner stated that “reference population data used can come 
from dialect databases such as Swedia, forensic material and other in-house 
adapted material” (Report §2.1). The Swedia database is a database of 
recordings of speakers with different dialects of Swedish. The forensic 
practitioner estimated that there were between 10 and 20 Somali Swedish 
speakers in the recordings in the reference data which he entered into the 
automatic system – less than 1% of the total number of speakers (Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 190, supra note 171). 
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this mismatch compensation technique, and hence use of an 
imposter set, is optional. 
For one of the comparisons (Comparison 1), the practitioner 
first performed an analysis without an imposter set, and then 
performed another analysis using an imposter set consisting of 85 
recordings of “young male speakers”178 recorded using lapel 
microphones. No additional information was provided regarding 
what population these speakers represented. For the other 
comparisons (Comparisons 2 and 3), no imposter set was used. 
Batvox outputs numeric likelihood ratio values, but the 
practitioner did not report these values. Instead he used the output 
of the automatic system as input to a subjective judgment process 
and used verbal expressions to convey the strength of the 
evidence.179  
 
6. Combination of Results and Statements of Conclusions 
The forensic practitioner combined the results from all four 
approaches and expressed his conclusions on a nine-level scale. 
The nine-level scale (reproduced in Appendix E) was based on 
that used by the Swedish National Laboratory of Forensic Science, 
with some additions made by the practitioner.180 The forensic 
                                            
178.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 95, supra note 171. 
179.  The practitioner offered the explanation that: “The outcome of all the 
tests made with any automatic system is treated as only one part in a full analysis 
. . . If the material in the case has been judged to be such that proper tests can 
be made with automatic systems, the scores or likelihood ratios are treated as an 
input to the analysts. It means that the experience of using a software is much 
more important than a score or likelihood ratio itself. For different material, 
different score spaces or likelihood ratio spans are expected due to the duration 
and or mismatch and quality between the material tested. I.e. for a mismatched 
test an analyst is better at judging the value of a score or a likelihood ratio than 
the machine itself and the analyst will together with the other results of the 
analysis judge where in a likelihood ratio span the outcome should be placed, 
i.e. on which level in the ordinal scale.” Report § 2.1, supra note 171. 
180.  Ordinal scales of this general type are popular in conjunction with 
both the likelihood ratio framework and other frameworks for the evaluations of 
evidence. See, e.g., Am. Bd. of Recorded Evidence, supra note 32; IAI 1991, 
supra note 32; Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, Commentary on A. P. A. 
Broeders (1999); ‘Some Observations On the Use of Probability Scales in 
Forensic Identification’, 7 INT’L J. SPEECH LANGUAGE & L. 238–243 (2000); 
AFSP 2009, supra note 69; Sheila M. Willis, Louise L. McKenna, Sean 
McDermott, Geraldine O’Donell, Aurélie Barrett, Birgitta Rasmusson, Anders 
Nordgaard, Charles E.H. Berger, Marjan J. Sjerps, José Juan Lucena-Molina, 
Grzegorz Zadora, Colin G.G. Aitken, Luan Lunt, Christophe Champod, Alex 
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practitioner did not express his final conclusions as numeric 
likelihood ratio values; he only provided the level numbers and 
verbal expressions from his nine-level scale. 
No details were provided as to how the results were combined 
other than that they were “weighted.” The report stated that: “For 
the [auditory] and [acoustic-]phonetic analyses a holistic likelihood 
ratio span is judged impressionistically and combined with the 
results from the automatic tests.”181 It also stated that: “The 
numbers representing the levels in the scale are only to a certain 
degree statistically based through calculation and to some extent a 
judgement of likelihood ratios.”182 When questioned during direct, 
the forensic practitioner stated that “the final conclusion is, of 
course, wholistic judgment based on all the tests made and the 
comparisons made in the whole examination.”183  
                                            
Biedermann, Tasha N. Hicks & Franco Taroni, ENFSI Guideline for Evaluative 
Reporting in Forensic Science (2015). 
181.  Report § 4. 
182.  Note appended to the version of the nine-level scale provided in the 
forensic practitioner’s report. 
183.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 121, supra note 171. The practitioner 
did not use the Level numbers to express the strength of evidence for each 
analysis and sub-analysis he performed. Instead, he used verbal expression such 
as “some support,” “support,” “strong support,” “distinct similarities.” Below we 
convert these to their corresponding Level values on the nine-level scale. We 
also report the Level values corresponding to the likelihood ratio values output 
by the automatic system. With one exception, the Level corresponding to the 
practitioner’s verbal expression was higher than that corresponding to the 
numeric likelihood ratio output by the automatic system. For a description of 
what constituted each comparison, see supra note 167. 
For Comparison 1, the forensic practitioner concluded that the strength of 
evidence was Level +3. 
Strengths of evidence reported for the auditory analyses correspond to 
Levels +2, +2, +3, +1, +3;  
for the acoustic-phonetic non-statistical analyses to Levels 0, 0;  
for the acoustic-phonetic statistical analysis to Level +2;  
and for the automatic analyses to Level +1 (LR = 35) or Level +2 (“support”) 
when no imposter set was used, or to Level +2 (LR = 158) or Level +4 
(“extremely strong support”) when an imposter set was used. 
For Comparison 2, the forensic practitioner concluded that the strength of 
evidence was Level +2. 
Strengths of evidence reported for the auditory analyses correspond to 
Levels +2, +1, +3, +2, +2, +1, +3;  
for the acoustic-phonetic non-statistical analyses to Levels 0, 0;  
for the acoustic-phonetic statistical analysis to Level +1;  
and for the automatic analysis to Level +1 (LR = 42) or +2 (“support”). 
For Comparison 3, the forensic practitioner concluded that the strength of 
evidence was Level 0. 
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B. Critique of Testimony 
How can we know whether the practitioner’s conclusions in 
this case were trustworthy? How should a court evaluate the 
admissibility of such testimony under Daubert? In the present 
section we critique the testimony in light of Rule 702 and the 
Daubert criteria. Each section below (except the last) addresses a 
question which is asked using Rule 702, Daubert, or Frye 
terminology. The last question relates to contextual bias, an issue 
not explicitly identified in Daubert but now of increasing concern. 
The questions are: 
Section 1: What methodology and reasoning were used? 
Section2: Was the testimony based on sufficient data and 
were the principles and methods reliability 
applied to the facts of the case? 
Section 3: Has the technique been empirically tested and 
what is the known rate of error? 
Section 4: Has the technique been subjected to peer 
review and publication? 
Section 5: Are there standards controlling the technique’s 
operation? 
Section 6: Is the thing from which the deduction is made 
sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs? 
Section 7: Were reasonable steps taken to reduce the 
potential for contextual bias? 
 
1. What Methodology and Reasoning were used? 
The Daubert ruling instructs the trial judge to consider 
“whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony 
is scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning or 
                                            
The strength of evidence reported for the automatic analysis corresponds to 
Level 0 (LR = 1/3.3, “no support”). The automatic analysis was the only one 
conducted for this comparison. 
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methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”184 A 
prerequisite to answering these questions is to understand what 
“methodology” and “reasoning” were used, i.e., what approach 
and framework were used. 
At first glance, it may have looked like the Daubert hearing 
was about the admissibility of an automatic approach to forensic 
voice comparison, but this was not the case. An automatic 
approach was used, but it was only one of multiple approaches 
employed by the forensic practitioner, and the final conclusion as 
to the strength of evidence depended little on the output of the 
automatic system.185 The methodology used by the forensic 
practitioner was a mixture of auditory, acoustic-phonetic non-
statistical, acoustic-phonetic statistical, and automatic approaches. 
The output of the analysis based on each approach was either 
intrinsically a subjective judgment made by the practitioner, or a 
subjective judgment made by the practitioner based on the output 
of a statistical model (the output of the statistical model was not 
directly reported). The final conclusion as to the strength of the 
evidence resulting from the combination of all the approaches was 
                                            
184.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993). 
185.  With one exception, the forensic practitioner’s subjective verbal 
expression of the strength of evidence for an automatic analysis corresponded to 
a Level value more favorable to the prosecution than the Level corresponding to 
the likelihood ratio value output by Batvox. When the likelihood ratio value 
corresponded to Level +1, the verbal expression corresponded to +2, and when 
the likelihood ratio value corresponded to Level +2, the verbal expression 
corresponded to +4. The latter corresponding to a likelihood ratio value of 1 
million or more, when the likelihood ratio value output by Batvox was only 158!  
The difference between the actual likelihood ratio value output by the 
automatic system and the practitioner’s verbal expression of the strength of 
evidence based on the output of the automatic system was due to the 
practitioner using his experience and also taking into consideration another 
analysis he had conducted. 
Q: But you disagreed with the outcome that Batvox arrived at, didn’t you? 
A: [. . . for] Mismatched. Yes, yes. 
Q: And you [dis]agreed because of your own personal experience? 
A: Yes. On how it evaluates for these kind of mismatched conditions in 
combination with a phonetic analysis. 
Q: And so again, this is a place where we should just take your word for it that 
your score is more representative of what really happened than the score of 
Batvox? 
A: Yes. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 269, supra note 171 (emphasis added). 
The Advisory Committee’s commentary on Rule 702 notes that “The trial 
court’s gatekeeping function requires more than simply ‘taking the expert’s word 
for it.’” 
2017] FORENSIC VOICE COMPARISON TESTIMONY 401 
also a subjective judgment made by the practitioner.186 It is the 
trustworthiness of this combination of approaches which must be 
assessed in the context of a Daubert hearing. If some component 
parts were judged trustworthy, this would not suffice if they were 
combined with other components of undetermined trustworthiness, 
or if the procedure for combining them was of questionable 
trustworthiness. 
Ostensibly the practitioner made use of the likelihood ratio 
framework. Although the report and oral testimony, and the scale 
of conclusions, included multiple deviations from a proper 
application of the likelihood ratio framework, for the sake of 
brevity we do not discuss those here.187 
 
2. Was the Testimony Based on Sufficient Data and were the 
Principles and Methods Reliability Applied to the Facts of the 
Case? 
                                            
186.  There are fusion procedures which use explicit weights calculated by 
statistical models trained on relevant data. See, e.g., Stéphane Pigeon et al., 
Applying Logistic Regression to the Fusion of the NIST’99 1-Speaker 
Submissions, 10 DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSING 237, 237–48 (2000), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/dspr.1999.0358; Joaquín González-Rodríguez et al., 
Emulating DNA: Rigorous Quantification of Evidential Weight in Transparent 
and Testable Forensic Speaker Recognition, 15 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
AUDIO, SPEECH, & LANGUAGE PROCESSING 2104, 2104–15 (2007); Geoffrey S. 
Morrison, Tutorial on Logistic-Regression Calibration and Fusion: Converting a 
Score to a Likelihood Ratio, 45 AUSTRALIAN J. FORENSIC SCI 173, 173–97 
(2013). Such procedures are transparent and replicable. Output from multiple 
systems may contain some overlapping (correlated) information, but the output 
of each system may also contain some information which is independent of 
(uncorrelated with) the information from the other systems. Statistical models 
can take account of correlation between the output of different systems and 
avoid the bias that would result from counting the same information multiple 
times (a potential problem that often goes under the name of double counting). 
Any improvement due to fusion via such a statistical model will be due to 
combining the independent (uncorrelated) information provided by the different 
systems. In contrast, the practitioner’s “holistic judgment” based final conclusion 
was not transparent, and we have no guarantee that it did not count the same 
information multiple times. (What the practitioner reported as the result of his 
automatic analysis had already been influenced by the result of his phonetic 
analysis, see supra note 185, and therefore even that did not constitute 
independent information.) 
187.  Lack of consistency with the likelihood ratio framework was admitted 
by the practitioner at multiple point in his testimony. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 102, 109, 119, 234, 236, supra note 171, 171. 
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Rule 702 requires that “(b) the testimony is based on sufficient 
facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles 
and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles 
and methods to the facts of the case.” Given the discussion above, 
and as previously stated in Section VI, we believe that these 
conditions can be met if the forensic practitioner’s calculation of 
the strength of evidence makes use of a sample of voice recordings 
which are representative of the relevant population and which 
reflect the conditions of the case under investigation, and if the 
forensic practitioner empirically demonstrates, under conditions 
reflecting those of the case, the degree of validity and reliability of 
their implementation of their approach to forensic voice 
comparison. 
Let us accept the practitioner’s proposal as to the appropriate 
relevant population: young adult male Somali speakers who are 
fluent in Swedish, but who have Somali accents in Swedish. It 
appears that the forensic practitioner did not actually have access 
to a sample which would be representative of the population he 
specified. When asked during cross if he had recorded Somali-
Swedish speakers to use in his automatic analysis, he stated that he 
had not.188 In his automatic analysis, the practitioner entered 
several thousand recordings, of which he estimated 10 to 20 (less 
than 1%) were of Somali-Swedish speakers. He had Batvox select 
45 of those recordings to use as a sample of the relevant 
population. Even if Batvox included all the Somali-Swedish 
speakers, they would still have represented less than half the 45 
used as the sample of the relevant population, the rest presumably 
being Swedish speakers without Somali accents (we have no 
information about which particular speakers’ recordings were 
actually included). Even if the results of the statistical model had 
been directly reported, the output of the automatic analysis would 
not therefore have answered the question implied by what the 
practitioner stated as being the relevant population:  
What is the probability of obtaining the measured acoustic 
properties of the questioned-speaker recording (in which 
the speaker is a young male Somali-accented Swedish 
speaker) if it were produced by the defendant (who is a 
young male Somali-accented Swedish speaker)? 
versus  
                                            
188.  Id. at 190. 
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What is the probability of obtaining the measured acoustic 
properties of the questioned-speaker recording (in which 
the speaker is a young male Somali-accented Swedish 
speaker) if it were produced by some other young male 
Somali-accented Swedish speaker?  
Instead the output of the automatic analysis would have been 
answering a question which would have been much closer to the 
following (fully the following if no Somali-accented speakers were 
included in the 45 selected by Batvox):  
What is the probability of obtaining the measured acoustic 
properties of the questioned-speaker recording (in which 
the speaker is a young male Somali-accented Swedish 
speaker) if it were produced by the defendant (who is a 
young male Somali-accented Swedish speaker)? 
versus  
What is the probability of obtaining the measured acoustic 
properties of the questioned-speaker recording (in which 
the speaker is a young male Somali-accented Swedish 
speaker) if it were produced by a Swedish speaker who 
does not have a Somali accent? 
We contend that the latter is a nonsensical question, and hence 
(even allowing for the question effectively asked to be somewhere 
between the two above) that the data were not “sufficient” and that 
the practitioner did not “reliably appl[y] the principles and 
methods to the facts of the case.” 
 
3. Has the Technique been Empirically Tested and what is the 
Known Rate of Error? 
The Daubert ruling states that “a key question to be answered 
in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific 
knowledge that will assist the trier of -fact will be whether it can be 
(and has been) tested. . . . ‘[T]he statements constituting a scientific 
explanation must be capable of empirical test’”189 And that “in the 
case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should 
consider the known or potential rate of error.”190 Combined with 
                                            
189.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 
190.  Id. at 594. 
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the requirement to consider “whether that reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue,”191 we 
interpret this as implying that empirical tests of validity and 
reliability of the forensic analysis system must be conducted under 
conditions which reflect those of the case under investigation, and 
that the results must be reported. If the judge is first satisfied that 
the data used to test the system are sufficiently representative of the 
relevant population and sufficiently reflective of the conditions of 
the known-and questioned-speaker recordings in the case, the 
judge can then consider whether the demonstrated degree of 
validity and reliability is sufficient. 
For the forensic practitioner’s analysis in Ahmed, what needed 
to be tested was the entire system: the conglomerate of his auditory 
subsystem, his acoustic-phonetic non-statistical subsystem, his 
acoustic-phonetic statistical subsystem, his automatic subsystem, 
and his procedure for combining the results of these subsystems, 
and including the forensic practitioner himself as an integral part of 
the system. As we have previously discussed (Section IV), knowing 
the performance of a subsystem or a component of a subsystem 
would not be sufficient. The final strength of evidence conclusion 
is produced by the system as a whole, and it is the performance of 
the system as a whole which needs to be considered by the judge. 
The forensic practitioner did not provide any results of 
empirical testing of the performance of his system as a whole. 
Indeed, it does not seem that the practitioner’s system as a whole 
has ever been empirically tested under any forensically realistic 
conditions. During cross we have the following exchange: 
Q Have you ever been tested to see what your accuracy 
rate is when you didn’t know the answer in advance? 
A  So the NFC [National Forensic Center] can provide 
blind tests for us whenever they want. And they don’t have 
to tell us. I presume that it’s not very often because it costs 
them money basically. But that’s the only way . . . 
Q  But have you ever been tested, that you know of, by the 
NFC and given the results in a blind test? 
A  No. 
                                            
191.  Id. at 593. 
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Q  And so you rendered results in these 350 or 400 cases 
and in those cases like here you say we should rely on your 
expertise, right? 
A  Yes.192 
We therefore conclude that the forensic practitioner’s method 
has not been tested, that the degree of validity and reliability of the 
implementation of his method has not been empirically 
demonstrated under conditions reflecting those of this case, and 
that the practitioner’s method and its implementation would not 
therefore satisfy this Daubert criterion. 
Although, as we have argued, demonstrating the performance 
of a subsystem would not be sufficient to satisfy the criterion, and 
the forensic practitioner’s expression of the strength of evidence 
depended little on the output of his automatic system anyway, the 
practitioner and the prosecution argued for the scientific validity of 
the automatic system.193 The practitioner’s report referenced a 
number of papers which ostensibly tested Batvox. We could 
critique each in turn, but here we provide only an overview. In 
some papers the evaluations reported were not independent 
evaluations, but evaluations conducted by Agnitio employees or 
others linked to the company (although this does not itself 
invalidate the results, one should be aware that the evaluations 
were not conducted by an independent third party). In some 
papers it is not clear whether the system being tested was actually 
the commercial Batvox version 4.1 used by the practitioner, or a 
different Agnitio system optimized for the particular test. 
Descriptions in some papers suggest that the latter was the case. In 
other papers it is not clear whether Batvox, or any Agnitio system, 
was being tested at all. Some papers seem to be describing other 
systems, and in some papers if Batvox is used it is one of several 
anonymized systems and we do not know which results correspond 
to those from Batvox. 
The relevant population in this case was young male Somali 
Swedish bilinguals with Somali-Stockholm accents in Swedish. The 
                                            
192.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 266, supra note 171. 
193.  For brevity, we do not provide here a discussion of information in the 
report and transcript with respect to testing of the validity and reliability of the 
practitioner’s auditory and acoustic-phonetic analyses, but we found no evidence 
that they had been empirically tested using data which we believe could be 
deemed sufficiently representative of the relevant population and sufficiently 
reflective of the speaking styles and recording conditions of the known- and 
questioned-speaker recordings in the case. 
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technical recording conditions in the case included using three 
mobile telephone recordings and one landline telephone recording 
to train a known-speaker model, and questioned-speaker 
recordings that were from a video with lossy compression, from a 
mobile telephone call with electrical pulses and very low 
transmission bit rate, and from a short (35 seconds net speech) 
mobile telephone call with electrical hum, and there being a 
particular mixture of Swedish, Somali, and Arabic on the 
recordings. We do not believe that any of the cited papers 
reported tests of Batvox under conditions which could reasonably 
be deemed sufficiently representative of this population or 
sufficiently reflective of these conditions for the results to be 
considered informative as to the expected performance of the 
system in this case. 
In a pre-hearing submission194 the prosecution claimed that 
Batvox had been tested by independent organizations and 
academic institutions, and in particular described its performance 
in the 2012 Speaker Recognition Evaluation (SRE) run by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The 
prosecution claimed that Batvox was ranked first or second in four 
out of five conditions and in the top ten overall.195 We would 
contend that this is not relevant since the system submitted by 
Agnitio was a research system, not the commercial version of 
Batvox used by the forensic practitioner,196 and the conditions 
tested in the NIST SRE did not represent the conditions of the 
forensic case under investigation. NIST explicitly states that SRE 
results should not be used to make decisions as to which system is 
best for a particular application,197 and that the SRE is not 
                                            
194.  Pre-hearing Submission, United States v. Ahmed, 94 F. Supp. 3d 394 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12-661). 
195.  The rules of the NIST SRE prohibit participants from making the sort 
of claims made by the prosecution: “Participants may not publish or otherwise 
disseminate their own comparisons of their performance results with those of 
other participants without the explicit written permission of each such 
participant. Furthermore, publicly claiming to ‘win’ the evaluation is strictly 
prohibited. Participants violating this rule will be excluded from future 
evaluations.” Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech., The NIST Year 2012 Speaker 
Recognition Evaluation Plan (2012) at 5, http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/upload/
NIST_SRE12_evalplan-v17-r1.pdf [hereinafter NIST 2012]. 
196.  Audio tape: Interview with Dr. Niko Brümmer, Chief Scientist, Agnitio 
(Jan. 28, 2016) (on file with author). 
197.  NIST includes the following disclaimer on its website: 
These results are not to be construed, or represented as endorsements of 
any participant’s system or commercial product, or as official findings on the 
part of NIST or the U.S. Government. Note that the results submitted by 
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intended to be representative of forensic conditions.198 When 
asked by the judge, the forensic practitioner claimed that the NIST 
SRE 2012 test material were “very similar to the audio in this 
case.”199 The practitioner did not, however, give a detailed 
explanation of how particular recording conditions and particular 
populations represented in the NIST SRE data were similar to the 
particular conditions of the known- and questioned-speaker 
recordings in the case and the relevant population in the case. We 
consider the populations and conditions tested in the SRE to be 
very different from those in the Ahmed case. 
 
4. Has the Technique been Subjected to Peer Review and 
Publication? 
Daubert also states that “Another pertinent consideration is 
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review 
and publication.”200 
The forensic practitioner’s report included 41 references. A 
substantial proportion of these, however, were not peer-reviewed 
articles published in archival venues. Nine (22%) were conference 
presentations which were not accepted in the basis of peer review 
                                            
developers of commercial SR products were generally from research systems, 
not commercially available products. . . . The systems themselves were not 
independently evaluated by NIST. 
The data, protocols, and metrics employed in this evaluation were chosen 
to support SR research and should not be construed as indicating how well these 
systems would perform in applications. While changes in the data domain, or 
changes in the amount of data used to build a system, can greatly influence 
system performance, changing the task protocols could indicate different 
performance strengths and weaknesses for these same systems. 
Because of the above reasons, this should not be interpreted as a product 
testing exercise and the results should not be used to make conclusions 
regarding which commercial products are best for a particular application. 
Nat’l Inst. Of Standards and Tech., SRE12 Results (Jan. 5, 2017), 
http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/sre12results.cfm. 
198.  This is explicitly stated with respect to a Human Assisted Speaker 
Recognition (HASR) test: 
Forensic applications are among the applications that the HASR test serves 
to inform, but the HASR test should not be considered to be a true or 
representative “forensic” test. This is because many of the factors that influence 
speaker recognition performance and that are at play in forensic applications are 
controlled in the HASR test data . . . .  
NIST 2012, supra note 195, at 6. 
199.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 138, supra note 171. 
200.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 
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of a paper. Two of these have associated non-peer-reviewed 
conference proceedings papers, and some of the rest have 
accessible abstracts, but for some there is no currently accessible 
information about their content. One was a conference 
presentation which was cancelled, and hence not actually 
presented. In scientific research, it is papers published in peer 
reviewed archival venues that count. Ephemeral presentations are 
not considered publications and referencing them is generally 
discouraged by reviewers and editors, and (as previously 
mentioned in Section VI) by the NCFS.201 Despite this, the 
previously mentioned pre-hearing submission202 copied the entire 
list of references from the report as evidence of peer review, 
including the 22% that are not peer reviewed publications!  
 
5. Are there Standards Controlling the Technique’s Operation? 
The Daubert ruling states that “in the case of a particular 
scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider . . . the 
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s 
operation.”203  
In her questioning of the forensic practitioner, the prosecutor 
appeared to take a very broad interpretation of the term standard. 
Mention was made of a protocol written by the practitioner and 
agreed to by the Swedish National Forensic Center (NFC),204 the 
International Association for Forensic Phonetics and Acoustics 
(IAFPA) Code of Practice,205 and the European Network of 
Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) Methodological Guidelines for 
. . . Speaker Recognition.206 Nothing that was referred to as a 
                                            
201.  NCFS 2015 LITERATURE, supra note 135. 
202.  Pre-hearing Submission, supra note 194. 
203.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
204.  The practitioner clearly followed this protocol. We think, however, that 
this protocol led the practitioner to follow certain operating procedures which 
we consider unwise, see infra §7. 
205.  This code of practice is very general, it addresses some ethical issues, 
but it says nothing about which approach or framework to use or how to use 
them, and it says nothing about testing validity and reliability. Int’l Ass’n for 
Forensic Phonetics & Acoustics, Code of Practice, http://www.iafpa.net/code.htm 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
206.  Andrzej Drygajlo et al., Methodological Guidelines for Best Practice in 
Forensic Semiautomatic and Automatic Speaker Recognition (2015), 
http://enfsi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/guidelines_fasr_and_fsasr_0.pdf. The 
guidelines had not been published at the time of the Daubert hearing, but a 
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standard was a National or International Standard, and the 
practitioner’s laboratory was not accredited.207 There is no 
evidence that the practitioner actually followed any standards 
which we would consider positive indicators of the quality of his 
work. 
 
6. Is the Thing from which the Deduction is Made Sufficiently 
Established to have Gained General Acceptance in the 
Particular Field in which it Belongs? 
Frye states: “the thing from which the deduction is made must 
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs.” The Daubert ruling states that: 
“‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A 
‘reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, 
explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an 
express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within 
that community.’”208 
In their pre-hearing submission, the prosecution argued that: 
With respect to the fourth Daubert factor, “general 
acceptance,” while biometric speaker recognition is a 
relatively new forensic tool, the science has gained a 
significant level of acceptance around the world and 
BATVOX is the “de facto standard” for forensic biometric 
voice recognition, utilized by numerous law enforcement 
agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation.209 
They also provided a list of 55 organizations around the world 
who own a copy of Batvox, including law enforcement agencies 
and private laboratories.210 Even if the prosecution’s contention 
                                            
near-final draft was available. There is no evidence that the practitioner actually 
followed these guidelines. 
207.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 205, 240, supra note 171. 
208.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
209.  Pre-hearing Submission at 16, supra note 194. Note that the FBI has a 
policy of not providing forensic voice comparison testimony in court. 
210.  When questioned, the forensic practitioner said that “almost all major 
forensic governmental forensic agencies in European countries have this 
software.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, supra note 171. In the 
INTERPOL survey, of 26 respondents who reported using a named automatic 
system, Batvox was the most used system, used by 12 respondents. INTERPOL 
survey, supra note 51. We would caution, however, that commercial success 
should not be taken as an indicator of scientific validity. 
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regarding Batvox being the de facto standard were true, it would 
be irrelevant since the forensic practitioner’s analysis and 
conclusions were not directly or primarily based on the output of 
Batvox. 
During direct, we find the following exchange: 
Q  Is there a consensus in the scientific community about 
the best way to conduct a phonetic speaker comparison? 
A  Yes. 
Q  What is that consensus? 
A  It is to do it basically in the same way as expressed in 
the report, to go through those different areas and define 
first the known, the known samples, to create a kind of 
linguistics model, phonetic model of the speaker before 
you compare those features of similarities that you find, and 
you find similarities and you find differences. Take all those 
into account and compare that to defined reference 
population for the speech involved in the case. 
Q  So just to clarify, there’s a consensus in the community 
that the three methods that you used in this case is the best 
way to conduct a forensic voice comparison? 
A211  Yeah, there are some people that will only do 
automatic and there are some people still that only will do 
phonetic analyses, but the majority, the consensus is to use 
all of the methods available.212 
The practitioner’s assertion that there is a consensus as to the 
best way to do forensic voice comparison was just that, an 
assertion, he did not back it up with evidence. As we found in 
Appendix D, it may be the case that approaches based on 
subjective judgment are generally accepted among practitioners, 
but among researchers, overwhelmingly the norm is the use of 
data, quantitative measurements, statistical models, and empirical 
testing of validity and reliability. 
 
                                            
211.  An objection was overruled before the witness answered. 
212.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, supra note 171. 
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7. Were Reasonable Steps Taken to Reduce the Potential for 
Contextual Bias? 
As we have already established, in Ahmed the forensic 
practitioner’s conclusion as to the strength of the evidence was 
based primarily and directly on subjective judgment. Whether he 
took any precautions to attempt to reduce the potential for 
contextual bias is therefore a legitimate question to ask.  
From reviewing the report and testimony it does not appear to 
us that the practitioner took any effective steps to shield himself 
from potentially biasing task-irrelevant information. 
During cross, the practitioner was asked whether he had a 
second practitioner independently perform the forensic analysis. 
He responded that he had a colleague do that to “some extent” 
and then they reached a consensus. The defense attorney did not 
press the matter, but it is unclear to us from the transcript whether 
a truly independent analysis was conducted by a second 
practitioner.213 Even if the analyses were independent and they 
reached the same conclusion, this would not necessarily reduce the 
potential for contextual bias if both examiners were exposed to the 
same potentially biasing task-irrelevant information.  
We believe that the practitioner is a man of integrity and he 
did not deliberately set out to act in a biased manner, but he 
followed a number of procedures which we consider unwise 
because they expose him to potential allegations that he was 
influenced by contextual bias. Examples include the following:  
• With one exception, what the practitioner stated as the 
strength of evidence arising from an automatic analysis was 
more favorable to the prosecution than the likelihood ratio 
value output by the automatic system itself.  
• The exception (Comparison 3) was a likelihood ratio which 
slightly favored the defense. This he discounted, however, 
because the recording conditions were poor. If a forensic 
                                            
213.  If independent analyses are conducted, these should be fully 
documented along with any differences in conclusions. Two genuinely 
independent analyses reaching the same conclusion may add greater certainty to 
that conclusion. If the analyses are not independent, i.e., the two practitioners 
discuss the analysis as they go along and reach a consensus, this may reduce the 
potential for procedural errors, but it does not provide the same sort of greater 
certainty that independent analyses do. If the first practitioner tells the second 
their conclusion, the second practitioner is subject to confirmation bias and they 
tend to agree with the first examiner to a greater extent than if they had 
conducted a truly independent analysis. See Thompson, supra note 93. 
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practitioner believes that conditions are too poor to obtain 
valid results, they should state so at the beginning (or after 
having run empirical tests of the validity and reliability of 
the system under those conditions), and they should not 
run the analysis of the actual known- and questioned-
speaker recordings. A forensic practitioner should not get 
the results of such an analysis and then try to explain them 
away.  
• The practitioner conducted one automatic analysis 
(Comparison 1), got a result, then modified the system (by 
adding an imposter set), reran the analysis, and got a result 
more favorable to the prosecution than the first result. A 
forensic practitioner should avoid acting in a way that could 
give the impression that they are cherry picking results, i.e., 
that they tested multiple systems and then selected the one 
which was most favorable to the party instructing them.214 
 
C. Conclusion with Respect to the Ahmed Testimony 
The forensic practitioner in Ahmed used a mixture of 
approaches: auditory, acoustic-phonetic, and automatic. The results 
of all of the analyses were subjective judgments. Even for the 
automatic subsystem, which calculated likelihood ratios using 
quantitative measurements and statistical models, the practitioner 
did not directly report the calculated values, but instead used them 
as inputs to making a subjective decision. The way the results from 
each analysis were combined was also a subjective judgment. In 
general the procedures were not transparent, and were not 
described in sufficient detail that they could be replicated by 
another suitably qualified practitioner. 
                                            
214.  To his credit, the practitioner was transparent about what he did in this 
instance; doing this and hiding it would obviously have been worse. 
Undoubtedly the practitioner’s reasoning for running the second analysis was a 
genuine belief that it would give better results than the first analysis (e.g., van der 
Vloed 2016, supra note 175) and was therefore a better analysis to conduct (this 
may not have occurred to him at the time he ran the first analysis or he may not 
have had imposter data available at the time he ran the first analysis). One could 
potentially always think that there might be a better system. The question of 
interest for admissibility, however, is not whether the best possible system has 
been used, the question is whether the system that has been used is sufficiently 
scientifically valid. We think it better to choose one system, test it, then use it. 
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With respect to the Daubert factors, the practitioner did not 
empirically test the validity and reliability of his system under 
conditions reflecting those of the case under investigation. There is 
no evidence that he followed any standards which we would 
consider indicators of trustworthiness. Although there were some 
peer-reviewed publications supporting some aspects of his 
approach, their relevance for assessing the trustworthiness of his 
overall conclusions was limited. Whether his approach could be 
considered generally accepted in the relevant scientific community 
is unclear. Indeed, whether any particular approach is generally 
accepted at this time is unclear. While his approach may be in line 
with common practice among practitioners, it is not in line with 
current practice in the scientific research community. Clearly, we 
believe that the testimony did not satisfy the Daubert criteria and 
should not have been admitted. 
Shortly after the hearing, the prosecution offered what the 
defense viewed as a favorable plea bargain and the case was 
resolved with a negotiated plea, rendering the admissibility issue 
moot. Although some might interpret this development as 
evidence that the prosecution feared losing the Daubert hearing 
and the case, there is no way to know how the court would have 
ruled. It remains to be seen how courts will view forensic voice 
comparison evidence when it is offered in future cases. 
 
VIII. MEETING THE DAUBERT STANDARD: WHAT WOULD A 
POTENTIALLY ADMISSIBLE FORENSIC VOICE COMPARISON 
ANALYSIS LOOK LIKE? 
Our critique of the testimony presented in Ahmed has been 
overwhelmingly negative. This does not, however, mean that we 
believe that forensic voice comparison testimony could never be 
found admissible under Daubert. We think that, in practice, only 
approaches based on relevant data, quantitative measurement, and 
statistical models would be able to satisfy the Daubert criteria. 
Below we outline how we believe a forensic voice comparison 
would have to be conducted in order to produce testimony which 
could potentially be found admissible under Daubert.215  
                                            
215.  For more concrete examples based on actual cases and including 
technical details, see: Ewald Enzinger, & Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, 
Mismatched Distances from Speakers to Telephone in a Forensic-Voice-
Comparison Case, 70 SPEECH COMM. 28, 28–41 (2015), 
https://entn.at/pdfs/enzinger_iafpa2014_demonstration.pdf; Ewald Enzinger, 
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1. To facilitate transparency and replicability, the forensic 
practitioner should document in their report or in bench notes 
all decisions they make and all actions they take. All parties 
should be made aware of the existence of these notes, and 
they should be provided to all parties upon request. All 
substantial decisions and actions should also be documented 
in the forensic report. On the basis of the report, bench notes, 
and a copy of the practitioner’s standard operating procedures 
and other appendices, another suitably qualified forensic 
practitioner (or researcher) should be able to critique the first 
practitioner’s decisions and actions and potentially replicate 
what the first forensic practitioner did. If anything is unclear in 
the report and appendices, the second practitioner should be 
able to find the answer in the first practitioner’s notes. The 
second forensic practitioner should not have to guess what the 
first forensic practitioner actually did. 
2. To reduce the potential for contextual bias, the practitioner 
should take steps to avoid being exposed to task-irrelevant 
information, i.e., information about the case which is not 
necessary for them to perform their forensic voice comparison 
analysis. In large laboratories, a case manager may be 
assigned to handle communication with the client and other 
parties, and only pass on to the practitioner task relevant 
information. In smaller laboratories the practitioner should ask 
the client up front to not provide task-irrelevant information. 
3. Based on an examination of the questioned-speaker recording, 
and relevant information provided by the client and other 
parties as may be appropriate given the circumstances of the 
case, the practitioner should formulate the details of the same-
speaker hypothesis and the different-speaker hypotheses that 
they plan to assess. The different-speaker hypothesis must 
include the definition of the relevant population. Before 
                                            
Geoffrey Stewart Morrison & Felipe E. Ochoa, A Demonstration of the 
Application of the New Paradigm for the Evaluation of Forensic Evidence 
Under Conditions Reflecting Those of a Real Forensic-Voice-Comparison Case, 
56 SCI. & JUST. 42, 42–57 (2016), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26746825; Enzinger 2016, supra note 37, 
at ch. 5; Cuiling Zhang, Geoffrey Stewart Morrison & Ewald Enzinger, Use of 
Relevant Data, Quantitative Measurements, and Statistical Models to Calculate a 
Likelihood Ratio for a Chinese Forensic Voice Comparison Case Involving Two 
Sisters, FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, (2016),  
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1828269788/fulltextPDF/25D7B738A545429B
PQ/1?accountid=10226. 
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proceeding, the suitability of these hypotheses should be 
confirmed with the client and other parties as may be 
appropriate given the circumstances of the case. The 
hypotheses, including the relevant population, should be 
clearly described in the report. 
4. Based on an examination of the known- and questioned-
speaker recordings, and relevant information provided by the 
client and other parties as may be appropriate given the 
circumstances of the case, the practitioner should describe 
what they understand to be the speaking styles and recording 
conditions of the known-speaker recording and the 
questioned-speaker recording. All reasonable enquiries should 
be made to obtain technical details about recording systems, 
etc. These conditions should be clearly described in the 
report. 
5. If the practitioner believes that a priori the conditions of the 
recordings are so poor that the performance of their forensic 
voice comparison system will be so poor that it is unlikely to 
be of value to the court, they should inform the client of this 
before proceeding. The client may still request that the 
practitioner proceed, but this will be an informed decision. If 
the client decides not to have the practitioner proceed with a 
particular comparison, this should be documented in the 
report, and no further analyses should be conducted on the 
relevant recordings. 
6. The known- and questioned-speaker recordings should be 
prepared by selecting only portions of the recordings which 
actually contain speech of the speaker of interest. Interlocutor 
speech, transient noises, and stretches of silence or 
background noise should be excluded from the analysis. (This 
will reveal one aspect of the recording conditions, the net 
durations of the known-speaker and the questioned-speaker 
speech.) 
7. The practitioner should obtain a sample of voice recordings 
representative of the relevant population and reflecting the 
speaking styles and recording conditions of the known-speaker 
recording and the questioned-speaker recording. The sample 
may come from an existing database, or new data may need 
to be collected. The practitioner must be satisfied that the 
sample recordings are sufficiently representative and reflective 
of the relevant population, speaking styles, and recording 
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conditions. The report must explain how the forensic 
practitioner sampled the speakers, and how they replicated or 
simulated the conditions. Sufficient detail must be provided so 
that the judge at an admissibility hearing has a basis on which 
to consider whether the recordings are sufficiently 
representative and reflective. We would expect the opposing 
parties to seek expert advice in this topic, and debate the 
merits before the judge during an admissibility hearing (if the 
testimony is admitted, this topic may also be argued before the 
trier-of-fact in relation to weight). 
8. The relevant population sample recordings should be 
prepared in the same manner as the known- and questioned-
speaker recordings. 
9. The practitioner should split their data into at least two 
separate parts: a training set and a test set. Statistical models 
should not be trained and tested on the same data.216 
10. To reduce the potential for contextual bias, the practitioner 
should use a system based on relevant data, quantitative 
measurements (e.g., measurements of acoustic properties of 
the voice recordings), and statistical models. The output of the 
statistical model should be directly reported, it should not be 
used as input to a subsequent subjective judgment process.  
11. The system should be trained and optimized using the training 
data, which reflect the relevant population, speaking styles, 
and recording conditions of the case. Ideally, a second 
forensic practitioner should check the first forensic 
practitioner’s work at this stage in search of any potential 
mistakes. Once the forensic practitioner is satisfied with the 
training and optimization of the system, the system should be 
frozen, i.e., no subsequent changes to the system will be 
allowed.217 
                                            
216.  As an alternative to two completely separate sets of data, a procedure 
known as cross-validation can be used to ensure that the same data are not used 
for training and testing. Statistical models perform better on the same data that 
was used to train them versus on new data. It is performance on new data that 
matters, the actual known- and questioned-speaker recordings will be new data. 
Training and testing on the same data would give an overly optimistic 
assessment of the expected performance on the system on the actual known- and 
questioned-speaker recordings. 
217.  The only exception will be if a genuine mistake is discovered at a later 
stage. Any such change must be fully documented in the report. 
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12. The practitioner should then use the test data to empirically 
assess the performance of their system. The system as a whole 
should be tested, including any components depending on the 
particular human operator. The system which is tested should 
be the same system which will actually be used to compare the 
known- and questioned-speaker recordings. The results of the 
tests should be documented in the report, and an explanation 
of how to interpret any numeric or graphical results should be 
provided in the report or in an appendix. Sufficient detail 
should be provided to assist the judge at an admissibility 
hearing to decide if system performance is sufficient to warrant 
admission of the testimony (if the testimony is admitted, this 
question may also be argued before the trier-of-fact in relation 
to weight). Ideally, a second forensic practitioner should check 
the first forensic practitioner’s work at this stage in search of 
any potential mistakes. Once the tests have been conducted, 
they should not be repeated in search of better results. The 
system should not be altered and then retested on the same 
data set.218  
13. The last step in the analysis should be to actually compare the 
known- and questioned-speaker recordings. The numeric 
likelihood ratio generated by the system should be reported as 
the strength of evidence statement. The report, or an 
appendix, should include an explanation of the likelihood 
ratio framework so that the judge at an admissibility hearing 
and the trier-of-fact at trial can understand how to 
appropriately interpret the result. Once the likelihood ratio for 
the comparison of the known- and questioned-speaker 
recordings has been obtained, the system should not be 
altered or retested, and the likelihood ratio should not be 
recalculated in search of a better answer.219 
Such procedures would, we believe, be potentially admissible 
under Daubert because they are logically correct, robust to 
cognitive bias, transparent and replicable, and include 
                                            
218.  Altering the system and retesting on the same data leads to 
optimization on the test data and the results will be overly optimistic with respect 
to performance on new data, i.e., the actual known- and questioned-speaker 
recordings. Optimization should be performed on training data, not on test data. 
Training data may be split into an initial training set and an optimization set, or 
cross-validation may be used. 
219.  Again, the only exception will be if a genuine mistake is discovered at 
a later stage. Any such change must be fully documented in the report. 
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demonstration of degree of validity and reliability under conditions 
reflecting those of the case under investigation. If the judge at an 
admissibility hearing is satisfied (1) that the test data are sufficiently 
representative of the relevant population and sufficiently reflective 
of the speaking styles and recording conditions of the known-
speaker recording and the questioned-speaker recording, and (2) 
that the empirically demonstrated degree of validity and reliability 
of the system under these conditions is adequate, then the system 
will have passed what we consider to be the most important 
Daubert criterion, i.e., “whether the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and . . . whether that 
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in 
issue,” including “whether it can be (and has been) [empirically] 
tested,” and “in the case of a particular scientific technique . . . 
consider[ation of] the known . . . rate of error.”220 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
We have argued that the most important Daubert criterion for 
deciding the admissibility of an implementation of any approach to 
forensic voice comparison (be it auditory, acoustic-phonetic non-
statistical, acoustic-phonetic statistical, or automatic) is whether it 
has been empirically tested under conditions reflecting those of the 
particular case under investigation, and found to be sufficiently 
valid and reliable. We see this as the direct primary indicator of 
scientific validity, and the other Daubert criteria as secondary 
proxy indicators. If the judge accepts that the test data are 
sufficiently representative of the relevant population and 
sufficiently reflective of the conditions of the case under 
investigation, they can then consider whether the empirically 
demonstrated performance of the system under those conditions is 
sufficient to warrant admission. We have also argued that, because 
of the substantial case-to-case variability in relevant population, 
speaking styles, and recording conditions, system performance will 
need to be empirically assessed on a case by case basis, and 
admissibility will need to be considered on a case by case basis. 
Although we have concentrated on admissibility under FRE 
702 and Daubert, and to a lesser extent Frye, our arguments are 
founded on what we consider to be good scientific practice, and, 
from a scientific perspective, these should be relevant irrespective 
of the legal standard for admissibility. 
                                            
220.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–3 (1993). 
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Although our focus has been on the admissibility of forensic 
voice comparison testimony, we believe that it would be logically 
consistent to apply the same criteria in considering the admissibility 
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XI. APPENDIX A: COMBING A PRIOR PROBABILITY AND A 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TO CALCULATE A POSTERIOR PROBABILITY 
(BAYES’ THEOREM) 
To explain how a prior probability and a likelihood ratio are 
combined to arrive at a posterior probability we introduce a 
mathematical formula, which is called the odds form of Bayes’ 
Theorem, and then explain what it means embedded in a concrete 
example. 
Odds form of Bayes’ Theorem: prior	odds	×	likelihood	ratio	 = 	posterior	odds|	 	𝑝 𝐻3𝑝 𝐻4 ×𝑝 𝐸 𝐻3𝑝 𝐸 𝐻4 = 𝑝 𝐻3 𝐸𝑝 𝐻4 𝐸|11000×4 = 1250
 
 
Imagine that a crime has been committed on an island, and the 
population of the island is about 1000. A suspect is arrested before 
anyone has had the opportunity to leave the island. The suspect is 
put on trial.  
The prosecution contends that the defendant is guilty, i.e., the 
prosecution hypothesis, 𝐻3, is that the offender is the defendant. 
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Before any other information is presented, what is the probability 
that the offender is the defendant? We could, perhaps, interpret 
the legal doctrine of innocent until proven guilty as meaning that at 
the beginning of the trial the trier-of-fact should assume that the 
defendant is no more or less likely to be guilty than any other 
person selected at random from the population. Since there are 
about 1000 people on the island, this would convert to a 
probability of guilt of about 1 in 1000, which we can write as 
1/1000. The prior probability that the offender is the defendant, 𝑝 𝐻3 , we therefore set at 1/1000.221  
The defense contends that the defendant is not guilty, i.e., the 
defense hypothesis, 𝐻4, is that the offender is not the defendant 
but someone else from the population. The two hypotheses are 
exhaustive (there are no other options other than the offender is 
the defendant or the offender is someone else on the island), and 
they are mutually exclusive: if 𝐻3 is true then 𝐻4 is false and vice 
versa, they cannot both be true or both be false. Under these 
conditions, the total probability, the sum of the two prior 
probabilities, must be 1 (100%), i.e., 𝑝 𝐻3 + 𝑝 𝐻4 = 1, therefore 𝑝 𝐻4 = 1 − ==>>> = ???=>>>. The first term in the odds form of 
Bayes’ Theorem is the prior probability of the prosecution 
hypothesis divided by the prior probability of the defense 
                                            
221.  Our example of one divided by the size of the population is easy to 
understand, but overly simplistic. Perhaps some portion of the population are 
children who could not have committed the crime, perhaps people who live or 
work near the scene of the crime are more likely to have committed it than 
people who live in a remote part of the island. The prior probability is whatever 
the trier-of-fact believes it to be. Factors such as the size of the population of 
people who could potentially have committed the crime will affect that belief, 
but in general how the trier-of-fact forms that belief is not dictated by any 
prescribed formula. The trier-of-fact should not, however, use the fact that the 
defendant is on trial to form their prior probability belief. That the defendant is 
on trial is the end point of a consideration of evidence and a reasoning process 
conducted by the police and the prosecutor. The prosecutor must believe that 
the defendant is guilty, otherwise it would be unethical of them to proceed with 
the prosecution. The prosecutor must present to the trier-of-fact the evidence 
and the reasoning that led the prosecutor to that conclusion (or a version of that 
reasoning and a subset of the evidence according to the constraints of what they 
are practically able and legally allowed to present). The trier-of-fact must 
therefore form an initial prior probability which corresponds to the start of that 
reasoning process, not to its end. See Bell v. Wolfish: “The presumption of 
innocence . . . may serve as an admonishment to the jury to judge an accused’s 
guilt or innocence solely on the evidence adduced at trial, and not on the basis 
of suspicions that may arise from the fact of his arrest, indictment, or custody, or 
from other matters not introduced as proof at trial.” 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). 
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hypothesis: 
3 @A3 @B = = =>>>??? =>>> = =??? ≈ ==>>>.222 This is called the 
prior odds.223 What do the prior odds mean? In this example, they 
mean that before any (additional) evidence has been presented, 
the trier-of-fact believes that the defense hypothesis is about 1000 
times more likely to be true than the prosecution hypothesis. 
Returning to our previous example involving hair color, all the 
eyewitnesses agree that the offender had blond hair, and it also 
turns out that the defendant has blond hair. Using the same 
simplifications as before, the probability that the offender would 
have blond hair if they were the defendant224 is 1 (100%), i.e., 𝑝 𝐸 𝐻3 = 1. E is the evidence (E = the offender has blond hair), 𝐻3 is the prosecution hypothesis, and 𝑝 𝐸 𝐻3  is the probability of 
the evidence if the prosecution hypothesis were true.  
A forensic practitioner obtains a random sample of 100 people 
on the island. 25 of them have blond hair, so the practitioner 
estimates that the probability that the offender would have blond 
hair if they were not the defendant but someone selected at 
random from the population of the island is about 25/100 = 1/4, 
i.e., 𝑝 𝐸 𝐻4 = 1/4. E is the evidence (E = the offender has blond 
hair), 𝐻4 is the defense hypothesis, and 𝑝 𝐸 𝐻4  is the probability 
of the evidence if the defense hypothesis were true.  
                                            
222.  The symbol ≈ means “approximately equal to.” 1/999 is 
approximately 1/1000. We originally said that the population of the island was 
about 1000, so it does not make sense to use a value as exact as 1/999.  
223.  Odds are common in gambling where they are expressed in words 
such as ten to one on, or ten to one against. Odds are ratios, and can be 
expressed using a colon or a fraction, e.g., 10:1 = EFE , or 1:10 = EEF. Statisticians use 
coherent odds, such that when converted to probabilities the total probability for 
all the options adds up to one. Bookies use incoherent odds, such that when 
converted to probabilities the total probability for all the options adds up to less 
than one. In the long term, the bookie gets to keep the proportion by which the 
sum of the probabilities is less than one. 
224.  Note that we have reformulated the hypotheses here, to the offender is 
the defendant versus they are not the defendant, rather than guilty versus not 
guilty. In fact, we should reformulate this even further to be the person observed 
by the witnesses is the defendant versus they are not the defendant. In general, 
the likelihood ratio generated by the forensic scientist will not (and should not) 
directly address the issue of guilt. In the present example, the defense could 
argue that the defendant was at the crime scene at the time of the crime, but 
they were not the one who committed the crime. In that case, the likelihood 
ratio we are calculating in the present example in relation to hair color would be 
irrelevant, and would not assist the trier-of-fact to reach a decision on the 
question of guilt. 
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The forensic practitioner therefore calculates that the likelihood 
ratio is 
3 𝐸 𝐻33 𝐸 𝐻4 = == G = 4. The probability that the offender would 
have blond hair if they were the defendant is about 4 times greater 
than if they were someone selected at random from the population 
of the island. 
If the trier-of-fact were to follow the normative logic of Bayes’ 
Theorem, they would multiply their prior odds 
3 @A3 @B = ==>>>  by 
the likelihood ratio 
3 𝐸 𝐻33 𝐸 𝐻4 = 4  to arrive at posterior odds 3 𝐻3 𝐸3 𝐻4 𝐸  of ==>>> ×4 = G=>>> = =HI>.  
The posterior odds are the relative probabilities of the 
prosecution hypothesis being true versus the defense hypothesis 
being true after having considered the strength of the evidence. In 
this example, after having heard the hair-color testimony the trier-
of-fact believes that the defense hypothesis is about 250 times more 
likely to be true than the prosecution hypothesis.225 
If another piece of testimony, e.g., testimony based on forensic 
voice comparison evidence, is subsequently presented, the trier-of-
fact’s posterior odds after hearing the hair-color testimony become 
their prior odds before hearing the forensic voice comparison 
testimony.226 If all the testimony combined leads to high enough 
posterior odds, then the trier-of-fact may decide that the case has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.227  
Even if they are not aware of it, if a forensic practitioner 
presents a posterior probability, such as a 95% probability that the 
voice on the questioned-speaker recording was produced by the 
known speaker, they must have at least implicitly used a prior 
probability. But unless the trier-of-fact tells the forensic practitioner 
what prior probability to use, the forensic scientist cannot calculate 
the appropriate posterior probability. If a forensic practitioner were 
to present a posterior probability, the only logically correct way for 
                                            
225.  We could do some additional mathematics to calculate the posterior 
probability of the prosecution hypothesis, 𝑝 𝐻3 𝐸 , but it is actually easier to 
think in terms of odds. 
226.  The different evidence could be presented in any order, e.g., forensic 
voice comparison testimony could be first and hair color second. 
Mathematically, the initial prior odds and multiple likelihood ratios will produce 
the same result irrespective of the order in which they are multiplied together. 
227.  Of course, in a real case it is unlikely that all the evidence presented 
will be forensic evidence with numerically quantified strength of evidence, and it 
may be that the trier-of-fact does not use normative Bayesian reasoning. 
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the trier-of-fact to use it would be for them to find out what 
(explicit or implicit) prior odds the forensic practitioner used, 
divide the forensic practitioner’s posterior odds by the forensic 
practitioner’s prior odds to calculate the likelihood ratio, then 
multiply the trier-of-fact’s prior odds with the likelihood ratio. 
Having explained how posterior odds are calculated by 
combining prior odds and likelihood ratios, we are now in a 
position to explain a common logical fallacy. In general the fallacy 
is known as the transposition of the conditions, and in the context 
of evaluation of forensic evidence it is also called the prosecutor’s 
fallacy. The prosecutor’s fallacy consists of interpreting the value of 
the likelihood ratio as if it were the value of the posterior odds. 
This would only be appropriate if the prior odds were equal to 
one. In the example we gave above, the likelihood ratio was 4, but 
the posterior odds were 1/250. If we treated both as if they were 
posterior odds and converted them to posterior probabilities, the 
respective probability values would be 80% and approximately 
0.4% respectively.228 We see that in this example interpreting the 
likelihood ratio as if it were the posterior odds vastly overstates the 
strength of the evidence. In general, if the prior odds are less than 
one, then committing the prosecutor’s fallacy gives a result which is 
more favorable to the prosecution than the actual strength of 
evidence provided by the forensic practitioner; it is for this reason 
that it is called the prosecutor’s fallacy. The name is not meant to 
imply that the fallacy is deliberately committed or that it is only 
committed by prosecutors. The fallacy is pervasive and is often 
unintentionally committed by prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
judges, jury members, translators and interpreters, journalists, and 
forensic practitioners.229 
                                            
228.  For the mathematically inclined, the formula to convert from posterior 
odds to posterior probability (or prior odds to prior probability) is: 𝑝 𝐻 =𝑜 𝐻 1 + 𝑜 𝐻 . Where 𝑜 𝐻 = 𝑝 𝐻 𝑝 𝐻  are coherent odds. 𝐻 means 
“not 𝐻”, hence 𝑝 𝐻 = 1 − 𝑝 𝐻 .  
229.  For further discussion of the prosecutor’s fallacy, and ways to avoid it, 
see: William C. Thompson & E.L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical 
Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defence 
Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 167, 167–87 (1987) 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1393631.pdf; Morrison 2010, supra note 1, at 
§99.380; Morrison et al. 2017, supra note 12, at §99.380; Robertson & Vignaux 
1995, supra note 39, at 91–93; Robertson et al. 2016, supra note 39, at 129–33; 
Balding 2005, supra note 39, at 146–47; Balding & Steele 2015, supra note 39, at 
167–68; Buckleton, 2005, supra note 39, at 50–52; Hicks et al., 2015, supra note 
39, at 66–69; Jonathan J. Koehler, Forensic Fallacies and a Famous Judge, 54 
JURIMETRICS 211, 211–19 (2014). 
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XII. APPENDIX B: TESTING THE VALIDITY OF A FORENSIC VOICE 
COMPARISON SYSTEM 
A general protocol for testing the validity of a forensic voice 
comparison system is as follows: A pair of voice recordings is 
presented to the system, one recording with conditions reflecting 
those of the known-speaker recording and the other with 
conditions reflecting those of the questioned-speaker recording. 
The tester knows whether this pair of recordings is a same-speaker 
pair or a different-speaker pair, but the system being tested must 
not be told which of these is true. The system analyzes the two 
recordings and outputs a strength of evidence statement. If 
operating within the likelihood ratio framework, this output would 
be presented as a likelihood ratio. In another framework the 
system could, for example, output “same-speaker” or “different-
speaker.” Whatever the output of the system, the tester compares 
this output with their knowledge as to whether the input was a 
same-speaker pair or a different-speaker pair, and assigns a 
goodness score (or a badness score) to the result. For example, if 
the input is “same-speaker” and the output is “same-speaker” this is 
good, but if the input is “same-speaker” and the output is 
“different-speaker” this is bad. A standard procedure is to assign a 
cost (a badness score) to each answer, e.g., if the output is correct 
the cost assigned is 0, but if the output is incorrect the cost assigned 
is 1 (see Table 1 for a list of correct and incorrect combinations in 
this framework). 
 
Table 1. List of input and output possibilities and corresponding 
correctness for a system which outputs either “same-speaker” or 
“different-speaker.” (This is not consistent with the likelihood ratio 
framework.) 
  output 









    correct     incorrect 
different
-speaker 
    incorrect     correct 
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Within the likelihood ratio framework, the answer is not “same-
speaker” versus “different-speaker,” but a gradient value such that 
the larger the likelihood ratio value the greater the support for the 
same-speaker hypothesis over the different-speaker hypothesis, and 
the smaller the likelihood ratio value the greater the support for the 
different-speaker hypothesis over the same-speaker hypothesis. 
Within this framework, when the input is a different-speaker pair, 
the larger the likelihood ratio value the higher the cost assigned, 
and the smaller the likelihood ratio value the lower the cost 
assigned. Also, when the input is a same-speaker pair, the smaller 
the likelihood ratio value the higher the cost assigned, and the 
higher the likelihood ratio value the lower the cost assigned. The 
tester presents a large number of same-speaker test pairs and a 
large number of different-speaker test pairs,230 calculates the cost 
for each pair, then averages over all the cost values. The smaller 
the average cost value the better the validity of the forensic voice 
comparison system.231 
 
XIII. APPENDIX C: TESTING THE RELIABILITY OF A FORENSIC 
VOICE COMPARISON SYSTEM 
Several factors can affect the reliability (precision) of a forensic 
voice comparison system, including intrinsic variability at the 
source, sampling variability, and measurement variability. For 
example, using one recording of the known speaker rather than 
                                            
230.  Ultimately the size of the test set will have to be large enough to satisfy 
the judge at an admissibility hearing and/or the trier-of-fact at trial. As discussed 
earlier with respect to the size of samples for estimating probabilities, the larger 
the set of test data the better the estimate of the performance of the system, but 
the higher the financial cost. Irrespective of financial cost, we would expect the 
total number of same-speaker test pairs to need to be at least in the tens and 
total number of different-speaker test pairs to need to be at least in the hundreds 
for the judge / trier-of-fact to be satisfied. 
231.  More comprehensive introductions to measuring validity are presented 
in Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, Measuring the Validity and Reliability of Forensic 
Likelihood-Ratio Systems, 51 SCI. & JUST. 91, 91–98 (2011) http://forensic-
evaluation.net/documents/Morrison%20-
%20Measuring%20the%20validity%20and%20reliability%20of%20forensic%20analysis
%20systems%20-%20slides.pdf (hereinafter Morrison 2011); and Didier Meuwly, 
Daniel Ramos and Rudolf Haraksim, A Guideline for the Validation of 
Likelihood Ratio Methods Used for Forensic Evidence Evaluation in  FORENSIC 
SCI. INT’L (2016), http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0379073816301359/1-s2.0-
S0379073816301359-main.pdf?_tid=418397b4-0042-11e7-a86d-
00000aacb35e&acdnat=1488567202_08e5a8595b8e1eece5c01c4199e0723d (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
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another, or using one sample of the relevant population rather than 
another, or re-measuring the same recordings again can result in a 
different value for a calculated likelihood ratio. In general, the 
smaller the size of the sample used to train a statistical model, the 
poorer the reliability of the model.232  
There are several solutions proposed for dealing with 
imprecision in forensic likelihood ratios:  
One proposal is not to report a specific number, but rather to 
report that the likelihood ratio lies within a range, e.g., between 10 
and 100, or between 100 and 1000, and to give verbal expressions 
to each range, e.g., “moderate support for one hypothesis over the 
other,” “moderately strong support for one hypothesis over the 
other.” Some practitioners whose strength of evidence statements 
are based on subjective judgments proceed directly to picking one 
of the verbal expressions in a predefined scale and never calculate 
a numeric likelihood ratio value.  
Another proposal is to use additional test data to numerically 
estimate and report the degree of precision of the system. Some 
protocols for doing this are similar to the protocol described above 
for testing validity, but somewhat more complex. For example: Use 
multiple known-speaker-condition recordings of each test speaker. 
Compare each known-speaker-condition recording of a given 
speaker with a questioned-speaker-condition recording of a given 
speaker (could be a same-speaker or a different-speaker 
comparison). Look at the variability within the resulting group of 
likelihood ratio values. Repeat for other combinations of same- and 
different-pairs of test speakers, and calculate an average of the 
within-group variabilities. Results of a forensic analysis may then 
be reported as a best estimate plus a range, e.g., my best estimate 
for the strength of the evidence is a likelihood ratio of 1000 and 
based on the results of tests of the reliability of my system I am 98% 
certain that it is greater than 100 and less than 10,000. Results may 
also be reported as a best estimate and the end of the range closest 
to the neutral likelihood ratio value of 1, e.g., my best estimate for 
the strength of the evidence is a likelihood ratio of 1000 and based 
on the results of tests of the reliability of my system I am 99% 
certain that it is greater than 100.  
Other researchers and practitioners have philosophical 
objections to the whole idea of measuring the precision of 
                                            
232.  In the context of forensic voice comparison, smaller sample sizes could 
be due to having shorter known-speaker and/or questioned-speaker recordings, 
fewer recordings of the known speaker, or fewer recordings of speakers 
representative of the relevant population. 
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likelihood ratios. They report a single value, but may adopt 
statistical procedures which result in likelihood ratio values which 
are closer to the neutral value of 1 than would otherwise be the 
case.233 
 
XIV. APPENDIX D: IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THERE IS 
CURRENTLY A GENERALLY ACCEPTED APPROACH TO FORENSIC 
VOICE COMPARISON? 
With respect to the question of whether there is currently a 
generally accepted approach to forensic voice comparison, if the 
relevant scientific community were chosen to be forensic voice 
comparison practitioners, there are two relatively recent surveys of 
practitioners which can be considered. Gold & French (2011)234 
published the results of a survey of forensic voice comparison 
practitioners, including some working in private laboratories and 
universities, and some working in law-enforcement and 
government laboratories. Of 35 respondents: 
• 25 (71%) reported using an auditory-acoustic-phonetic 
approach.  
• 7 (20%) reported using a human supervised automatic 
approach.  
• 2 (6%) reported using an auditory-only approach.  
• 1 (3%) reported using an acoustic-phonetic-only approach.  
• The spectrographic approach was not mentioned.  
Turning to a more recent survey conducted by INTERPOL,235 
however, the picture changes somewhat. The number of 
respondents who reported having speaker identification capabilities 
                                            
233.  Whether forensic practitioners should or should not assess the 
precision of the output of their forensic analysis systems, and if so how, is a 
matter of debate. Interested readers may wish to consult the papers in a 2016–
2017 virtual special issue on measuring and reporting the precision of forensic 
likelihood ratios in the journal Science & Justice, and papers cited in those 
papers. Geoffrey Stewart Morrison et. al., 56 SCI. & JUST. (2016), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/13550306/vsi. 
234.  Erica Gold and J. Peter French, International Practices in Forensic 
Speaker Comparison, 18 INT’L J. SPEECH, LANGUAGE AND L. 143, 143–52 (2011) 
https://www.internationalphoneticassociation.org/icphs-
proceedings/ICPhS2011/OnlineProceedings/RegularSession/Gold/Gold.pdf 
(hereinafter Gold & French survey). 
235.  INTERPOL survey, supra note 51. 
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was 44, but many reported using more than one approach (hence 
the following values add up to more than 44 and more than 100%).  
• 25 (41%) reported using an auditory-acoustic-phonetic (non-
statistical) approach.  
• 21 (34%) reported using a spectrographic or auditory-
spectrographic approach.  
• 20 (33%) reported using a human-supervised automatic 
approach.  
• 15 (25%) reported using an auditory approach.  
• 15 (25%) reported using an acoustic-phonetic-statistical 
approach.  
• 9 (15%) reported using a fully-automatic approach.  
Differences between the results of the two surveys may in part 
be attributable to the fact that the INTERPOL survey only solicited 
responses from law-enforcement agencies.236 A particularly notable 
difference between the surveys was the great popularity of the 
spectrographic approach found by the INTERPOL survey 
compared to its complete absence in the reported results of the 
Gold & French survey. 
Since auditory-acoustic-phonetic approaches were the most 
popular in both surveys, one could conclude that this is generally 
accepted. Whereas this represented a majority (71%) in the Gold & 
French survey, in the INTERPOL survey it was only the largest 
minority (41%). In the results of the INTERPOL survey no 
approach was used by a majority, hence there seems to be a lack 
of consensus among practitioners in law-enforcement agencies, and 
no approach appears to be generally accepted, at least if general 
acceptance requires a majority. Williams237 and Smith238 held 
under Frye that general acceptance does not require a majority, 
but in that case would 33%, a substantial minority, be enough? If 
so, then the spectrographic approach would meet this criterion, but 
                                            
236.  Non law enforcement laboratories were only potentially included in 
the survey if they were contracted to work for law enforcement agencies. The 
INTERPOL survey potentially included responses related to investigative 
applications in addition to forensic applications (the latter being related to the 
preparation of reports and testimony for presentation in court). The fully-
automatic responses are likely to have been related to investigative applications.  
237.  United States v. Williams, 583 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978). 
238.  United States v. Smith, 869 F. 2d 348, 353–54 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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Angleton under Daubert found it not to be generally accepted by 
the scientific community.239 
If we group the approaches which by definition are based on 
subjective judgment (auditory, spectrographic, and acoustic-
phonetic non-statistical approaches) versus the others (although, 
rather than being directly presented, the output of acoustic-
phonetic statistical and automatic approaches can also be used as 
input to a subjective judgment process), the balance of responses is 
61 to 44 in the INTERPOL survey and 27 to 8 in the Gold & 
French survey. This could suggest that, although there may be a 
lack of consensus among practitioners as to exactly which 
approach to use, approaches in which the strength of evidence 
statement is primarily and directly based on subjective judgment 
are generally accepted. 
Choosing practitioners as the relevant “scientific” community, 
however, may be problematic. A better “scientific” community 
may be those who publish peer-reviewed research on forensic 
voice comparison. Given our previous comments on the quality of 
the peer-reviewed literature, however, this may also be a 
problematic choice. For what it is worth, in a review of forensic 
speech science literature published between mid 2010 and mid 
2013, Morrison & Enzinger (2013)240 found that in contrast to 
earlier years there had been a shift toward the vast majority of 
experiment-based publications empirically testing systems which 
used data, quantitative measurements, and statistical models to 
calculate likelihood ratios, i.e., acoustic-phonetic statistical and/or 
automatic approaches combined with the use of the likelihood 
ratio framework (we count 33 papers in this class). Papers not using 
the likelihood ratio framework were in the minority (we count 4), 
and papers only describing approaches in which the conclusion as 
to the strength of evidence was based primarily or directly on 
subjective judgment were in the distinct minority (we count 1 of 
the latter 4). General acceptance in the scientific research 
community therefore appears to be empirical testing of systems 
which use data, quantitative measurements, and statistical models 
                                            
239.  In Angleton the court considered research literature on auditory-
spectrographic approaches covering a period of over 30 years, and concluded 
that: “These articles show that neither voice spectrography nor aural 
spectrographic analysis has been generally accepted as a method of identifying 
unknown recorded speakers.” United States v. Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 2d 892, 
900 (S.D. Tex. 2003). 
240.  Geoffrey Stewart Morrison & Ewald Enzinger, Forensic Speech 
Science – Review: 2010–2013, 17 INT’L FORENSIC SCI. MANAGERS’ SYMP. 614, 
616–23, 629–35 (2013). 
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to calculate numeric likelihood ratios as strength of evidence 
statements. 
With respect to framework for evaluation of forensic evidence 
the INTERPOL survey results were: 
 
• 22 (50%) identification / exclusion / inconclusive 
• 10 (23%) numeric likelihood ratio 
• 9 (20%) verbal likelihood ratio 
• 4 (9%) verbal posterior probability 
• 3 (7%) numeric posterior probability 
• 3 (7%) UK framework 
Among law enforcement agencies who responded to the 
INTERPOL survey and indicated that they have speaker 
recognition capabilities, identification / exclusion / inconclusive was 
by far the most popular framework for expressing strength of 
evidence. The likelihood ratio framework was the second most 
popular (18 respondents, 41%, indicated that they used numeric or 
verbal likelihood ratios or both).  
The vast majority of authors who regularly publish on the topic 
of forensic inference and statistics in refereed journals agree that 
the likelihood ratio framework is the logically correct framework 
for the evaluation of forensic evidence. These authors may (and 
do) disagree on nuances, and on details of how best to implement 
the framework, but they agree that it is the logically correct 
framework. 
 
XV. APPENDIX E: SCALE OF CONCLUSIONS USED BY THE 
FORENSIC PRACTITIONER IN AHMED 
The following is the Swedish National Laboratory of Forensic 
Science nine-level scale of conclusions with additions to the verbal 
expressions made by the forensic practitioner in Ahmed. The 
additions are in italics. The equivalent likelihood ratio ranges come 
from Nordgaard et al. (2012).241 The end of each range closest to a 
likelihood ratio of 1 is included in the range, the end of the range 
                                            
241.  Anders Nordgaard, Ricky Ansell, Weine Drotz & Lars Jaeger, Scale of 
Conclusions or the Value of Evidence, 11 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 1–24 
(2012) https://academic.oup.com/lpr/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/lpr/mgr020. 
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furthest from 1 is excluded. The values 1/6 and 6 are excluded 
from the Level 0 range.  
 
Level Verbal expression Equivalent 
likelihood 
ratio range 
+4      The results of the examination 
extremely strongly support that the 
compared speech material originates from 
the same speaker. 
     The results are extremely more 
probable if the main hypothesis is true 
compared to if the alternative hypothesis is 
true. 
     Very striking and distinctive similarities 
revealed themselves during the 
comparison of recordings. Phonetically 
and acoustically the speech showed 
consistent and distinctive similarities in 
accordance with the main hypothesis. 
Even if it currently is impossible to rule out 
the possibility that there is some support 
for the alternative hypothesis (others in the 
population who share the relevant features 
from a recorded voice) I believe this 
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Level Verbal expression Equivalent 
likelihood 
ratio range 
+3      The results of the examination strongly 
support that the compared speech material 
originates from the same speaker. 
     The results are much more probable if 
the main hypothesis is true compared to if 
the alternative hypothesis is true. 
     Several distinctive similarities revealed 
themselves during the comparison of the 
recordings. Phonetically and acoustically 
the speech showed several distinctive 
similarities in accordance with the main 
hypothesis. Even if it currently is 
impossible to rule out the possibility that 
there is some support for the alternative 
hypothesis (others in the population who 
share relevant features from a recorded 
voice) I believe this possibility to be very 




+2      The results of the examination support 
that the compared speech material 
originates from the same speaker.  
     The results are more probable if the 
main hypothesis is true compared to if the 
alternative hypothesis is true. 
     Several similarities were revealed 
during the comparison of the recordings. 
Phonetically and acoustically the speech 
showed several similarities in accordance 
with the main hypothesis. Even if it 
currently is impossible to rule out the 
possibility that there is some support for 
the alternative hypothesis (others in the 
population who share relevant features 
from a recorded voice) I believe this 
possibility to be small in this case. 
 
100 – 6,000 
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Level Verbal expression Equivalent 
likelihood 
ratio range 
+1      The results of the examination support 
to some extent that the compared speech 
material originates from the same speaker.  
     The results are somewhat more 
probable if the main hypothesis is true 
compared to if the alternative hypothesis is 
true. 
     No dissimilarities were revealed during 
the comparison of the recordings. 
Phonetically and acoustically the speech 
showed similarities in accordance with the 
main hypothesis. On the account that only 
a small number of non-distinctive 
similarities were revealed, a certain 
support for the alternative hypothesis can 
not be ruled out (a number of other 
speakers with the same regional, social and 
ethnical background might share some 
relevant features). 
 
6 – 100 
0      The results of the examination support 
neither of the hypotheses that the 
compared speech originates from the same 
or different speakers. 
     The results are equally probable if the 
main hypothesis is true compared to if the 
alternative hypothesis is true. 
 
1/6 – 6 
-1      The results of the examination support 
to some extent that the compared speech 
material does not originate from the same 
speaker. 
     The results are somewhat more 
probable if the alternative hypothesis is 
true compared to if the main hypothesis is 
true. 
 
1/100 – 1/6 
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Level Verbal expression Equivalent 
likelihood 
ratio range 
-2      The results of the examination support 
that the compared speech material does 
not originate from the same speaker. 
     The results are more probable if the 
alternative hypothesis is true compared to 




-3      The results of the examination strongly 
support that the compared speech material 
does not originate from the same speaker.  
     The results are much more probable if 
the alternative hypothesis is true compared 




-4      The results of the examination 
extremely strongly support that the 
compared speech material does not 
originate from the same speaker. 
     The results are extremely more 
probable if the alternative hypothesis is 






Note included on the Swedish National Laboratory of Forensic 
Science version (the version valid from 21 January 2013):  
If one of the hypotheses can be excluded other terms are used, 
such as ‘it is’, ‘it is not’ or ‘it can be excluded that’.  
Note included on the forensic practitioner’s version:  
The numbers representing the levels in the scale are only to a 
certain degree statistically based through calculation and to some 
extent a judgement of likelihood ratios. 
 
